

# Andover Newton Bulletin

## *Church Education for Today*

The first two articles in this issue present a forward looking proposal for the reformation of religious education in the Protestant churches. The Editor of the Bulletin invites comments and criticisms and evaluations of the proposal from readers. It is hoped that a number will be moved to write in extended, thoughtful fashion, setting forth their reactions to the ideas which follow. The Editor desires to use such papers as may be submitted in a future issue of the Bulletin. After reading, take your pen in hand and write down your reactions. Send your document to the Editor, in care of the School.

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# *Church Education for Today*

WESNER FALLAW

## A. A DESIGN FOR TEACHING

In our day the impression is strong that products of Protestant Sunday schools know little about the Bible and less about the meaning of Christian faith. Here is a college instructor who laments the fact that students seldom catch a literary allusion to the Bible; there is a professor of religion's survey demonstrating former Sunday school pupils' almost total lack of knowledge of Old Testament event and New Testament teaching. And everywhere there are cries of distress because religious knowledge remains elementary. Consequently, at best literary tastes are cheapened and understanding of the Christian heritage so deficient as to cause many leaders and friends of the Sunday schools to conclude that they are unequal to the teaching task of the Church. At worst, youth are deprived of saving knowledge of God in whose Church they have been misled by inept teaching.

What do church leaders, parents, and young people really expect to be accomplished within the usual type of educational program in our churches? After more than a century and a half of Sunday school work in this country, and despite all the investment of devotion, effort, time and money, are the results satisfactory to anybody?

Luther and other Reformation leaders perceived that an informed Protestantism requires ability to read and understand the Bible, hence their emphasis on education. Wesley saw great promise in the Sunday schools and supported them enthusiastically. I doubt not that a considerable proportion of those in the Reformation and Evangelical tradition are ready to agree that Protestant Christianity must always depend upon an educated and intelligent priesthood of all believers, and that evangelism and education complement each other in the upbuilding of our churches. We realize that the American scene made sectarian teaching inadvisable in publicly supported schools. Quite rightly the propagation of the several doctrines among us was delegated to the various denominations. That is past history, but a history which turned to the Sunday schools ought now to be made to take a new tack.

Visualize, if you will, a boy or a girl about to graduate from high school, expecting either to go to college or to enter immediately upon a life career. Remember that general education knows rather precisely what it ought to have achieved up to this point with this youth both as a person and a student. But does the Sunday school know what it should have accomplished with this same young person? What do you and I want him to have from Church education?

## I

First of all, we covet for every young person intelligent commitment to Christ as Lord and Savior. As a person, we desire that the eighteen-year-old shall walk humbly with his God, loving mercy and doing justly. With all his maturing adequacy — his ability to think clearly, to co-operate and contribute to the common good, resisting evil — we expect him to realize that self-sufficiency needs to yield to the all-sufficiency of the God of Christ, the Elder brother. The youth nurtured in faith, hope, and love is one who bears within himself the courage and compassion of a disciple of Jesus Christ. He is an advocate of truth who has learned that the greatest among us must be servant of all. The boy or girl nurtured in Christian virtue from childhood to the threshold of adult life, is distinguished by an integrity surpassing that of those who have not communed with the anointed of God; such a young person is *expected* to be devoted to Christ, and if he is not — if the fruits of his living show that he is not in fact experiencing God's love — then we must conclude that the fault is not the youth's alone, but also that of the kind of nurture he has had.

After allowing for the limitations of formal teaching, the acquisition of knowledge of right and wrong, and the learning of essential facts of the Christian heritage, we are still left with the need to lean heavily on the nurture process in the work of the Church. As we do so, we shall be aware that beyond the hearing of the ear and the appropriating with the mind, we desire that each learner shall know and love Him — above all others — who is the way, the truth and the life. Commitment to the living Christ is paramount if growing persons are really to know God. Education simply for the acquisition of knowledge — even knowledge about God — is not our ultimate goal. We realize that there are dangers in undue emphasis on an intellectual approach to Church education, but nurture remains the most dependable means we humans have to bring our young into a continuing relationship with the Christ who transforms them. Basic in nurture is study, learning, knowledge. And though knowledge isn't necessarily virtue, neither is there any virtue in ignorance.

We aspire, then, to provide solid knowledge, the meat and not merely the milk of the Gospel. And providing it we expect it to be assimilated.

The high school graduate, as the product also of the Church's teaching, ought to be able to read the Bible with enjoyment and profit. That this elementary goal is never reached by a good many adults as well as youths is demonstrated by the way they stumble over words and miss the meaning of the Scripture they undertake to read orally.

The product of the Church's classrooms ought to understand the



essential unity of the Bible and know the central message of its books, together with the historic conditions out of which they were written. History, poetry, drama, narrative, doctrine, and exegesis are to be differentiated and understood. Further, highlights in church history — particularly the significance of the Reformation — the rise of the major denominations, and the world mission of the Church all lie within the range of understanding and latent interest of the young person capable of graduating from a respectable high school. Moreover, as the aim of general education is effective citizenship, so the aim of Church education is participation in Christian community by each youth as worshipper and disciple.

We turn now to the problem of designing a program for Church education, one which will require radical revision of present practice and eventuate in a pastoral teaching order in local churches.

## II

Let us look at three churches and see how teaching might operate in them.

(1) *Suburban Church* with a membership of 1500 members has two ministers and employs six students from a neighboring seminary to assist in the pastoral and teaching program. The annual budget approximates \$100,000 of which about \$35,000 is allocated to salaries. The church school has an enrollment of 710, including about 200 juniors, 150 junior high and 120 senior high pupils. Most of the rest of the school are young children. The curriculum is planned by the education board under the leadership of a minister assigned to the educational program. At present the teaching is done not only by laymen and seminary students but also by both ministers, each of whom has a section of the ninth grade for a full year during which pupils are prepared for church membership. The ninth grade classes are held in place of regular church school classes and are integral to the curriculum. One minister meets his section on Sunday morning, the other on a weekday. The work is comprehensive and requires preparation and examinations, with the result that interest remains high throughout the year. Pupils and their parents appreciate the classes.

Now note that these two ministers are teachers. Their classroom standards are respected and the learning which takes place is on a par with that in the excellent public schools afforded by the high socioeconomic status of the community. Note also that one of these sections meets on a weekday, and this in a community crowded with after-school activities and home-work for children, and a multiplicity of civic, church, and personal affairs for adults. The weekday class is better attended than regular Sunday school classes, partly because families

frequently go off for weekend outings, and partly because the Sunday school — quite understandably — is considered trivial. Given a choice between the ordinary Sunday school class — taught by a layman with less than adequate training in Bible, theology, church history, and principles of education — and a class taught by a minister who knows these fields and children, what child or parent would not prefer the latter?

Presently the ministers are considering scheduling more classes during the week, and fewer on Sunday, with the hope of maintaining better attendance and improving the quality of the Church's teaching. Significantly, Suburban Church has already made a start, whether it knows it or not, in the direction in which it ought to move; that is, toward arranging weekday classes taught by the ministers for all pupils, at least those from junior age through high school.

In round numbers these 500 pupils could be assigned to five minister-teachers, one hundred to each man, who would divide them into four sections of twenty-five each and meet them once a week for a full hour. Thus each minister would spend four hours of his work week in the class room. Or the preacher and his associate might better teach only two classes each a week — the one saving his time for sermon preparation and general pastoral work, the other concentrating on supervision and administration — while ordained teachers yet to be secured would take on eight to ten hours of classroom work each.

Such a plan would be put into operation gradually, with the present two ministers teaching the high school classes and the lower grades continuing for the time-being in the Sunday school. But as soon as qualified men and women minister-teachers are found, all pupils of school age would study under them at suitable intervals during the week.

But what about dislodging lay teachers, violating the principle that the minister is to be a "teacher of teachers." (*The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry*, by H. Richard Niebuhr, p. 83.) The answer is that laymen would serve as assistants, supervising lesson-preparation, directing projects, field trips and the like, provided the hour-a-week class might reasonably be expanded. In any event some would conduct tests and read pupil essays, and the few with rare gifts might teach. There would be no less use of lay people, only less misuse of them, a cessation of the present practice of coercing reluctant and incompetent laymen into trying to teach children accustomed to highly trained and skilled professional teachers in the public schools.

And until the budget can be enlarged and women teachers secured — seminary graduates trained to teach — pre-school and primary classes would continue to use volunteer lay leadership.

Moreover, the Sunday school hour may well be retained for pre-

adolescents, with laymen directing such activities as church music, drama, missionary projects, and library preparation for week-day classes.

Money is not the main difficulty at Suburban Church. Additional funds could be found at once to add one or two minister-teachers at salaries comparable to those paid in local public and private schools. However, if tuition were charged, it is altogether likely that a community of this kind would value Church education enough to encourage children to attend classes more regularly than they have Sunday school. Both the superior merit of ministerial teaching and payment of a fee could be counted on to elicit interest. Parents who delay a family trip so that a child won't miss his weekly music lesson — a lesson already paid for — are likely to be the same parents disinclined to take the child out of town when he is due at his Church class, particularly if that too has already been paid for. And what parent — given a choice between poor religious instruction at no fee and exceptional instruction at a cost comparable to that for music lessons — wouldn't prefer the latter for his child, even at a financial sacrifice?

To be sure the church I am discussing cannot be taken either as typical or as a pattern for the rest of the country to follow. But it is one among hundreds in similar circumstances.

Let us suppose that only 300 of the 500 pupils respond to the new program. I for one think it is time for Protestants to make a firm decision as to whether it is preferable to teach fewer people better than to continue with superficial work among the swelling Sunday population. Actually, however, in the long run we are more likely to see even larger enrollments as a direct result of improved church education.

Be that as it may, 300 pupils, paying — let us say — \$60 dollars each for an academic year, would mean an additional \$18,000 for the church, enough to employ three new minister-teachers at salaries comparable to those of school teachers in this particular community. Thus the needed staff of five ministers to teach 500 prospective pupils is secured — provided, of course, competent people can be found. And no child would be deprived of attending classes because of lack of money.

A further word must be said about fees. The question of whether to charge tuition undoubtedly will cause sharp differences of opinion. Some will think Protestants would err were too many features of synagogue schools adopted, and others would feel that a principle of stewardship was being threatened by a pay-as-you-go plan. A compromise policy might well be adopted similar to Joseph Lancaster's humorous notice over the door of his first school, opened in London in 1801. The notice read: "All who will may send their children and have them educated freely, and those who do not wish to have education for nothing may pay for it if they please." (*England Before and After Wesley*, by J. Wesley Bready, p. 355.)



(2) We turn now to *City Church*, with a membership of around a thousand — about half of whom are active — and a Sunday school of about 150 children and adolescents. There are three ministers, one designated Minister of Christian Education. Between eight and nine hundred people attend worship on a Sunday morning, the majority of whom are transients and other non-members attracted only by able preaching and an impressive worship service. Of the members, the greater number do not live in the neighborhood but commute from the suburbs, in part because their forebears lived in the city and were members of this church. The annual budget of \$150,000 is made possible by income on endowment, a sizable portion of which is allocated to salaries for the ministerial and lay staff, for the church operates on the conviction that a declining constituency calls for heavy expenditure for program. Therefore, Sunday school and released-time teachers, youth workers, and various activity leaders are paid for their services. Both ministers and laymen are much concerned to provide first-rate education and pupil enrollment has increased in recent years.

One of the ministers teaches the eighth grade for a few months each year, preparing pupils for church membership. During this time the regular Sunday school work for this age-level is dispensed with. Another minister teaches an adult class. Both classes are small and both are held on Sunday mornings. In addition, there is a college-age class taught by a seminary student who also directs a large Sunday evening fellowship for this age-group.

Here, too, is a church that has made a beginning toward effective education. It offers not the usual third-rate Sunday school program but it has come to rest on a plateau of a second-rate Sunday school because most of its teachers are either college students — in training to become public school teachers — or seminary students thinking only of a generalized ministry in the future. The former don't know the Bible and theology; the latter are not even teachers-in-training. So it is that we have another example — among the thousands over the country — of Protestantism's educational short-sightedness. This church's educational program is deficient in comparison with the work done in a good public or private school. And it could provide first-rate education, simply by realigning duties of the present ministerial staff and giving proper place to teaching.

In this and similar churches minister-teachers — theologically, biblically, and educationally competent — ought to move at once toward fulfilling the demands of Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Knox and other Reformation leaders that Protestantism teach effectively. In his Yale lectures, delivered in 1888, H. Clay Turnbull observed that the reformers "were alive to the importance of the revival of the primitive church-school idea," and added that "Luther went so far as to say that a clergy-



man was not fitted to be a preacher unless he had first been a teacher." According to Turnbull — then the editor of "The Sunday School Times" — the churches must teach if the "divinely commanded" task is to be carried out, must teach if "the best fruits of the Reformation (are to be) preserved and transmitted." And by teaching he meant "interlocutory teaching" — a method of conversation and dialogue. (*The Sunday-School; Its Origins, Mission, Methods, and Auxiliaries*, p. 68).

Any city church that wonders how it is to be more than a preaching station, and wonders how long it can survive and draw unchurched children off city streets in order to bring them up in Christian faith, may well reappraise its educational offering. That it will build up a teaching order of ministers equal to the best work of the rabbi in the synagogue and the priest on the Roman system, goes without saying. But the local church cannot do this alone, for the seminaries, in conjunction with university departments of education, will first have to produce minister-teachers.

(3) Now let us look at a single-minister town church. *Small Town Church* is faced with manifold housing, lay-leadership, and financial needs. The pastor very wisely — in my opinion — conceives of his role as educator "as the most valid expression of the ministry," to use Professor Samuel Blizzard's expression. This pastor thinks as does the one in twenty-five in Blizzard's study of 1,111 college and seminary trained men. He considers education "the major program of the church," whose "goal is that faith be communicated appropriately and comprehensively at every age level." He, like the few in the study, understands "the basic philosophy of education . . . the needs and abilities of children and young people, and possesses certain skills associated with an education program." (*Religious Education*, July-August, 1958, p. 378.)

Let me make it clear that this minister — so described and found by Blizzard in 22 denominations — lives in the flesh in the small town church of which I am thinking. After three years of conducting leadership education, during which he has raised the standards of his Sunday school, there is no longer a problem of recruiting and training enough fairly capable teachers and officers to care for the 165 pupils and the 21 classes. Nevertheless, as an educator, he considers the work of his school inferior to that of the public school and — in his words — "would like . . . very much" to teach the youth himself. Before undertaking to schedule weekday classes, he feels the need for backing from a council of churches in order to secure a released-time plan. The fact that there is no junior or senior high school in the town bears on this problem, for the young people spend considerable time commuting to public schools in an adjoining community.

A realistic view of this and similar situations might make minister-taught weekday classes conditional upon a released-time plan, but it is

better for a church to avoid asking for either released- or dismissed-time. A working balance between the claims of school and church on the child's time need not curtail the *academic* program of the public schools. Rather, the balance we seek would seem to be one resulting from elimination of certain extracurricular affairs, keeping specified after-school hours clear for the churches. And in this particular case, we have a minister whose interest and teaching ability give promise of attracting and holding youth to his classes on their own time. I must confess that I find distasteful the idea of using the public school's position to direct pupils into church classes. Nor can I reconcile the principle of church and state separation with any church's wish to borrow hours from school instruction. Granted that a sizable proportion of adolescents are in the public school only because they are required by law to be there, granted further that voluntary after-school church classes — even with the best minister-teacher on the job — will not initially draw as many pupils as the Sunday school, there is merit in superior teaching of the few instead of inferior teaching of the many. And in the long run, I anticipate that ministers' classes will not only provide more productive Christian nurture but will also enroll greater numbers of pupils. Obviously much depends on the minister, as a person and as a teacher. But the true pastoral temperament, combined with the gift of teaching, is exactly what is needed to accomplish the educational mission of the church.

In a small church the pastor is in an enviable position to know and guide his people in Christian growth. And fortunate is the congregation whose children and parents have the benefit of their pastor's formal and informal week-by-week teaching.

### III

The churches just discussed cannot be taken as representative of all of American Protestantism with its multiplicity of types and governing conditions, nor can there be any abrupt shift from the Sunday school to a ministerial teaching order. Even were there enough pastors qualified and desirous of teaching, enough money to enlarge ministerial staffs, and sufficient interest among the laity to warrant a decisive move toward Church education, there would still be the Sunday school tradition to reckon with: the rooted custom of lay-teaching and lay-control of an organization which in some cases tends to rival rather than function as the Church. The human disposition to grasp the familiar with renewed firmness the moment the new poses a threat must not be underestimated. I am under no illusion that it would be easy to enlarge the popular image of the minister as preacher and pastor, or displace the image of the hatted-woman and big brother type of layman as teacher and officer of the Sunday school.

Nevertheless, many churches can begin to make the transition to a genuine school of the church with minister-teachers assisted by laymen and class hours scheduled on weekdays.

Let us picture the qualified teacher and the class setting. Like the teacher described by Dean Zeran of Oregon State College ("School and Society," November 8, 1958, p. 298), the competent minister-teacher "knows his subject field, the laws of learning, and then applies them to the teaching process." He "can motivate the student to accept the goal as his own." I would add that the minister-teacher knows his pupils and their families and is their pastor, a chief servant whose life and relationship with his people moves them Godward.

As for his pupils, they come to class expecting to work, to learn. Incidentally, they wear school clothes which are more conducive to work than fancy dresses and creased trousers worn to Sunday school. The room itself is distinctly a classroom, larger and better equipped than the usual Sunday school room not only because this is what is needed but also because it is within the means of almost any church that abandons the policy of trying to house all pupils during a single hour. Instead of many unsuitable rooms there are a few good ones — used repeatedly during the week — that contain open reference shelves, adequate cabinets for supplies, and proper desks. Handy storage space is provided for switching different sets of furniture back and forth to fit the needs of various classes.

Until pupils are willing and can find the time for outside preparation, a part of the hour is given to supervised study. Research and occasional projects definitely linked with the subject are included in the class procedure. There is little lecturing or reciting, even in higher grades; rather, there is much conversation about the subject being investigated. The teacher listens to his pupils, thus they are more disposed to listen to him. Teaching is largely a matter of prompting and dialogue. The best text books, reading books, and visual aids are used, available from any source. Most books are supplied by the local church and remain its property, hence they are hard-back books, after the fashion of the Westminster and Seabury series. Some are purchased by the pupils for their own libraries.

Pupils are expected to range widely in their interests, according to their abilities. Not all classes need be closely graded but in general this system is followed. Drawing and painting by the younger children, essays and research by the older ones are encouraged and due recognition is given to each pupil's progress. But the teacher is alert to prevent the class from becoming coldly intellectual, for he is minister and friend who strives to transmute each class into a fellowship, a church in microcosm aware of its ties with the Church Universal. There is enjoyment here; there is also ambivalence which attends every learning



enterprise. Some fun, no foolishness that makes the occasion trivial. Always the teacher sets the tone and he is a school master, albeit a warm person who represents the Master Teacher.

From grade to grade, year to year, one class to the next, pupils gain a sense of progression, of growth in faith and understanding of the Christian life and heritage. With achievement of this kind, summer classes become superfluous. Accordingly, the church school year matches the academic year of general education. A diploma is given upon satisfactory conclusion of the high school curriculum, and another one after two years of work paralleling that of a junior college. Graduates are ready for advanced collegiate or seminary study. Students who do not fulfill class requirements may qualify for a certificate of attendance.

#### IV

The proposal before us calls for a ministerial teaching order to serve Protestant churches. The objective is to provide children and youth with a more adequate program of Christian nurture than has been given by the Sunday schools and other agencies of the church. It is recognized that relatively few ministers now have either interest or ability necessary for this undertaking, but some churches have already made a beginning. If seminaries and denominations will proceed to create opinion favorable to a teaching order, theological students and churches may be counted on for support.

But what of parents' backing and pupils' willingness to attend Church classes on a weekday? How realistic is it to expect high school or even junior high pupils to give place for religion in a week packed with athletics, bands, and orchestras, home-work and clubs, and earning money after school? That is the problem and it will be most difficult to solve. However, it can be done — provided Protestants decide, under God, to put first things first, seeking God's Kingdom and his righteousness above all else. Not only in principle but in practice the Church — the Christian Community — must become the center of our children's lives; not the secular school and its exaggerated concern with sports and a plethora of activities, nor materialistic society and its deceptive values which cause adolescents to be preoccupied with earning money to spend for things they don't need.

Verily, the task before us is great, for it necessitates nothing less than a transformation of our values and rooted customs. By means of renewal of the Church, in response to the working of the Holy Spirit, this transformation can take place.

#### B. THE MINISTER-TEACHER

We need a pastoral teaching order for local churches. Competent minister-teachers, men and women, would provide better nurture than

the Sunday schools can possibly do. We can honor the Sunday school movement for what it has meant in the past — a past less complex than our times with their exacting educational and theological demands on Church teachers — but we cease honoring the cause of Christian nurture if we insist on subjecting relatively unprepared lay men and women and their pupils to a system decidedly inadequate for the task before us today. Here is an apt quotation from President Emeritus Cutten of Colgate University. "A large number of persons on the faculties of our colleges and universities lack teaching ability and have no interest in the teaching function. Indeed, with the possible exception of the Sunday school, probably the poorest contemporary teaching is that to be found in our colleges." ("School and Society," October 25, 1958, p. 372.)

Whatever the reliability of Dr. Cutten's judgment of college teachers, the majority of Sunday school teachers are deficient both in knowledge of the Christian heritage and in teaching ability. And just how large a proportion are simply uninterested in the teaching function is an open question.

Let us visualize Church classes for children and youth taught by interested and capable ministers at stated periods during the week. These men and women would view teaching as no less important than preaching and would prepare themselves for classroom work with the same care used in preparation of the best sermons. They would strive to make church teaching equal to or better than that to which their pupils are accustomed in general education. The churches would back them, knowing that it is unrealistic to expect any but the most exceptional layman to be as well equipped as ministers in Bible, theology, church history, and the rest.

However, long before ministers are ready to teach, there will have to come into being a new conception of the pastor's work and the significance of nurture for redemption of youth and adults. To this end official policy by the denominations and seminaries must first give form and substance to the idea of a ministerial teaching order. More of this presently.

In the foregoing article we considered what the church ought to try to accomplish with students and observed that commitment to Christ and the acquisition of knowledge are our main goals. We now address ourselves to the minister-teacher's depth relationship to his pupils and their families, and close with a brief examination of what the seminary must do to prepare men and women for a Protestant teaching order.

## I

We are not without precedent for including teaching in the work of the pastor, but so far as I have been able to determine, ordination rites in denominations which mention teaching refer only to pulpit instruction.

It was the custom of early Congregationalists to ordain and install one man as pastor and another as teacher, the latter being charged with expounding doctrine. In Colonial America, however, a church could not afford two ministers and soon it came about that a man was chosen as pastor and teacher, (*History of American Congregationalism*, by G. G. Atkins and F. L. Fagley, p. 102), a custom that has continued to the present. Not only in New England but elsewhere the preacher was often also a school master. Indeed, schools and colleges and Protestantism grew up together in this country but the past century has seen a widening of the breach between popular education and the churches. While tax supported schools have established skilled professional instructional staffs, Protestant churches — unlike Judaism and Roman Catholicism — have tried to convince themselves that lay staffs can carry on effective teaching. Not so.

The time has come for us to have minister-teachers for our children. I know of no denomination that maintains that a pastor is called to minister only to adults. A child or adolescent no less than an adult deserves to have direct and very personal contact with his minister. Children are eager for recognition and support by the pastor, not superficially, but at a depth-level. They stand ready to respond to him, if he proves that he has an affinity for them, for they want a significant person — to use a current phrase — to relate to, to admire, to look up to. More than adults perhaps, they are quick to identify themselves with a person of recognized merit. For those in middle childhood and adolescence, a man of God is needed; and for younger children, a woman of God.

Let this be emphasized. God, the Church, and basic needs of the young come to focus in the minister, a principal mediator of Christian growth. The minister-teacher who can relate himself to his pupils is exactly what Protestantism must provide if spiritual integrity is to characterize boys and girls.

Children at all ages have deep longing to be known, listened to, understood, and guided — by somebody, and by the somebody who stands in peculiar relationship to God. The worthy minister-teacher can give the child stability with which to cope with personal fears and perplexities in a rudderless society and a home which like as not is devoid of God's grace. The young need human models, will have them one way or another. Personality development requires admiration of another, one to whom the child looks not only in early years but also in later childhood for clues for living, valuing, becoming mature, experiencing salvation. This holds true for the child from the best home and the worst, for the child from the former needs also an estimable model outside the family, and the child from the latter more acutely needs a good model. Perhaps the Church has conformed too much to



the world precisely because its children and youth have had inadequate relationships with the minister.

A depth relationship between the child and the minister is achieved in the measure that the minister *is* himself, a man of God, embodiment of Christian grace and knowledge, as such enabling the child to become what he was created to be: also man of God, therefore redeemed. Beyond acquisition of knowledge, is this relationship — established in acceptance, companionship, love — utterly different from the surface relationships now existing between pastor and children in most of our churches.

Have we not overlooked the significance of a child's preoccupation with teachers? Listen to the young talk among themselves, rating school teachers, revealing their adoration for some, resistance to others, hatred for a few. But all teachers are considered persons to be reckoned with, for the child knows his fate hinges on them. Discerning in his judgment, the child is happy when he can praise the teacher, most happy when he has one whose personal standards and professional ability are above reproach. In sum, a child not only wants to be admired but also to admire.

Is it not cause for lamentation that a minister sometimes caught up in exaltation in delivery of a powerful sermon, seldom knows similar exaltation in a teaching experience? True, the gift of teaching is rare, especially so among men whose entire orientation is to proclamation rather than to dialogue and critical inquiry shared in by a class. Nevertheless, when ministers become teachers, they will discover depths and heights unknown in their adult world, for the child-world is marked by quickness to trust, to give loyalty and affectionate response to a respected mentor.

High on the list of a child's needs today is the perennial need to learn right from wrong. The minister-teacher may confidently be expected to have firmer standards than most of his parishioners, truer moral and ethical perception, more valid spiritual insights concerning what God requires of child and man. Moral authority and religious sanction are the minister's province as is not ordinarily the case with parents and school teachers. This is no plea for ministers to dispense moralisms; rather it is a call for relationship between pastor and children wherein teaching-learning proceeds by clear and worthy example, and by conversation that clarifies issues of Christian belief and conduct. Children from the best as well as the worst homes stand in need of coming to terms with valid authority, for the authority of contemporary life is of dubious quality, and the authority of God in Christ so far removed from many children and church families as to be absent. Who better than the minister-teacher, in an effective depth-relationship with

children, can provide authoritative guidance requisite for church teaching and personal conduct?

Emmanuel Mounier (*The Character of Man*, p. 287) wisely points out that in dealing with the child "one must mingle grace with discipline, relaxation with effort." This suggests the combination of qualities essential for the pastor in classroom and parish, in his relations with the young. At its finest, the class becomes a fellowship in which pastor and children grow together in Christ. In effect, each group reaches the high tone and level of achievement typified by classes in preparation for church membership described by L. A. Convis in his book *Adventuring Into the Church*. This is an account of what knowledge and devotion to Christ can mean to pupils taught by a pastor who considers teaching of fundamental importance in his ministry.

## II

As educator, the minister also purposes to enter a depth relationship with the families of his pupils, for he recognizes the primacy of the home in nurturing the child in Christian faith. Moreover, the minister is sensitive to adult longing for relationship wherein persons dispel the sense of meaninglessness pervading their lives. Let me mention two dominant but rather inarticulate desires which I believe many people have. First, desire for a family physician to blot out one's depersonalizing and humiliating experiences when visiting clinics and their squadrons of specialists with machines, charts, and statistical procedures; second, desire for a pastor who is a shepherd in time of joy and sorrow, at birth and at death. Ministers err who choose program promotion to the exclusion of pastoral visits; who turn the church study into a counselor's office, imitating psychiatrists; who for any reason abandon pastoral contacts with the excuse that nowadays people don't want the minister bothering them. On the contrary, men and women today, as always, want to be known, seen whole, receive pastoral attention. They are sick of being fragmented by modern life, repulsed by being shunted from specialist to specialist, from superficial or impersonal interview to more of the same. Though they may not realize it, for themselves and their children they yearn for a living, rallying center embodied in the man of God who can make himself available to them, entering into their lives, guiding them through his life into oneness with the Christ of God.

Can this be true? Is it accurate to contend that an urbanized civilization absorbed in economic security, in pleasurable pursuits, in avoiding involvement with neighbor and the world, actually desires communion with a pastor and his God — a God who inevitably makes disturbing demands? I think it is true. I assert it is true, for man's

basic need is for community and communion — precisely those experiences negated by the current mode of existence.

The anonymity of the city, the frenetic pace of suburbia, the imposing of mechanized bigness and cultural conformity even on rural America, cheapen the human order and diminish the individual and his family. Mediocrity, sameness, timidity mar us and we are stamped Standardized Products, things. Our life is shallow, ourselves empty; for we — in the Church and outside it — have vainly sought to fill ourselves with busyness, motion, *things*, the while slipping into the toils of another-directed society. But now it is clear that the more we have poured even good things and good activities into ourselves the emptier we have become. Those within the Church though presumably fed, hunger; though looking up to see the shepherd, see him not — because he is swallowed up in playing organization man, running a church that is no Church.

Happily there are young men graduating from our seminaries resolved to lead their flocks into becoming the Church, the household of God against which the hell of the world shall not prevail. Certain gifted young pastors come to mind, men whose eyes are fixed on the small, intimate, face-to-face flock, avoiding the large institution sometimes mistaken for a church. At once I hasten to explain that I do not equate a small parish with a colony of God on an alien continent of big churches. Bigness of the institution does not necessarily make estrangement from God inevitable. Both in the small and the large flock the sheep can hear the shepherd, can know and be known by him — provided he and they so arrange his task that he reaches them where they live, in their families.

At risk of imprecision, let me suggest that a pastor can minister at a depth level to the needs of 50-100 families, a congregation of from 250 to 400 persons, sharing family life with them, teaching classes for children, youth, and parents. If there are more than 100-125 school age children in the church, his teaching load might prove too heavy. Hence it would be better for him to include only older children and adolescents in his classes. Four to six hours a week spent in teaching, eight to ten hours for class preparation and follow-up with individual pupils, may occupy the minister-teacher. As preacher he needs eight to twelve hours to work on his sermon, deliver it, and conduct public worship. This totals a maximum of twenty-eight hours of his work week. Add about ten hours for pastoral calls, allow another ten for funerals, weddings, board and committee meetings, and sufficient time is left from a forty-eight hour week for meditation, study, recreation and his own family's affairs. And administrative tasks? Let there be less of them — assuredly so to the extent that on analysis it is found that the pastor's administrative function has become like that of the



business executive. A new conception of leadership training would prepare laymen to assume much of the administrative and promotional work now carried by the minister, thus freeing him to be pastor and teacher.

By concentrating on classroom teaching of the young, the minister may find the way opening for a more fruitful kind of pastoral call in which he talks over individual needs and abilities and gives informal guidance to the family group. What is paramount is not so much the substance of these conversations as the relationship formed between family and pastor. To be sure, most times only the mother and perhaps a small child are home when the pastor calls, but some visits can be made at hours when the father and the rest of the family are present. In any event, in view of the fact that members of the modern family tend to go their separate ways, much preliminary work needs to be done with individuals before a great number of families are ready as a group for a visit and conference with the pastor. Meantime pastoral calls are quite in order even though made to but one or two persons.

Young couples contemplating marriage need the minister's guidance. And this I see not in terms of so-called marriage counseling — at stated periods in a church office — so much as in terms of three people in friendly, earnest conversation, carried on in the parsonage living room or possibly in the living room in the prospective bride's home. In either setting the three are to be left strictly to themselves for all or part of the conversation. Instead of professionalized marriage counseling, therefore, informality and friendship mark the occasion, an occasion improved by coffee and cookies with the minister as host in his home or the bride-to-be as hostess in her parents' home.

After marriage the couple find the minister's concern issuing in guidance anticipating the birth of children. Thus young parents are prepared to covenant with the Church to nurture the child in Christian love and faith. The growing family is rooted in the worshipping community and come what trouble and estrangement may, the pastor and the ministering community are there to sustain both children and parents. Whether healing or divorce follows, persons are supported, even greater love being given when sin and suffering rend the family group. Always both pastor and ministering community remember that they are to give themselves first to the lost, like the Great Physician concerning themselves more with the sick than with those who are well. Not condemnation of persons but the overcoming of sin is the aim of the spiritual mentor of family life, especially so because strained and broken family relationships are so prevalent in our society.

Through an educational and personal ministry of this sort, children and parents are prepared for home and church family worship services of a quality not generally achieved. Kinship families closely linked with

the pastor are ready now to enter into the life of the church family, and persons united in Christ are joined to each other in the fellowship of grace. Thereby the worshipping community comes into being, and persons divided within themselves, alienated from each other and from God, are made whole, redeemed.

We turn next to look briefly at the church served by two or more ministers. The same kind of strategy used in the small church for effecting close relations between pastor and people is suitable for the large church. Let us suppose that a church has a minister-teacher for every 50-100 families comprising it. A division of labor enables each minister to serve the families of the children enrolled in his classes, but parishioners do not have to confine themselves to their particular minister — all hear the preacher, and any family is free to ask any one of the ministers to perform a marriage or render some other service. Even so it is the responsibility of the minister assigned to a given section of the local church to provide his flock with complete pastoral care, despite considerable overlapping where there are large families with children studying under different ministers.

Although their respective functions are clearly defined, the ministers operate as a closely knit staff, "in honor preferring one another," by grace able to permit members of the church to show whatever preferences they may. The man whose name appears at the top of the list of ministers is usually the preacher and — though not called that — also the chief of staff. There is no assistant minister, no director of education. The ministers think of themselves as colleagues, teachers and pastors whose additional duties are designated by the church by such terms as "chairman of church life" — this to cover lay administrative development; "program chairman" — this to indicate missionary and evangelistic outreach. In some situations a layman might well be employed to raise the budget and manage the general business of the church, thereby conserving the ministers' strength for their primary responsibilities as pastors and teachers.

### III

The heart of the matter before us is this: the establishing of a Protestant teaching order in local Churches. Toward this end less difficulty may be encountered with laymen than with ministers, seminary students, and the seminaries themselves. The one in twenty-five pastors Professor Samuel Blizzard found who views education as central in the ministerial task, very likely does not represent the country at large. I suspect that hardly one in a hundred Protestant pastors in the United States things so highly of education.

Even among the eleven hundred ministers Blizzard studied (see

*supra*) what they had in mind for themselves was not the role of classroom teacher so much as that of educational administrator.

One need but spend some time on a seminary campus to know the extent to which students ignore or disclaim the teaching program of the churches. Recently I asked a class of twenty-three men how many of them were interested in teaching. About half raised their hands. I expressed surprise and amended: "I mean teaching in the church." Then I wasn't surprised — but the class was, for jaws dropped at sudden realization that teaching could possibly refer to anything but college teaching. Sad to tell, this particular class had just spent about two months considering the educational work of the local church. Their reaction, of course, reflects none too favorably on me; it also reflects the seminarian's predisposition to limit his role to preaching and pastoral care. But then the seminaries have given students no clear vision of a pastoral teaching order for the churches.

Actually, of course, the ministerial task is already too intricate, but it is needlessly so because of misdirected concern and effort. Reformulation of the task would mean relinquishing certain pastoral practices in favor of the teaching and family ministry I have been discussing. Furthermore, a seminary faculty and education boards of the churches convinced that Protestantism's major need is for minister-teachers would mean a seminary student body convinced, ripe for learning how to teach. Encouraged by the denominations and given a generation to accomplish the goal, I doubt not that Church education would develop a deepened and truly enlightened Protestantism across this nation. But not easily. Not without pain.

What pain inheres in a seminary curriculum revision! Nonetheless, I visualize no disruptive change in the usual course offering. My suggestion presses hardest upon Field Work assignments in which remuneration is primary and educational growth of the seminarian a poor second. Concisely, I propose that during their last two years in seminary, prospective ministers be apprenticed to master-teachers wherever they can be found — in neighboring churches, synagogues, elementary and secondary public and private schools — and spend three or four hours a week in their classrooms learning to teach. This would total about two hundred hours per man invested in learning to teach, the equivalent of eight weeks of daily experience provided by certain college and university teacher-training programs in co-operation with public schools. Related seminary courses required to develop competent teachers would be offered mainly during the final or Intern year of B.D. study.

Eventually, Protestant churches may be expected to provide a proper training ground for the apprentice, but for the present our churches have little to offer. Fortunately, much can be learned in the



secular school about techniques, capacities of pupils, and how to correlate the subject matter of school and church. And in the better synagogue afternoon classes both technique and subject matter are relevant to Protestant teacher-training.

Women students, aiming for competency as Church teachers, need the B.D. degree, for their biblical, historical and theological knowledge must be no less than that of men. This imposes both more and less exacting demands on women; more, because of an extended and rigorous academic program, and less in that the teaching function offers a clearer-cut and less enervating professional role than does the administrative and promotional work of the director of religious education. Incidentally, as a member of a staff of minister-teachers — whether ordained or simply installed — the woman will find her status clarified and, happily, elevated. Like her male associates she will serve her assigned pupils and their families. Furthermore, in very large churches — with five or more ministers — at least two ministers may be women, partly for the purpose of including primary and younger children in the plan for Church education and partly to provide a balanced staff of men and women.

President Cutten, quoted above, and others warn that a Ph.D. degree is no assurance that a person can teach. And to be sure a B.D. degree does not make a teacher. Professor H. Richard Niebuhr and associates, in their recent study of theological education, point out that greatness in teaching is a gift (*The Advancement of Theological Education*, by Niebuhr, Williams, Gustafson, p. 142). It is that, and it is an art; but there is also a science of teaching which can be learned.

We learn to teach by teaching, under guidance, directed and inspired by a master-teacher in a dynamic classroom situation. To this calling seminary students will turn when churches, colleges, and seminaries — stimulated by denominational commissions on the ministry — chart the way. I am encouraged to believe that twenty to forty per cent of able seminary students are normally attracted by teaching. True, they generally think only of college posts but they can develop interest in Church teaching. The fact is that there is no higher calling, no greater need; in a sense, Church teaching for children and adolescents demands greater professional competence than college teaching, for the most satisfactory contemporary teaching in America — according to Professor M. P. Gaffney of Harvard and Sidney Hook (Cf. *Education for Modern Man*, p. 175), — is not found in the colleges but in elementary and secondary schools.

If this be true, then minister teachers are challenged to perform at least as well as the best teachers in America, realizing that pupils are inevitably comparing them with their teachers in general education.

#### IV

In sum, Protestants need Church education carried on during the week by minister-teachers who are biblically, theologically, and educationally competent. Beyond knowledge of the Christian heritage, experience with Christ is the goal as minister, pupils and their families enter into a depth relationship. A child wants to know and be known by his pastor. He and his parents will respect significant teaching and support it. The program of formal Church education will use laymen as class assistants and directors of projects, while informal nurture will involve not fewer but more laymen, for the Christian community — living its life in church and family — is the matrix in which persons become members one of another, learning of God.

Church education calls for a new conception of the pastor's role, a realignment of tasks resulting in laymen carrying more of the promotional and business enterprises of the church, thus freeing the pastor to use to the full his special gifts as minister and teacher. Fewer and larger classrooms, used repeatedly during the week, will induce a more satisfactory educational architecture, a more faithful discharge of stewardship responsibility, a conserving of funds to employ minister-teachers as needed. Finally, an intensive teaching and pastoral ministry to individuals and families can truly nurture persons in the grace and knowledge of our Lord and his Gospel.

# *The Problem of Love*

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

Before the second decade of this century there was no problem of love such as envisaged in this lecture, except that of expressing it in good will and justice. The imperfections of human love and the difficulties in its way were readily recognized. It was known that love involves suffering and sacrifice, and that it is commonly mixed with selfishness, which makes it to come short of the ideal of unselfish love. Men even recognized, especially as against "humanism", that faith in God and a sense of our need of his help are necessary for maximum exercise of love. So the problem of love was one of faith and effort, of enlightenment and a willingness to pay the price: a problem which could be solved more or less successfully depending upon the conjunction of Divine grace and human virtue in those strivings for the ideal as presented by Jesus. The preacher appealed to the good will and the good sense of his hearers, and left to them the task of making decisions more or less in conformity with the standard of unselfish and beneficent love.

One facet of this view was the value of love as the basis of community and "the brotherhood it brings."<sup>1</sup> Love was recognized not only as practical but also as conducive to the making of a good and just society. It was understood and commonly believed that where there are affection, sympathy, good will, there is the proper motive for justice and an adequate basis for a community of brothers.<sup>2</sup>

Another facet of this view of love was the belief that it would spread out from limited circles of the family and the neighborhood, to larger circles of the city, the nation and the world; from personal relations to political and economic relations, until it would become universalized, so that people would come to love all men without regard to color or creed, class or kind. If love be an attitude and affection, there seemed to be no prohibitive impediment to its expansion through enlightenment and effort, especially with God's help and the good influences already present in the community.

Thirdly, there was the conviction that there is a congruity between the ideal and "man's deepest strivings."<sup>3</sup> It was held that love is at once an expression of God's and of man's natures. It was of course well known that human nature is marred by selfishness and that ill will created a grave problem for love. The facts of human cruelty and injustice were too obvious and deeply felt not to raise questions about the nature of man. But it appeared evident that we must nevertheless believe in man and hold as true that his "deepest strivings" are from love and for love. It was a matter of logic and hope. Once you deny

that love is the ideal of man and that he is striving for it, even if weakly and confusedly, there is no hope for a better society; and without hope all is lost. Therefore, it was believed that love, with God's help, is a human possibility.

The above view of love was never proved to be wrong. It was attacked with more or less logic and great persuasiveness because world events after the First World War produced not progress toward the ideal community of love but terrifying outbursts of inhumanities and miseries. Instead of a decrease in human woe and peril, there was an increase. Neither faith in man nor faith in enlightenment could withstand the onslaught of facts which uncovered massive cruelties and stupidities in our world. Affection and good will were not getting us very far, and reason was at large overwhelmed by unreason. Something was deeply wrong, and men began to think in radically new ways. "Realism" dictated that human love is inadequate for the need of the present; and theologians turned to God, not as the bearer of love's ideal but as the revelation of another Love under which man's love was seen as sentimental and hypocritical, and his righteousness as "filthy rags."

Thus, the First World War and its aftermath of troubles and frustrations, led to strong reactions to the "idealism" of the first decades of the nineteenth century. Neo-orthodox writers accused "liberalism" of idealism, romanticism, evolutionism, monism, humanism, rationalism, and even suggested that they had been stupid. They set out to rediscover the Bible, the Gospel, and the "Reformation Theology." They inveighed against the pride and complacency of modern religion. They spoke vehemently of revelation and redemption. They rediscovered the depravity of man and the hypocrisy of his ways. And with a newly acquired realism, some insisted that love is not a human and historical possibility. Others were content to contrast God's love with man's, *agape* with *eros*, hoping that once the distinction is properly made, and Christians come to know it, somehow the Church will come to its own.

In our present situation, it would hardly be helpful to compare liberal "idealism", and neo-orthodox biblicism and realism as contradictory doctrines. Liberal theology was a response to a human situation in which the dignity of man was jeopardized by ideas derived from science and economic life. The interpretations of love in terms of affection, sympathy, good will, mutuality, must be understood over against the indignities, privations, miseries which human beings suffered in the industrial societies of the times. When people spoke of respect for personality, and the infinite value of personality, they were using language intended not to inflame the pride of man but to induce them to treat one another with the justice and decency due to human beings. It goes without saying that "the liberals" were right and are still right. Respect for personality is never out of date.



When the neo-orthodox attacked the liberal position they also were responding to a human situation. There is today something futile in saying "love and good will and respect for personality": not that we do not need these things, but that it seems impossible to have enough of them for our present need. It does not seem to be in us to love as the times require; and the love we do have seems irrelevant as well as insufficient. It is no wonder that we have had Christian thinkers who have sought to remind us of another Love which might be what this age needs for its peace. It is natural that they should have opposed the love we knew with another Love, and should have insisted upon the disparity between the two. It is no wonder that they have turned our attention to God who alone, they say, makes Love possible. Every note struck by the new orthodoxy on the subject of love is to be understood as a criticism of opposing notes which seem no longer serve the purpose of peace.

On the other hand, the new expositions of love are not obviously relevant to our situation or promising for our future. Affection, good will, sympathy, humanity, had the advantage of at least being within human reach. They appeared relevant and needful; they made some kind of sense, and man could be induced to take them seriously. People could see and understand that love is the bond of humanity and the way to peace and joy in the community. They may have been too romantic and sentimental in thinking that they loved as needful, or that they could love if they would. They may not have been properly biblical and realistic. But the love they were talking about was relevant and they seriously assumed the responsibility to practice it.

The new love, *agape*, may be relevant as an impossible possibility, but it is no way for human life in this world. Nobody lives it. Nobody intends to live it. Nobody who has any sense of responsibility toward his neighbor can live it. And perhaps the notion that it is necessary for the realization of mutual love and decency we do need and must practice, is not valid. I can understand the *agape* of neo-orthodoxy as a criticism of sentimentalized and hypocritical humanity; but as a positive way of life in this world, I think it is futile.

According to its expositors, Christian love or *agape* is a spontaneous, unmotivated love: "indifferent to value" and utterly alien to prudence.<sup>4</sup> From Jesus' love for "sinners" and "enemies", Dr. Nygren deduces that God's love is directed toward creatures who in no sense are in a position to move Him to love them. Men have no value before God; and he loves them not because they are worth loving but because He loves them; and in loving them who are worthless, endows them with worth and value.

Barth has spoken of God's love in similar terms: "This love of God is His grace. It is love in the form of deepest condescension. It

occurs even where there is no question of claim or merit on the part of the other. It is love which is overflowing, free, unconstrained, unconditioned. And we must add at once: It is love which is merciful, making this movement, this act of condescension, in such a way that, in taking this other to itself, it identifies itself with its need, and meets its plight with its own concern . . . ”<sup>5</sup>

Emil Brunner has written in a similar vein: “‘And what is worthy to be loved can be an object of friendship’, says Aristotle, in so many words. But love asks no questions about the nature of that which is to be loved. That is precisely the miracle of the love of God, who loves not only the man who is worthy to be loved, but also the unworthy. It is always love all-the-same, never love because. It is loving born simply of the will to love, not of the nature of the beloved. It is not a love which judges worth but a love which bestows worth. Neither Aristotle nor any other pagan knew this love; it is identical with the message of Scripture.”<sup>6</sup>

Dr. Brunner refers to Nygren’s *Agape and Eros* as “the authoritative work on this subject.”<sup>7</sup>

Coming to our own country, Dr. Nels Ferré has characterized *agape* in his last book as follows: “Agape is, first of all, always God-centered. God alone is the Source, Standard, Authority and Dynamic of Agape . . . Agape is therefore not rational in the sense that it is dependent upon community . . .

“Agape is also completely universal in its creative and redemptive concern. No wall or barrier can shut out relation to God who is Agape. Agape is, furthermore, unconditional love. Agape is never dependent upon the response of its object for its motivation. In Nygren’s terms in his *Agape and Eros*, Agape is unconditional, uncaused, unmotivated, groundless, uncalculating, spontaneous Love, creative of fellowship . . . [Agape is] completely outgoing and self-giving, as witnessed by God’s going to death on the Cross, not for friends, but for sinners . . . Such is the heart of biblical faith . . . ”<sup>8</sup>

The consequences of such a view for the Christian life have been drawn properly by Paul Ramsey: “Not anything in the neighbor, not anything in the agent himself nor any treaty of peace between them but the controlling love of Christ reverses natural self-love into neighbor love and, at the same time, requires of a person infinite willingness to be himself . . . In short, he ought to love himself for the purpose of loving his neighbor as he naturally loves himself.”<sup>9</sup>

“Christian love in its nature gives some good, it is not primarily concerned to seek good. It is deontologically, as a matter of obedience, related to the neighbor as such; it is not teleologically, as a matter of desire, related to some norm.”<sup>10</sup>

Reinhold Niebuhr has made further deductions from the nature

of *agape*. The self-sacrificing *agape* of Christ is a non-prudential love which "transcends all particular norms of justice and mutuality in history."<sup>11</sup> As a love "which seeketh not its own", it "is not able to maintain itself in historical society,"<sup>12</sup> and is bound to end in tragedy. It is therefore not a "simple possibility." Men cannot practice it without destroying the structures of mutual obligation and power which are essential for social existence.

"Sacrificial love thus represents a tangent towards 'eternity' in the field of historical ethics. It is nevertheless the support of all historical ethics; for the self cannot achieve relations of mutual and reciprocal affection with others if its actions are dominated by fear that they may not be reciprocated . . . Sacrificial love is thus paradoxically related to mutual love, and this relation is an ethical counterpart of the general relation of super-history to history."<sup>13</sup>

We do not wish to deny the validity of the above conceptions of *agape* as criticisms of varieties of cheap love to which we all are all too readily subject. Selfish, sentimental, calculating, dominating loves are recognizably bad, and we cannot be too often warned against them. Loves which lack spontaneity, unselfishness, creativity, and even "self-sacrifice" are counterfeits, and a disgrace to humanity. But the definition of love in negatives as "unconditional, uncaused, unmotivated, groundless, uncalculating;" as self-giving, self-denying, self-crucifying, simply outgoing; as unprudential, unevaluating, unteleological, etc., leave us with a "love" which is not only impossible for human beings, regenerate or unregenerate, but also of doubtful biblical and theological validity. "Liberal sentimentalism" is sobriety itself compared with the neo-orthodox *agape* which violates Divine and human nature alike.

I agree with Reinhold Niebuhr that his Love is an impossibility for human beings, and I deduce from that that no man lives by it, or is obliged to live by it, or can be expected to live by it.

The problem is practically that while theologians extol the excellence of their *agape*, and preachers propose it from their pulpits, the people are turned away from the Gospel and the Law alike. It is, and cannot but be, confusing, frustrating, and conducive to a "neurotic personality", that a man cannot be a Christian, and live as one, unless he is engaged in "self-sacrifice"; in a groundless and unmotivated love which sets no value upon its object and *does not even hope to be loved back*. The notion that mutual and teleological love, love in which human beings seek a common good is sub-Christian, and calculating as well as selfish and sentimental, does not make sense and is practically intolerable. No matter what goes on in his mind, in his relations with others, no man stands for it. The relationship between Christian love ["sacrificial love"] and mutual human love cannot be "paradoxical." Either Christian love is mutual love, or it is a violation of hu-

manity. Either sacrificial love expresses mutual love, or it is misunderstanding and a stumbling block. In this day and age when we are likely to perish for want of mutual love, it is no service to humanity that Christians should come out with a groundless, unmotivated, self-abnegating love as their contribution to the peace of the world. The problem is to state properly the "love" in "mutuality," and not to find another, unmutual love, which admittedly is beyond us.

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The common doctrine of the agapists is that Jesus loved with a love which flowed out of him as water from a spring: spontaneous, outgoing and unmindful of any reciprocation. In the orthodox fashion, when these writers consider Jesus they can only see one who loved sinners and died for them. The primary image in their minds is the One hanging down upon a cross. They interpret the cross as "sacrificial love", and interpret the whole life of Jesus, his dealings with his fellow-men in terms of a selfless, outgoing love toward "sinners" who in no sense and way evoked the love with which Jesus loved them. So we are given a picture of Jesus going about and loving sinners unworthy of love, and going his way to love some more; until, on the cross, he crowns his love with his self-denying death.

Now, I do not deny that the Gospels, especially John's Gospel, says much, especially about the cross, that seems to justify this version of Jesus' dealings with those around him. But another view of Jesus' ways is available from the Gospels. It is true that Jesus seems to have a special solicitude toward "sinners." But, perhaps they were people who aroused, as the people they were, affection and friendliness in him. May it not be that he preferred them to the "righteous" because he saw in them a grace which was lacking in the latter? Some of these people were "publicans and harlots", some may have been thieves and other shady characters. But it is not self-evident that they were unlovable. Many were "common people", "people of the land;" Jews who were not "righteous" in their failure to be good according to standards of the synagogues. They were guilty, confused, lost people, who were supposed to have incurred God's displeasure and been more or less forsaken of him as they were of "the righteous".

Well, Jesus was on the side of the sinners, and presented God as with them and as their Father. He loved these people who were sinners, because he saw in them a humanity which escapes the righteous, and is in fact repudiated by them. The sinners, for all their sins and wrongdoings, showed a sensibility, like the adulteress at Simon the Pharisee's house or Zaccheus the publican, which is the love one creature hopes for from another and owes another. Jesus loved Peter, for all his impetuosity and inconsistency, because Peter was a compas-



sionate human being. He loved the young aristocrat who asked him what he might do "to inherit eternal life," for all his doublemindedness and attachment to his wealth, because he had the grace to realize that his goodness fell short of the love which gives men joy and peace one with another. Maybe "because" is too causal a word to use in such situations. There need not have been any conscious evaluation of these sinners as a basis of Jesus' love. But surely, it is not self-evident that Jesus was not responding to these people as human creatures who were sinners. A centurion, a Mary, a Zaccheus, a Peter, a Matthew, were not to Jesus simply sinners, *for there is no such being*; they were bewildered and "lost" creatures of God who in their bewilderment and lostness, already despised and rejected by the righteous, sinned against God and their neighbors. They indeed put forth no claim to Jesus' love, because they did not have any as sinners. But it does not follow that Jesus did not acknowledge them as "flesh and blood". They were in fact human beings who were sinners, whose sin at once alienated them from polite society and made them eager for the love of Jesus. In this they were lovable; and Jesus, as against "the righteous", loved them, recognized them as human beings, and drew them to himself and one to another, thus making community.

Agape is commonly described as not seeking but offering love. We must agree that Jesus' love was not self-seeking, utilitarian, calculating, etc. Jesus was not buttering his bread or feathering his bed. But does it follow that he was indifferent to the response of these people to him? Any man who loves but does not care whether he is loved back or not is a monster. Imagine a man going around and "loving" people and doing them "good", without giving a fish what they think of him and how they feel toward him. The "love" of such a man is counterfeit and the good he does is evil. Any man who does not have the grace to hunger for the love of his fellows, who does not feel empty when they do not love him, and full when they do, has removed himself from human society and already destroyed the bond of humanity. He is a sinner besides whom publicans and harlots are, unless they are like him, very models of humanity. There is no love of a creature for a creature that is not evoked by the one loved and that does not rejoice in the love of the one loved. Whether the one loved is righteous or sinner is irrelevant. Righteous or sinner, a man is a creature and one owes him the love of a creature and from him he must hope for the love of a creature.

The agapists who deny or softpedal Jesus' involvement in mutual love, which alone has validity in human relations, deny the humanity of Jesus; which denial has been common among the orthodox, but is nonetheless heretical and a repudiation of the Gospel of God. They derive their doctrines from the Gospels by distorting and overlooking much

that goes contrary to it. Jesus not only loved but was also loved back by the sinners. It is true he did not love so that he might have been loved back. But it does not follow that he did not care whether he was loved back or not. It does not even follow that he did not love people because he found them lovable as his fellow-creatures. Nothing but theological prejudice and confusion, accumulated through the centuries by distorted interpretations of the cross, would lead a man reading the accounts of Jesus' encounter with people to judge that his love was a one way affair.

If a man engages in "sacrificial love" toward another whose love for him is a matter of indifference, his sacrifice, even if he gives his body to be burned, is an affront to the creature, and a damning act. Such sacrifice is neither human nor divine; it is the doing of a diseased mind, at best a waste and at worst a murder of humanity. Sacrifice presupposes the love of the creature, and such love seeks to be loved. I do not say that one loves in order to be loved; but I do say that one loves as a man who depends upon the love of others for his joy as a creature. One sacrifices oneself, if one does, for those one loves; for people whose love for him is not a matter of indifference but a matter of a most wonderful hope. Any sacrifice, any self-denial and self-sacrifice, is authenticated by a love which gives because it has already received. Sacrifice on the part of a man is an act of justice; a response meant to be according to the due of the loved one; of a person and a community, which are recognized as worthy of the sacrifice of one's time, goods, or any other good, and even of life itself.

It has been pointed out rightly and often that the love Jesus practiced and advocated transcended the limits of race, religion and geography. Jesus judged the "natural" love of people for their own kind and kin, for those who pleased them either by beneficence or by some common love and interest, as insufficient and even as unauthentic. But it does not follow that he substituted for it this other Love described by the agapists. He practiced and advocated a love which binds man to man as a "living soul," as a being who is by creation bound to another as a fellowman, as a *Mitmensch*, as a human being without whom he himself neither exists as a human being nor has joy as a human being. This creaturely love, suffused with the anxiety and hope of the creature, both experienced in the communion of human beings, is the valid presupposition of self-denial and sacrifice. It is that love without which the love of kin and kind becomes a constant source of alienation and conflict in the human society. It also is the love which legitimizes "the partial loves" which the agapists deride, and rightly, as sources of idolatry and injustice.

I think that Jesus loved the sinners around him without raising the issue as to whether they did or did not deserve to be loved. Or may-

be he recognized that the sinners were loved of God in their state of sin and therefore without deserving his love. But it does not follow that Jesus saw in these sinners nothing but offenders, and loved them absolutely; without regard to their humanity or their misery as creatures who lived as though God were not with them. I think his love was one which recognized the sinners as creatures, and in this recognition bound them to God and to their neighbor, he being in the forefront of the new community to which they entered by his love. These people deserved his love as God's creation, as His good creation. They deserved his love because God deserved it. God the Creator deserves the creature's love as God who has created the creature whose existence as such is good. God is to be loved because he is good, and his mercy endures forever. And this goodness of God is acknowledged when a man confesses that the existence he has as a fellowman is good; when he acknowledges that the existence of his fellowman is good, good in the same way, as his own existence; that his fellow creature deserves to exist as God's good creation, and to be loved as such: loved in his anxiety and his sin; as the object of God's judgment and mercy, which position and life he shares with the one who loves him.

The love of Jesus may well be seen as compassion (as a love in which the very bowels were agitated together with the soul) for the people who were "like sheep without a shepherd". These lost people still were people; they were flesh and blood; they were flesh of Jesus' flesh and blood of his blood; they were human beings who were Jews or Gentiles, — creatures, there for him to see and understand, and to recognize as fellowmen whose very lostness pointed to the bond of creation with which they were bound to him.

I think there is something pathetic about our troubles with the love of Jesus. The Christian tradition has been perennially confusing in this respect. Even though we have had elaborate doctrines of creation, and even more elaborate doctrines of sin and salvation, we have thought as though we could discuss the creature apart from the sinner and, what is more relevant here, the sinner apart from the creature. This is where the agapists, submitting without proper criticism to a longtime practice, have made their crucial and consequential mistakes.<sup>14</sup> They say, with the Augustinian tradition, that man is a fallen and sinful being, who deserves or merits no pleasure from God. The rest of the phantasy about God's and Jesus' "unmotivated" love follows. For surely the sinner is without merit and in him as sinner there is no ground for God's love. But the sinner is a creature, and as a creature he is an object of God's love: the love which created him and preserves him. The creature exists by God's creation. He is creation while he is creature, and so there is no creature except by creation. On the other hand, creation posits the creature as an object of God's love, so that

God at once creates by love and loves what He creates. The sinful creature exists by God's love, both as creation by grace alone, and as a creature who is the object of God's love. What God creates freely He loves as his creature worthy of his love. The worth of the creature is indeed bestowed upon him by free grace, as is his being. But since the creature exists, God loves him as this existent creature, who is neither God nor nothing, but a human being responsible to God.

God is not a man that He should forget the creatures because of sin. That is the way of man the sinner who is tempted at all times to annihilate his neighbor because of the enmity between them. It is we and not God who pretend that our fellowmen are sinners and not human beings; we who overlook, under the stress of anxiety and enmity, both ourselves and our neighbors as creatures. Men alienated from themselves-and-one-from-another can only see the sinner or the enemy, and attribute to God the same blindness. They can see only themselves as violated and their neighbors as violated; themselves as rejected and their neighbors as the rejectors. In the fury which goes with the injury they receive, they will the annihilation of their neighbor, and express it by denying that the sinner is a creature. This denial justifies them in their enmity toward their neighbor, because a sinner who is not a creature, to whom one is not bound in "the bundle of life", is justly hated and destroyed.

It is illogical and impossible to forgive and to embrace a sinner who is not acknowledged as a creature. This is indirectly recognized by our agapists. Enmity is destructive. My enemy is out to annihilate me. But annihilation by an act of a responsible being is absolutely evil, and in the nature of the case is not to be forgiven. In so far as men see one another as wrongdoers, as violators and murderers, they can only "forgive" by calculation, by fear and prudence; which is no forgiveness. The enmity remains and continues in its career of injustice and murder. Not even the celebrated "self-sacrifice" of Christ, praised all over Christendom for its supposed saving power, has kept those who "believe in" it from hostilities and persecutions which gives the lie to the "new being in Christ Jesus." For instance, the insistence of Christians that the Jews are "deicides" rather than creatures is part and parcel of the inhumanities they have perpetuated against them through the centuries to the eternal shame and confusion of the Church. Not even "saints" can and will forgive malefactors, or presumed malefactors, whose excellency as creation is repudiated. The forgiveness of the sinner *qua* sinner is impossible. No wonder therefore that the forgiveness of Jesus, his love for sinners, has been construed as an irrational, supernatural, groundless, unteleological act, by which we are presumably saved, yet so that love for us remains an "impossible possibility." The self-sacrificing love of God in Jesus Christ, as understood by orthodoxy



and neo-orthodoxy alike, is a misunderstanding and utterly unassimilable to our lives with our fellowmen. It is unintelligible; therefore it is neither practiced nor practicable. This to me is the deepest irrationality in traditional Christianity, and the source of pretensions and frustrations and neuroses which attend being an orthodox and neo-orthodox "Christian". It turns love into an insoluble problem as well as a source of living, rather dying confusion.

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Protestants, repulsed by the Catholic love for heaven, with its immutability and perfection, have preferred to discourse on the love of God for man as against man's love for God. Such a recovery of the Gospel and the consequent recovery of faith in the loving God was the crown of the Reformers' glory and it remains the justification of Protestant Christianity. The Gospel is the celebration of the love of God for sinners; when it is confused or replaced by a celebration of man's love for the transcendent, faith is turned into superstition, hope into wish, and love into vanity.

Nevertheless, the love of God is the possibility of our love for him. The creature restored to his integrity in Christ is no pipe or channel of God's love. It is not proper to celebrate the love of God without heeding the commandment that we love him with all our heart, soul and strength. There is no Gospel without commandment, because man is a creature, not an outlet. God loves as Creator and Redeemer: we are to love as creatures being redeemed. God loves as one who forgives: we are to love as sinners being forgiven: He as Reconciler, we as being reconciled. God loves us as creatures who have sinned against him; we are to love our neighbors as creatures being reconciled to God, as human beings who are united to us as our fellowmen by God's creation and redemption. But such love for our neighbor presupposes freedom from bondage to sin and death, for the praise of God and the love of God. In the creative and redeeming work of God, in the Word and the work of the Spirit, the creature is posited as creature, as a being who glorifies God by his consent to himself; as a responsive and responsible being, who receives with the Gospel of God's grace, God's commandment: "thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . ." What do freedom, reconciliation, restoration mean if not the hearing of the commandment with joy and hope? The love of God in Christ is for the creature's love to God in the same Christ: a love expressed in the consent of the mind, the confidence of the living soul and the exercise of one's powers as God's intelligent creation. Since we are human beings, we do not know the love of God for us except in a freedom to know and love him as our Creator; to consent to "being in general"; to love his handiwork both in ourselves and in our neighbor.<sup>18</sup>

We are to love God as Creator; we as creatures are to love him who is our Creator. But how can we love God unless we love ourselves? There is no love of God without a love of the creature, as there is no knowledge of God without the knowledge of his mighty works. The living God is known in his acts; his acts reveal him in his glory *as God*; and we love him as we glorify him; as we thank him for the life he has given us among our neighbors, and for the light which enables us to reflect his glory by our intelligence and consent to "being in general." Consent to our being and destiny as God's intelligent creation, in our relatedness to universal being, in our rightful place in creation as beings with our fellow beings, is inseparable from love to God. Such consent is a proper love of ourselves without which we love neither God nor our neighbor.

The traditional and endlessly repeated doctrine that self-love is incompatible with the love of God and the neighbor is due to misunderstandings which have become deeply rooted in the Christian mind.<sup>10</sup> Otherworldly Christianity distinguished the love of self from the love of God by making the former a natural love of one's mundane good and the latter the love of a supernatural good. So self-love was affirmed as a legitimate but inferior love, whereas the love of God was proposed as highest and best love open to man. The love of self was interpreted as the love of the temporal, and the love of God was attributed to the soul with its yearning for the eternal. So those who were spiritual and concerned with the eternal sought to ascend from the love of self to the love of God. Although self-love was deemed natural for the common people, the truly spiritual preferred the love of God. But this love of God was bound up with man's desire to transcend his creaturely existence in this world, and the love of self worked as the love of goods without the love of the creature.

The thesis that man's self-love is corrupted by sin or his alienation from God into egocentrism and injustice was the grand affirmation of the Protestants; and it does not need apology. But that Christian love is a self-less love is a confused and confusing proposition which has done deadly harm in the church. It is not true that God's own love is self-less, nonteleological, undemanding: a love which finds its last end in the forgiveness of the sinner. God who loves, also saves; God who saves, also commands. He loves toward the liberation of the creature from bondage to sin and death; and this liberation finds its proper expression in the creature's consent to God's creation. As God illumines the mind of the creature, the last end of the creature's existence is the glory of God. There is a divine integrity which demands that the glory of God be the chief end of man, and therewith the enjoyment of God's glory by the creature. We are saved and made free as we acknowledge God's glory to be the last end of creation. Hence, God has created us, saved

us from sin and death, and through all loved us, for his glory as Creator. To make God's love undemanding, to see the creature as its last end, is a subtle and confounding misrepresentation of the proper relationship between the Creator and the creature, and a temptation to egocentrism in its most deadly form. A man who says "God loves me, period, and no questions asked," has succumbed to the devil's last argument and repudiated himself as a creature who exists by the light of intelligence and in the knowledge of the glory of his Creator.

God loves as God, man loves as man; God as Creator, and man as one who knows and glorifies his Creator: glorifies him by his consent to his own nature and destiny as a creature. If sin is rebellion against God, and if the source of this rebellion is the anxiety, despair, self-repudiation of the creature as creature, then righteousness is not contempt for life and the world; it is not the repudiation of the living, thinking, loving, hoping individual human being who must not only affirm himself as a creature but must also distinguish himself from his neighbor as *this* creation and a fellow-creature to his neighbor. It is simply impossible to affirm the existence of the neighbor *as a creature* without affirming one's own as such. A man and his neighbor are the two foci of an ellipse, and without both the foci there is no neighbor to be loved. Self-denying love is a contradiction in terms. There is no knowledge of the neighbor as creature and love of the neighbor as oneself, without one's loving oneself as a creature, without glorifying God in consent to one's life as a creature.

The notion of a selfless love is not Christian. It arises out of a natural revulsion against selfishness which is universally abhorred in others. All men occasionally, moved by particular attachments, lapse into unselfish love, and act for the good of the neighbor without hope of reward. They may not do so as often as they think they do it. But they do do it, and that without reconciliation and freedom in Christ Jesus. Such love is conducive to peace among men, and one is grateful for it. It is a gift of God bestowed upon men universally, even though universally corrupted by man's prevailing anxiety and alienation from "being in general."

But to confuse this selfless love with the creature's consent to his life and his openness to his fellowcreature, is to misconstrue the whole meaning of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ brought into the world an "unselfishness" which means the conversion of the rebellious spirit and his reconciliation to his Creator. What is realized is not self-repudiation but the restoration of man to his original dignity and integrity as a creature. Jesus reconciled man with God by giving him the freedom to consent to himself as a creature. He posited once again God's intelligent creation, who by his very willingness to be the individual human being God made him, is enabled to love his neighbor as himself. To be a

human being, to be *this* person, is to be a neighbor, a fellow creature. To know one's neighbor is to love him as a fellow creature, to love in the knowledge of him as a creature; and this goes with self-knowledge and gratitude and love to God as a creature. So it is that we are commanded to love our neighbor as ourselves.

The real issue is not self-love as against the love of the neighbor. It is the faithfulness of the creature to the end for which he is created, and therewith faithfulness to himself and his neighbor. No man can love his neighbor unless he consents to his own being as a creature, unless he lives in the praise and love of God as his Creator. Love is a faithfulness which presupposes a man's peace with God as his Maker and the love of God's creation which goes with that peace. It is absurd to love one's neighbor while one ignores one's own life. It is absurd to be unselfish through self-denial, to be generous through indifference to good and goods. A man cannot seek the good of his neighbor while he will not receive thankfully God's gifts to himself. Indifference to one's own good is not a sign of unselfishness but of alienation from God the Creator, and its real fruits are not love and justice but enmity and tyranny, disguised as self-sacrifice. Such indifference is more poisonous than the selfishness of the man who prefers his good to that of his neighbor. The latter may be prudent, but the former can only be a Pharisee.

We can understand how men have sought to remove selfishness by unworldliness, by ceasing to desire wealth, power, comfort, and the sundry sources of pleasure within man's reach. Selfishness has been opposed to unselfishness, and "self-sacrifice" has been set up as a cardinal virtue. What drastic measures have been taken by Buddhists and Jains, Stoics and ascetics, and Christians, to break the power of cupidity and to exercise freedom from greed! What distortions, unnatural and irrational strivings, what hypocrisies and self-mutilations, have been perpetuated by "selfless people!" What self-repudiations, contempt for men and the world, what tyrannies and cruelties, in short what in-humanities, have been practised by "unselfish souls" who have escaped every evil but pride and despair!

In the meantime, multitudes have followed their self-love and loved themselves more than their neighbors, living in uneasy peace in societies where the common life has been constantly poisoned by their impregnable if ill-concealed selfishness. Community has been confused by men's "innocent" self-love; and strife, with injustice and oppression, has contaminated human life everywhere, making peace a delusion and happiness a mirage.

There is a common notion that unselfishness is impossible under the best of circumstances. Hence our realists speak of it as a "transcendent ideal", and hope that it will mitigate more or less the primitive



selfishness of men. It is, it has been and remains, a matter of doubt and debate as to whether men can be unselfish. The realists accuse the believers in unselfishness of sentimentalism, and the latter accuse the realists of cynicism and despair. Meanwhile there is confusion both of mind and of life.

This whole discussion, which is as old as Christianity, is not carried out on the basis of adequate premises. It fails to take seriously man's nature as a creature. The first duty of man is not to deny himself but to know himself and his neighbor as creatures; it is not to mortify the flesh but to consent to his nature and destiny as spirit, to glorify God as his intelligent creation. It is to cleave to God as the creature which he is; which he is by virtue of his knowledge of his neighbor as creature who with him has his peace and fruition by faith. It is the proper exercise of human intelligence to acknowledge that a man is himself only as he is neighbor to his fellowmen. There is here no question of self-repudiation or the repudiation of the neighbor, of selfishness or unselfishness, of seeking one's own good or the good of his neighbor. It is a matter of faithfulness, of truth, of justice, of acting toward oneself and toward one's neighbor in the love and fear of God. Love is the communion of spirit with spirit; the recognition of creature by creature: the respect and justice of the creator toward the creature. This recognition and respect are of the essence of love, and the love in all love, prior to love of family and friends, of neighbors and enemies. It is the love which is the salt of all love, between man and woman, between parent and child, between nations, races, and tongues. It is the love without which no man has friends, and no nation has peace. It is the love every man needs for his life and every man owes to his fellowmen. It is the very root as well as flower of faith. It is the origin and end of hope. It is the glory of God reflected in the creature and the creature's own fruition and foretaste of eternal life. It is the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ; it is the essential gift of the Spirit; it is the knowledge of God as Father and the knowledge of men as brothers. It is the kingdom of God among us.

What bedevils human life is not that men seek their own good. If this were so God would be the devil who has made us so that we must have power with life, and goods and health and comfort and pleasure and friends and all the things men seek after. What bedevils human life first of all is the creature's alienation from God and his fellowman, his refusal and inability to meet his neighbor as a creature. This is what embitters man against man and drives each one mad for hostility. A man is a creature and wants above all to be recognized as such. He is not first of all rich or poor, male or female, black or white, capitalist or communist. He is a creature; and he is either respected as a creature or not respected as one. When he is so respected, the

ground is laid for a common life of fruition. When he is not so respected, there is only bitterness and strife. No man really wants to be the beneficiary of another's unselfishness; but every man lives in the community of creatures, and will die when he is excluded from it. The love of would-be self-sacrificers is poison compared to the love of man for man as man, and the just and generous impulses which flow from it.

What the community needs is not self-sacrifice but the creature's justice to the creature. Love is nothing else than such justice. Justice is defined as giving every man his due. But what is first of all due to every man except faithfulness to him as a creature, and what is love but such faithfulness? It is a misunderstanding of the Christian faith and confusion of thought to argue that love is higher and more difficult than justice.

Love defined as self-sacrifice and justice defined as giving men their due (unless as creatures), confuse the problem of the good life. Men who define love as God's love for sinners have a rather dim view of love between the sexes, the love of friends, and all the decencies which make life sweet. *Agape* is contrasted with *eros* and *philia* to the discredit of the latter as deficient or even false love; and ordinary *justice* is looked down upon as a poor substitute to the transcendent, self-giving and uncalculating love. Since self-love enters into the commonality of love and justice as practised by men. Christian poets look at these as inferior virtues to be superseded by *agape* in the world to come. So we have once again a spirituality which contains elements of alienation from the life of the creature as creature. All this may make a man critical and uneasy, but it does little toward the redemption of our common life.

In the Bible the word love is used with a positive appreciation of *eros* and *philia*. It is taken for granted that a man's love of his being and good; his love of wife, family and friends; his love of his people and tongue, — are unqualifiedly and without reservation real love. A man's affection for his fellowmen, his love of beauty and goodness, his kindly and generous impulses, cannot be brushed aside as inferior and short of the glory of God. How in fact is true love, the love of the creature as creature, to be expressed except in human love and justice as exercised in daily intercourse, at home, in the market place and among one's neighbors? What does the practice of Christianity consist of if not in the quiet and small decencies which are the very vehicles of "true love?" How does a man practice *agape* if not in his faithfulness to his neighbor, in his sensitivity to the needs and hopes of his fellowmen, in his understanding and patience and doing what little he can for the fruition of his neighbor? How does one love if not by his thoughtfulness and by giving a man his due as the occasion arises? In short, the concrete decencies which men owe one another and expect

from one another in affection, with justice and faithfulness, are the very stuff of love, the creature's regard for the creature.

It is as we day by day acknowledge our responsibility, in this matter and that, in this form or that, to treat our fellowmen according to obvious rules of justice that we come to grips with the ultimate questions of life, and meet our God and his creation. It is in the give and take of "the concrete problems of ethics" that we actually come to know the grace of God and the judgment of God, the meanings justice and love, of repentance, faith, hope and the whole mystery of the kingdom of God. There is no existence of the creature as creature except in the exercise of his powers as a human being; and he exercises these powers in his intercourse with his fellowmen and the responsibilities which emerge from it. Love among sinners is the vehicle of the Creator's love; and by our exercise of such love or justice, the living God redeems our common life for the creature's peace in our common life.

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## *The Prospect of Love*

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

When love is defined as self-giving — as spontaneous, unmotivated, unevaluating, self-emptying — the prospect of love is dim indeed. It is dim because God the Creator, who put us in this world to enjoy him in his creation, in ourselves, in our neighbors, in the opportunities and fulfilments this world affords, — will not bless a love which does not grow out of respect for creation and does not tend toward a fulfilment of the creature. And man is no more favorable to self-sacrifice than God. Even while he is alienated from creation and seeks a good beyond it, he still has sense enough to love his life and seek after goods, friendship, security, power, and the like, which are the contents of his self-love, and essential to his commerce with his fellowmen. He may engage in self-sacrifice. But he does not do it spontaneously, without motivation, but because and when he cannot live as a human being, in his integrity and love, without choosing the loss of some good and even of life itself. The prospect of love becomes other than sheer failure and frustration when as the mutual recognition of creatures as creatures, in their common anxiety for life and hope of fulfilment, it is acknowledged as the very possibility of life and its fruition in humanity. If love is to have a decent chance in this world, men must consent to it with all their mind as well as with all their heart. It must be clear that love is humanity: the way of man which is eminently rational, or intelligent, as well as the law of God. If Christian love were not human love, the love which is the substance of human existence as the bond between man and man, it would be an alien principle, a *faux pas*, which would be condemned to eventual disqualification as the way of life. Therefore it is of utmost importance for the future of love that it be thought of not as a transcending but as a fulfilling of humanity.

The agapist notion that love is a divine and not a human possibility needs to be qualified with a recognition that it was in fact exercised by a human being whose name was Jesus; a man who lived in Palestine “under Pontius Pilate.” The Christian faith stands or falls, the possibility of love is established or removed, we have hope or do not have hope, according as we do or do not take seriously and consider joyfully, that a man, flesh of our flesh, bone of our bone, did in truth love God with all his mind, soul and strength, and did in truth love his neighbor as himself. Jesus loved as a man, and with the powers of a man; with the spirit of a man; with the will and affections of a man; tempted as a man and with the faith and hope of a man in God. His freedom to love was the freedom of a man in whom the power of anxiety and



despair worked with its common virulence, and was overcome through the same faith and hope energized by love. In short, a man loved as a man, consenting with joy at once to the Creator and to creation. It is this fact that gives love a prospect of fulfilment. It is because Jesus loved that sinners were saved, and without his love as a man there is no salvation. The good news is that a man has loved and still loves. The Gospel of the resurrection and ascension without the Gospel of the love of the man Jesus is incongruous with the Christian life.

A Christology in which the humanity of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is stated clearly and without doubletalk is indispensable for the establishment of love as the *ethos* of the Christian Church. Any view of Christ which obscures this humanity, whether by subtly denying it or by idealizing it beyond the reach of ordinary people, in its orthodox, liberal, or neo-orthodox forms, darkens the prospect of love. The neo-orthodox Christology, as implied in Nygren's view of *agape*, and stated by other well known proponents like Brunner and Barth, is in line with the orthodox doctrine of Christ according to which the person of Christ, as it were, in the core of his being is the divine logos and not a human being. When Nygren identifies the love of Jesus with the love of God he identifies Jesus as God and not as man, and this not only goes against the evidence of the Gospels but also confuses the prospect of love. If Jesus' love was the love of God and not the love of a man, it is not a love for men or a love which is at once required of man and possible for men. But if it is not required of us and possible for us, it is none of our affair. The whole point of Jesus' humanity in relation to us is that his love is a presentation to us both of the necessity and the possibility of it.

The Sonship of Jesus in this connection means that God was in Christ restoring love to its own as the bond of community. Were there no God, there were no Son of God; no humanity of Jesus and no saving love creating the love of Jesus among us. If God were not for us, and had not saved us from bondage of sin and death by his Son, we would know no Son, no Jesus, no realization of love, no promise and no hope. Without the love of God there would have been no love of Jesus. This we know because our own love is a gift through Jesus. The gospel is the gospel of God; of the love and omnipotence of God. In this the orthodox and the neo-orthodox are right in expressing the mind of the Church.

But, the doctrine that the divine logos is the person of Christ is still untenable. Even though the possibility of the love of the Son of God was and is from God, the love of the Son is the love of a man; a love that goes with the faithfulness of a man and the hope that grows from it. In this matter the power and acting of God are no simple substitutes for the power and acting of a man. It is the peculiarity of

the acting of God the Creator that it realizes rather than annihilates the acting of man. The power of God is contradistinguished from the power of the creature in that the exercise of it establishes the power of the creature, so that when by God's creation and redeeming act the creature acts as creature, by God's omnipotence the creature's act — *his* faith, hope, and love — becomes "the means of God's grace." Such is the working of the living God who both creates and saves by his Word and Spirit. When God acts as God and man acts as man; God speaking as God, man hearing as man, — the Spirit of God brings to pass the love which is humanity.

But the point of this paragraph is that if we may live in the hope of love it is because we were first loved by the man of Nazareth. The promise of love can only be in its actuality. Love is neither first of all a human ideal nor an *Eigenschaft*, a private and incommunicable property of the Deity. It is what has been accomplished among us (Lk. 1.1). It is the love of Jesus for us who are creatures who are sinners; the love which has made us free to love our neighbor as ourselves; the love of Jesus, crucified and risen, which is the possibility and prospect of love among us.

I am not forgetting "the suffering servant" and him who reconciled us to God and one another by his death and resurrection. But it were a grievous error to see in Jesus self-sacrificing love without remembering that what makes the self-giving of Jesus saving and joyous is the love which restores men to the joy of humanity by the recognition of man by man. Jesus' self-giving, with the suffering it entailed in his living and dying, was a necessity laid upon him by the very joy of his being with his neighbor, which overcame sin, death, the devil and all evil. The spontaneous and undemanding creative love of Jesus was nevertheless the outcome of a faith, a faithfulness to God and man which goes with faithfulness to one's own being as God's creation. The self-giving love of Jesus was grounded in his love for his *neighbor as himself*. It is because he loved as himself that he gave himself. It is by his love as himself that the sinners were "*saved*:" regained their dignity and joy as human beings. Jesus saved the sinners into humanity by recreating community between them and himself. And doing this he loved them as himself.

There has been much discussion as to whether Jesus founded the Church. If by the Church we understand churches with their ministries, sacraments, governments, I think none but an anxious ecclesiastic would be sure that Jesus founded them. I wish to offend no one. I simply say the matter is doubtful. But if by the Church we are to understand an association of human beings saved by Jesus, then I think there is no doubt that Jesus founded it. When Jesus revealed himself as the sinners' neighbor, and persuaded them to be neighbors, people

open one to another, in faithfulness one to another's humanity, he restored community and in that very doing, he founded the Church. When a man by the love of Jesus loves his neighbor, there is the Church, and nowhere else is the Church except in a state of negation and corruption. The Church is the right association of creatures created, being created by God. It is an association of sinners who have met Jesus Christ, and in joy have met a man who loves them with the love every man owes to his fellow, but will not give it. It is a company of people who have eaten with Jesus, and drunk with him, and laughed with him with that laughter which comes from the depths of humanity. The Church is the people who have followed Jesus around, and seen his mighty works, none mightier than their own salvation, and glorified the Father in heaven. The Church came with Jesus, and it will remain with Jesus.

The Church exists where Jesus is received with joy; where this creature (Jesus) open to his neighbor, opens a man to his own neighbor, and so on for ever. Since the saving work of Jesus is the opening up of men one to another, there is a living connection between the Gospel and Ethics, Christ and the Church. People have asked for ages, "What connection is there between God's loving us and our loving one another?" We have been told that because God loved us, we ought to love one another; that since God gave his Son for us, we ought also to give ourselves one to another. But Christians usually find it easier and less demanding to love God who loved them, than to love others who do not love them; because it is one thing to love one who loves us, and to love one who does not love us. And the "ought" uttered by reason has dubious validity. It simply does not seem to us that we ought to love men because God loves us. Reason and affection alike dictate that we ought to love one who loves us; but they do not dictate that because one loves us we should love another.

But such arguing has nothing to do with love in the Church. The love of Jesus is not a *virtue* we *imitate* but a *power* which makes us free for love. The love of Jesus is his openness toward us, which by nature opens us to him, as this person who loves us; and in him, to our neighbor. By the love of Jesus we enter into community, and the Church is founded and established. It is not possible to love Jesus and not to love someone else, because it is not a goodness peculiar to Jesus we are to love, but him as a human being who by his humanity has made us free to be human, that is to love all men as human beings. This love is a power which overcomes sin, and opens up the shut up and self-destroying soul to men as men. Jesus made sinners free for love, and in so doing, he enabled them to love their neighbor as themselves. The bond between Jesus' love for us and our love for our neighbor is first of all not an "ought" but a freedom from the power of sin, death,

the devil, the world, wrath and hell, with joy; a freedom whose proper exercise is the love of man for himself, his God, and his neighbor, without confusion and without separation.

We should not confuse the "thou shalt" of the divine commandment with the "ought" and the "therefore," the imperative and the rationale, of the individual conscience responding to "the superego," to society and its coercions. "The ought" pronounced by institutions, including the ecclesiastical, has indeed a confused grounding in love. "God has loved us, therefore, we ought to love one another" is, without its grounding in the love of Jesus for the sinners, a pseudological statement and carries a coercive undertone. It is incongruous with the love of the neighbor as ourselves, which is an act of obedience having for its context the Church not as an institution but as an association rooted in Jesus' love for sinners, in the meeting of man and man through him. It is one thing to be constrained by the love of Jesus, and quite another to be coerced by the threats and promises of an institution, even if it is called the Church. The former makes us free; the latter makes us to conform. The former puts us in a position to love, the latter draws out submission. Love belongs with association, not with membership in an institution.

The love of Jesus is a forgiving love. It is at all times a love of sinners, and as such it cannot but be a free and freeing forgiveness. Here we are to be careful not to confuse forgiveness as offered by an institution, with that which we are offered by Jesus, in association with him. An institution does not know sin. It only knows crime against society. A crime is an act against an institution in a society, recognized by the public through the law as disruptive or destructive of that society. Society is concerned with the non-recurrence of the crime. To this end it may punish; it may exact some satisfaction, or even "forgive" when it feels safe, by softening or even omitting a punishment due the criminal. It demands and encourages "repentance" only in so far as a criminal sorry for his deeds of crime is likely not to repeat it.

A society cannot legalize love. It cannot make it a crime that a man does not love his neighbor. It cannot punish enmity except as expressed in a criminal act, and it cannot forgive enmity because it is not concerned with it. Its acquittal of a criminal, in so far as it is an institutional act, has no quality of forgiveness in it, unless the judge sets aside his role as a judge and meets the criminal as a human being.

The forgiveness of Jesus is directed toward sinners and not toward criminals, even though thieves may be recognized as criminals as well as sinners. Jesus saw people not as individuals in "society" but as people among people. He recognized not crimes against society but sin against God and fellowmen. This is why publicans, thieves, harlots, who are criminals, received from him a recognition and forgiveness



which are beyond the mores of society and the practice of its institutions. He was not concerned with their position as criminals, and the forgiveness he offered them was not an acquittal of criminals but a restoration of their humanity and as persons in association with other human beings.

Forgiveness is an act one human being can offer another, and must offer if there is to be human association. A man forgives another not as one individual in "the social organism" or as a functionary of an institution, but as a person who recognizes the criminal as a human being, as a sinner. The miracle of Jesus which gave joy to sinners is that he was able to see criminals as sinners, and therefore as human beings; that he was free and able to see them as sinful men. This very seeing and knowing was his act of forgiveness for which the people glorified God, because they knew that such understanding is a gift of the Creator. The miracle of Jesus was the faithfulness he exercised towards the human beings he met, a faithfulness which was forgiveness and the love of sinners as human beings.

Sin occurs in a "vicious circle." We sin because we are sinned against, and we are sinned against because we sin. We are indifferent because we meet indifference, and we meet indifference because we are indifferent. Love refused breeds the refusal of love, enmity breeds enmity. And deep and devastating is the offence of enmity. Not to love is to break up human association and therewith to evoke despair through the destruction of humanity which accompanies the break up. The withholding of love among human beings is an act of unique violation, which empties life of all joy because it drains away our humanity. When we are not loved we are murdered and retaliate even as we die with murder which is sin. And our misery becomes immovable because we see our sin as a just response rather than the provocation. The only way we know to hold on to ourselves is to protest our own justness in the matter, which only establishes both our fury and the fury of our neighbor; our fury of violated innocence and his fury at our infinite injustice. The only thing institutions do or can do in this state of human misery is to provide us with the law which coerces a way of life which makes for "peace" and order without giving us joy. For this reason we meet "good" people in our churches as well as our other institutions, but we meet too little joy.

The miracle of Jesus is that in him the vicious circle is broken. Here was a man free from the fury of violated humanity; a man who in his faithfulness was able to destroy this fury and to meet the sinner as a man meeting man. Something unheard of was here: a man who would not allow the wrath of the sinner to blind him to the creature who cried from the depths for recognition as creature by his neighbor; a man whom neither death nor the devil were able to provoke, tempt

him as they did, to wrath: to rejecting the sinful creature. This is how (and mystery it is) death and the devil were vanquished, and with them the sinner's fury; and the people praised God. Once the miracle occurred, the circle of sin was broken into and humanity dug out from under a mountain of offences; and there was a "new creature." When this one man loved his neighbor as a creature, as himself, and freed him from his despair and fury, man was opened for men, and forgiveness entered the world as the glory of the Christian Church.

The Church exists by "the forgiveness of sins," which is by Jesus' meeting the people. This is another miracle; another mystery. In the Church, Jesus, crucified and risen, meets the people, in his humanity, to recognize them as sinners who are his neighbors. The risen Christ is still the man Jesus, and it is as the man Jesus that he forgives our sins, restores us to God, ourselves and our neighbor. This is the miracle that is the work of the Spirit of God. When we meet our neighbor, this man and that, this sinner and the other, we meet Jesus; rather Jesus meets us with the love and faithfulness of God. Every man presents Jesus to us, and Jesus speaks by him and forgives by him. Not a ghostly Jesus, not our idea of Jesus, not a Jesus we can objectify and dispose of, but the living and reigning Jesus who overcomes our sin and by whose meeting us God creates a "new man" or us in our true humanity. When Christians associate one with another, they associate in Jesus' company. He is in the midst of them, as he was in the midst of those who ate and walked with him nineteen hundred years ago. Thus the Church is gathered around Jesus by the power of God's Spirit, each man speaking to his neighbor in Christ's behalf because Christ in the Spirit speaks by his "brother."

I am not Jesus, and my neighbor is not Jesus. I am a sinner before Christ, and so is my neighbor a sinner before Christ. I am forgiven by Christ, and so is my neighbor forgiven by him. Nevertheless, as Christ forgives us, we are to forgive one another. Christ's forgiveness makes us free, and we act in our freedom when we forgive one another. We cannot associate except to love, and we love to forgive and to be forgiven; ourselves to forgive our neighbor and ourselves to be forgiven by our neighbor. If we despise the love, and therefore the forgiveness of our neighbor, we have no neighbor and we reject the love of Jesus. If we do not receive our fellowman in the name of Jesus, if we do not rejoice in *his* love and forgiveness, we reject the love of God and blaspheme against his Spirit. Everything in the Church, in a sense, depends upon whether we do or do not put ourselves in the position of receiving the forgiving love of God from the hand of our neighbor; upon whether we do or do not repent before our neighbor. If we do not meet our neighbor, in all simplicity, as those who have sinned against him and need his forgiveness for our very existence as human beings,

we have not met Jesus and we do not know the power of God. Unless our neighbor be our minister, and we our neighbor's minister, there is no Church; and if no Church, neither ministry, nor the Word and the Sacraments. It is futile to seek to deceive God. Any man who does not have the grace, the trust, the humility, the understanding, to pray his neighbor's forgiveness and to hope for his love, does not believe in God and the love of Jesus is not in him. Any man who does not have the grace, the trust, the humility, the understanding, to pray that he may forgive his neighbor and to hope for the love which makes him free to do so, does not believe in the living God and has already turned his back on Jesus. The Church is where men forgive one another and love one another, because Jesus has opened them one to another. The Church is the association of men as human beings. But there is no such association without the recognition of men by men. But sinners do not give such recognition one to another, and they sin against one another as they sin against the Creator. They sin one against another; therefore, unless they forgive one another, they do not show that they recognize one another. But if they do not recognize one another, they do not love one another — and there is no Church, because there is no association of human beings, no joy, no fruition, no humanity.

Ecclesiastical institutions tell us that each man sins against God; that he sins by transgressing the law, which is most insistent in matters like theft, adultery, and murder, which are crimes against society. They tell us that Jesus Christ has atoned for our crimes by his death, and provided "the means of grace" available through the institution, for our acquittal and restoration to God's favor, which shall ensue in a happy life in this world and in the next. They offer us God's forgiveness, provided we repent of our crimes and promise not to commit them again. But they are well aware that we are not reliable. Therefore, they also impress upon us the dire consequences of sin, which are excommunication of a sort in this world and hell in the next. The whole system is shot through with appeal to fear of punishment, which is an institution's ultimate device for producing conformity. The words are the words of Scripture, but the mind of Scripture is distorted to a caricature. This is so because the institution has no competence for love and forgiveness. Institutions do not love, and they do not forgive. They only provide for "godly and lawful" behavior compatible with a "righteousness" which neither forgives nor asks for forgiveness. Men whose affairs with God are more or less in order through the satisfaction offered to God by the Son of God, and do not commit crimes prohibited by the law of God as given in the second table of Moses, have no occasion to ask the forgiveness of their fellow churchmembers, and no reason to forgive those who do violate the law. It is in fact understood that it is a beastly business to need men's forgiveness, and that

nobody can blame a man if he will not forgive those who offend him. Thus it is that unforgiving men not only exist in our churches but also thrive in them, if they contribute palpably to the work of the institution. Forgiveness is not essential to the existence and prosperity of any institution — including the churches.

This is not so in "the body of Christ." The members of this body live by the love of their neighbors. Forgiveness is the very life they receive one from another. With Jesus Christ in their midst as the Head of the body, they live one to another, building one another up with the love of Christ which makes them free from the power of sin and death, free to quicken one another and to give one another joy. With them it is not a matter of law, crime, guilt, fear, and the like, but of faithfulness, repentance, prayer, hope, always blessed by the grace of Jesus Christ and the miracle of love with joy. "The body of Christ" is no institution, with its claims upon men's "loyalty" because of services rendered, but a company of people gathered around Jesus, joyful with him and one with another, hearing his words laden with his grace, and happily breaking bread together in thankfulness. Indeed, they know the wrath in sin and the bitterness of death in it. Publicans, harlots, thieves, murderers, cry out for mercy. But so do all the loveless who have committed no crimes; those who have turned away from their neighbors in the misery of despair. Not that they do not know the difference between a thief and an honest man, or an adulterer and a lover. But in Christ's company, they are equal. They are human beings forgiven of their sin and made free to love one another as themselves. The honest man breaks bread with the thief and the adulteress with faithful housewife. Indeed, it does matter that people commit crimes, and that others are good citizens. But in this company it does not matter as it matters that they all are with Jesus and one with another, forgiven, forgiving, hoping to be forgiven and to forgive. They know one law: that they are to love one another. They know one evil: that they have been unfaithful one to another. They know one guilt, which is incurred by denying that they are neighbor; and one fear, that they will be separated from their neighbor. These people know that their business is with God and their neighbor, and not with an institution. Of course they have to behave themselves and play their rôles in the institution. This is necessary "for order and decency." But when it comes to worshipping God, confessing their sins, hoping for salvation, they have to do not with law, institution, organization, but with souls and people, with flesh and blood, with human sensibility. They know that joy and misery occur not in organizations and playing of rôles, but among persons who alone are competent to give joy with their love and to induce misery with their indifference. In the world where men despair of love, people pretend that what is good for the institution is



good for human beings. But in the Church where Jesus creates the hope of love, people know that it is their neighbor who makes the difference between joy and sorrow. In the world where sinners despair of their neighbors, people pretend that every good is from the institutions. So they do their duty and wait for their reward. But in the Church where Jesus creates hope among neighbors, people dare even to expose themselves to their neighbors, knowing that only thus shall they live in an association of human beings. The world and the institutions which serve it work with the hopeless premise that love is an impossibility. But in the Church, where Jesus speaks and acts among the people, love and forgiveness are the cement in human association; they uphold a vessel that contains not despair but joy.

Of course, it is contemptuous for men to say that love is a "simple human possibility;" it is contemptuous of God, of his Son and his Spirit. But it is equally contemptuous of the triune God to say that it is not possible for a man to love his neighbor as himself. If love be impossible, God has no power, and there is no God. But God is and is able, for Jesus lived and loved and saved sinners. Since Jesus loved, and Jesus was a man, love is possible among men, and with love the Church also is possible. The Church was founded by Jesus Christ, therefore love is possible, and so is forgiveness. If this were not so, faith and hope also would not be possible, and it would be as though Jesus had not lived. But Jesus did live. He did found the Church. In the Church, in the Communion of saints, we are to live in hope: in the hope of loving and being loved; in love received and given.

By faith, a Christian knows himself as a Christian and he knows every man as his neighbor. By faith, he knows his mission to love, and he knows his need to be forgiven and loved by every man. By faith, he knows that he is Christ's and he knows that so also is his neighbor. As a neighbor who is to love his neighbor as himself, he goes out to meet sinners for whom Christ died and by whom Christ saves him as by him he saves them.

Christians will do this not as solitary heroes but as they are prayed for, helped, encouraged, suffered and rejoiced with, in short builded up by the body of Christ, by Jesus himself through the members of his body. Christians build one another up as they hear the Word of God and participate in Baptism and the Lord's Supper, and accept the discipline of the Church. These institutions *in* the Church are "the means of grace" provided by the living God, and without them the Christians have no life to share. But, they are institutions *in* the Church; institutions which presuppose, and therefore, by God's power, create and sustain the Church. They are not the Church, or a substitute for the *ethos* of the associated community. Unless there is grace in the Church, there are no means of grace in it. There is no love and forgiveness of

God without the love and forgiveness of Jesus, and there is no love and forgiveness of Jesus where "Christians" have no hope of loving and forgiving one another. The mission of the Church today requires that we insist upon this point and put it at the center of our believing that the Church exists as the body of Christ.

The prospects of love in our day are bright in so far as God in Christ Jesus creates and sustains the Church by his Spirit who creates and sustains love and forgiveness among us; the love in question being the love wherewith we are loved of God in the love and forgiveness of Jesus. But this love we receive by the love of God working in our neighbor, by the grace of God working in us and opening us up to his judgment and mercy we know in our commerce with our neighbor who is being saved for the exercise of love and forgiveness even as we are. It were a pity to regard this love either as impossible or as already possessed, because in either case we are tempted to reject the Gospel of God.

I do not wish to be understood as saying that if we understand love better and approach its practice with hope, we shall readily forgive and love, and be forgiven and loved, and the golden age will be here. Doubtless we must be ready to fail both as givers and as receivers of forgiveness, and therefore as those who love and are loved. I offer you no sure and painless prescription for success in this matter. My duty is to point out that the Communion of saints is, together with preaching and the sacraments, an indispensable "means of grace;" and that when we receive our neighbor as God's minister for us, we have the promise of God in the Church that we shall enjoy a peace and joy which shall make for the peace and joy of God's world, to his own glory with joy which is the last end for which He created it and sustains it.

What I am pleading for is faith in man, in any man; rather, I am pleading for faith in God whose love and forgiveness are promised in and to the Communion of saints. There was a time when people believed in man, and said they believed in God. They construed their own good will and sundry kindnesses as expressions of the love of God and Jesus. I do not say that these "liberals" did not love the creature. But I do say that faith in man was understood as the conviction that men are "good," possessing kindness and justice, and therefore to be trusted to love and to do good. What was obscured and even forgotten is that good men are sinners, and need the forgiveness of God and their neighbor. With this obscuring and forgetting went a failure to recognize the human being as a creature in bondage; a failure of the kind of love which is the *ethos* of the Communion of saints. Therefore, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," which belongs properly in the Church or among creatures under the power of Jesus' love, became

unintelligible and was construed as a counsel of perfection. In short, in so far as faith in man was not faith in man the creature in sin, it was a faith which despoiled the Gospel and misunderstood both Jesus and the Church. God was understood not a Creator and Redeemer, but as the ground and perfection of human love as exercised by the believers in man. Such faith made the Church as the means of grace superfluous, and blocked the very grace of God among us.

But the recent protests against such faith in man have led to a revival of the traditional absurdity of faith in God as against faith in man. Of course, Augustinianism, as against Pelagianism, is valid. Without the grace of God, man is without the power of both being and love. Without the Creator there is no creature, and without the Redeemer there is only the bondage of the creature to sin and enmity. In this matter, and so far, the neo-orthodox have made their point which belongs at the center of the Christian faith. But unless we go further, we turn this same faith into superstition. The grace of God which creates a "new being" does not operate as a private power, by the action of God upon the individual sinner apart from the Church. Faith in God which denies the "means of grace" is a supernaturalism which itself is a denial of not only the Incarnation and the Atonement, but also of the whole self-revelation of God as understood through the Scriptures. Moreover, faith in God which limits the means of grace to the cult of the Christian institutions, to Baptism and the Lord's Supper, even when it adds to these preaching and "discipline," is bound to end either in sentimentalism or in despair. The truth seems to be that any faith in God which omits faith in the grace of God working in the Communion of sinners acting as priests toward one another is an idolatrous superstition, and leads not to the upbuilding of the Church but to its corruption into a cluster of religious institutions lacking the grace of God. If faith in man does not create love, neither does faith in God, unless it is exercised in the Communion of saints or the Church.

The miracle of love occurred by the grace of God through the love of Jesus. Our faith in God is inseparable from our faith in Jesus by whose love we are saved for love. We are saved by the power of God working by his love, and not by the power of Jesus' love. So we have faith in God. But without the human love of Jesus, the love of the creature with the power of the creature, we do not receive or know the power of God's love. If we despise the human love of Jesus, or do not have faith in him, we shut ourselves to the love of God, or do not have faith in him. So it is that faith in God and faith in the man Jesus are bound together; so that to have faith in the one and not in the other is not to have faith. But faith in God is not faith in man, and faith in man is not faith in God. These two are distinct as well as inseparable.

Are we then to believe in Jesus the creature as the bearer of God's grace, and not in our neighbor the sinner as the bearer of the same grace? Are we to say that God loves in and through the just but not through the unjust? And who is it that ties God's hands? Besides, God in Jesus called to himself a people, to be his servants and the means of his grace among themselves for the upbuilding of the Church. If Jesus by his love founded the Church, founded the Communion of saints for their life and strength as members of the same body, then it is blasphemous and deadly not to believe in man; that is, not to believe that the creature and sinner who is one's neighbor is in truth the means of grace ordained by God and enabled by Jesus for his vocation. There is not faith in God without faith in man the sinner who is being quickened and strengthened for his life and vocation in the Communion of saints; whether the sinner be oneself or one's neighbor. Faith in man is faith in oneself as well as in one's neighbor, since by God's grace I who am this sinner am as this sinner the means of my neighbor's faith in God. I am to have faith in myself, or I am to believe that by God's power the love and forgiveness of this sinner and creature which I am, mark the salvation of my neighbor. This is the miracle, the two way miracle, by which I and my neighbor are surprised in the Church and in which we are to rejoice giving thanks to God. By this miracle, and under it, we are to believe in God and in man; in God who is Creator and Holy, and in man who is creature and sinner. We are not to despise the sinner, and his forgiveness and his love; neither are we who are sinners to withhold from him the forgiveness and love which are his due. For by the peculiar omnipotence of the living God, the sinner's love and forgiveness, under grace the love and forgiveness of the creature, are the means of God's grace and blessing to the joy of his saints.

Faith in man the creature and sinner cannot be limited to the Church as those who live under the Christian institutions and participate in them. Whereas it is easy to distinguish between the baptised and the not baptised, between churchgoers and not churchgoers, it is not equally easy to separate the servants of God from those who are not his servants. To have faith in a Protestant but not in a Catholic, in a Catholic but not in a Jew, in a Jew but not in a Buddhist, in this man one meets but not in that other, is not to have faith in God. If faith in God is to believe his promise of love in Christ Jesus, then to think that He will not and cannot fulfil this promise through a man we meet because this man is not a "Christian" is to deny God's providence and his power. To meet any man with the fixed notion that he is not an angel of God, a means of grace, an occasion for the working of God's judgment and mercy, is to deny God. To despise the love and forgiveness of any man because he does not confess the Messiah and his cross is to act in a pride which can only end in shutting off



God who is the Lord of all men and will do with them as He will do with them. The freedom and sovereignty of God in his dealings with us can mean no less than that we are to love and forgive any man, and are to expect him to love and forgive us; and God's arm is not shortened, so that He may not bless him and me because of the sin in us. We are to believe in all men provided we approach them as creatures and sinners under God's grace. No man is excluded from the service of God; therefore we are to believe in anyone we meet as our neighbor. We are to be grateful to God for him and to rejoice in his love by the hope in us. Christians are to love all men; therefore they may hope in all men. One way love is no love for human beings.

The agapists have had a dim view of the prospects of love in our common life as citizens engaged in economic and political activity. They have countered "the sentimentalism" of the past with a "realism" which delivers our public life to the operations of legal justice and power. Their "sacrificial love" is so incongruous with business and politics that the men of the world, those engaged in public pursuits have been left with "enlightened self-interest" as the working *ethos* of their activities. The agapists hope that love is not altogether irrelevant to justice and common wellbeing in society at large, national or international. They have insisted that *agape* is needed for a proper execution of justice in a harmony of interests in our world. But self-sacrifice remains inassimilable to economic relations and to our political life. "The practical man" does not live by *agape*, and indeed can make neither head nor tail of it. We are in the embarrassing situation of Christians talking of *agape* and living by "self-interest," more or less enlightened, more or less qualified by regard for the interests, economic and political, of others.

I think we have to allow that in the daily and continuing life of the people engaged in the pursuit of goods, status, security, power in our "age of power and abundance," self-sacrifice is neither offered nor expected among us. In our way of life and in our institutions, we do not ask or expect that men shall sacrifice their interest for our own; we do not intend to and are not expected to sacrifice our interests for those of others. Producers and buyers, managers and workers, businessmen, technicians, professionals, teachers and preachers — in short all who make a living in our society, and seek the goods available in it are expected to receive as well as give, to live in a mutuality without which there would be no common life. In international, interracial, and sundry more or less global, relations, the several contending entities are expected to pursue their own interests, but to do so intelligently and with minimum of peril to themselves in the context of the one world being forged by "the age of science." Nobody expects another to sacrifice his interests for another, and nobody expects to do the same.

Self-sacrifice is out of the question. "*Agape*" as policy is absurd. It remains, with its cross exhibited in churches, a cultic symbol; a verbal, as well as material, symbol, which identifies the churches as institutions, but does not characterize our way of life. As much is admitted by thinkers who hope that *agape* somehow makes for an increase of justice.

This hope is not altogether a dream. Justice, regard for others' interests, is likely to exist more among people who love one another than among strangers and enemies. In fact, without love justice is likely to turn into a scramble for goods, and may utterly disappear. This is too obvious to require elaborate discussion and proof. But the question remains as to what the love is which makes for justice, and even becomes a bond of humanity among seekers of partial goods, especially their own. It is an unmotivated, self-denying, self sacrificing love that enables us to live in peace, and even affection, with people who may well be our rivals? I do not see that a spirit of *agape*, working directly in public life, is a factor in the making of community. Profession of a love directed toward another instead of oneself is an embarrassment in human relations. One is seldom comfortable in the presence of self-giving people, and one is bound to wonder if there is not a mistake, or even an inhumanity, in such a profession. There are indeed situations in which we are happy to observe unselfishness, loyalty, devotion, in ourselves and in others. But we may rightly shrink from people who are simply selfless and habitually preferring the good of others to their own. What makes for peace and joy among men engaged in the businesses of our common life is not "*agape*," but the creature's regard for his fellowcreature, even while they are engaged in a given business, each for his benefit. Regard for another's interest, and willingness to act on it, requires not "the spirit of self-denial", but a recognition of the other as the creature-sinner who stands before one bearing the possibility of that joy which goes with such recognition offered and hoped for. What the people, of any race, color, or creed, of whatever status and power, hope for, when they meet others in the several businesses which bring them together, is not only a private or public benefit, but also a "look" which shall be one of reconciliation and love. We can stand and accept various degrees of self-love and self-seeking, and we can have joy, provided that we meet a "neighbor" who recognizes us as the restive creatures that we are, and stays before us open to give and to receive love. When our business with others is blessed with the union of man with man, then it is successful with the authentic profit of humanity. When it lacks this union, there is no profit that will make up for it, or will not leave us empty. The grave and infuriating injustice in public life is not "selfishness," as the justice in it is not "*agape*." It is rather the ignoring and virtual annihilation of human beings. It is the identification of them with rôles; the definition of them by their classification in

the public life; the denial to them of their concrete and universal dignity as "intelligent creation." Primal justice is humanity, and humanity is the love of the neighbor as oneself; and without it public life lacks the meaning which alone makes every man's life a *bonum solidum*. Without it no unselfishness, no unprudential and self-sacrificing love, is of avail for the making of peace. With it, politics and business become occasions for the fruition of the creature.

It were therefore better for the health of the Church in the world that love were recognized as a mutual concern of God's creatures made at once real and possible by the Word of God the Creator and Redeemer; and not a supernatural, self-annihilating altruism which avails only to confuse and paralyze the people called Christians. Love may and will give itself, as indeed did Jesus. But self-giving as such is not love; it is a corruption of it. What the age needs is men who love and hope for the love of their neighbors, and not self-immolating martyrs praised by institutional propagandists to the permanent confounding of the Church, and continued and perilous virulence of inhumanity in our world. If we the advocates of Christianity as the salvation of the world are serious about the Gospel, let us stop "talking big" to the people about a Christian love which is as inhuman as it is impossible and futile, and let us become witnesses to Jesus Christ who came to persuade and enable us to love our neighbor as ourselves; that is to love men and to hope for their love, as befits creatures who exist under the grace of God.















Jung  
AND  
Analytical Psychology

*by*

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## *Carl Alfred Meier*

Dr. Carl Alfred Meier, internationally prominent psychiatrist, successor to Dr. Jung as Professor at the Swiss Federal Institute (ETH) was born in 1905, in Schaffhausen, Switzerland. Upon completing his medical education at the University of Zürich, Medical School, (M.D. 1929) he pursued further graduate studies at the Ecole de Medicine, Sorbonne Paris and the University of Vienna, Medical School.

For five years, 1930-1936, Dr. Meier served as Assistant Doctor and Director of Laboratory Research at Burgholzli Psychiatric Clinic, Zürich. During that time he was a co-worker of Eugen Bleuler, M.D. and H. W. Maier, M.D. In 1936, he received a Specialist Degree in Psychiatry.

Because of Professor Meier's close relationship with Dr. Carl G. Jung, Dr. Meier became active in many areas related to Analytical Psychology. From 1933-1943, he served as General Secretary of the International Society for Medical Psychotherapy (while C. G. Jung was President); from 1933-1948, he served as Vice-President of the Swiss Society for Practical Psychology; 1946-1950, he served as President of the Psychological Club of Zürich. In 1948, Dr. Meier founded the C. G. Jung-Institute, Zürich, and served as its President until 1957. He is also the founder (1957) of the International Association for Analytical Psychology.

In 1949, Dr. Meier was appointed as Professor at the Swiss Federal Institute (ETH) succeeding Dr. Jung upon his retirement.

Ever since 1935, Dr. Meier has been a prolific writer in the field of medical psychology and psychotherapy. He has read papers in English, French, Italian and German, to learned societies in most European countries and at a great number of International Congresses.

He has been generally acclaimed as the most brilliant disciple of Dr. Jung.

## *Foreword*

In many ways the Cutting Lectures delivered at Andover Newton Theological School by Professor Carl Alfred Meier, M.D. of Zürich, Switzerland, should be looked upon as a milestone in the area of Religion and Analytical Psychology. That Analytical Psychology has made a genuine contribution to our understanding of man's relationship to his Creator, and man's relationship to himself in the realm of Spirit or Psyche is no longer a debatable question. The profound knowledge of and scholarship in all areas of man's existence have made Analytical Psychology *sine qua non* in our attempt to understand man's religious growth throughout the ages.

Very few people are so eminently qualified to deal with the immensity of Carl Gustav Jung's contributions as is Carl Alfred Meier. Through his continuous emphases on the totality of man's nature and man's genuine need for a healthy relationship to his God, Meier has shown extraordinary capacity for relating the empirical knowledge of psychology to Christian theology.

The lectures as they appear here are essentially as they were delivered by Professor Meier.

John Milton Billinsky, Professor  
Andover Newton Theological School

Newton Centre, Massachusetts

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# I

## *Jung and Analytical Psychology*

During months of preparation for these four lectures, I became aware that my layman's view on possible theological implications of analytical psychology and its practice, the analyses, was limited and that I had to give more thought to the matter. I became tremendously interested, more so than I had anticipated, and as a result of my thinking I came to the conclusion that whatever we do in analytical psychology and particularly in personal analysis is far from being explained only by psychological means. I came to the conclusion, which I had tentatively formulated some ten years ago, that the effects analysis may have, whatever they may be, particularly in cases with disturbed patients, or in cases where there are definite neurotic symptoms, cannot be understood by psychological knowledge alone. This, I am sure, many analysts and psychologists would not accept; not too long ago I might myself have taken exception to any such statement.

The question of healing as such is, of course, so complicated, so complex, and so many known and unknown factors are involved in it, that it may not be too astonishing if a psychologist in summing up his experiences, or in trying to give an explanation for whatever he may have experienced in the more or less convincing successes of his practical work, is really confused by the multiplicity of unknowns in his equation. For this reason, I must say, after nearly thirty years of experience in this field, that the cure, the healing of a mental disease or neurosis is to me a riddle, or if you wish a miracle, even perhaps more so now than it was when I was a beginner. You may be astonished at the fact that it took me such a long time to realize the vital importance of what I may call the religious factor in the treatment and healing of neurotic people. But as we describe the complicated problems in psychotherapy the reason for this may be clear. The religious phenomena occurring during psychotherapy are concealed in a subtle way, so that if one does not see things from the point of view of a participant in religion he may miss this altogether; in other words he may try to understand those facts, those effects, those phenomena in terms which are non religious. We know very well that the Freudian school still maintains that phenomena of such a nature should really be reduced to their biological origins, for to call such phenomena religious must be regarded as misinterpretation. This sort of prejudice can be attributed to the medical training of most psychotherapists and psychiatrists. Too often such training is devoid not only of the knowledge that is needed in order to understand religious phenomenology, but also devoid of a

proper kind of logical thinking which will allow a doctor to draw necessary inferences and conclusions from material of this sort. A doctor is biased in a particular way, so that he tends to explain all the phenomena he may observe in his own terms. As a result, he eliminates religious phenomena, and is inclined not to admit that there may have been certain factors in the decisive part of the treatment which cannot be, and must not be, explained on the level of science, particularly natural science.

Since I am a physician, I had to go a long way to come to the point where I realised that the religious factor is of vital importance in the treatment and healing of people suffering from mental illness and neurotic disturbances, in spite of the fact that I have had the privilege of being a personal pupil of Jung who has always recognized the religious factor. But Jung did not, as far as I can see, support his belief in the importance of the religious factor with the necessary proof until 1932 when he read a paper at a conference of Alsatian Parsons. I hope, therefore, that I may be forgiven for not having reached this conclusion earlier myself. As a matter of fact, I may say that this is rather an advantage, for in this way it cannot very well be said that I took this conviction over from my teacher. I had to learn the lesson myself, and I believe that this is in harmony with one of the basic tenets of analysis, namely, that a given realisation can only be considered as being a definite one and a real achievement when we discover its truth ourselves and not when we simply take it on, either from books or from what our teacher, however wise he may be, tells us. I shall go into these deeper problems in the fourth lecture; now my task is to give the outlines and basic concepts of Jungian psychology.

This in itself is a difficult task, because there is no definite Jungian system which will let us proceed methodically to outline Jung's ideas. I have, therefore, chosen another method, which is biographical or chronological. Something of Jung's background and his personal and professional development and career should be known since all his findings stem from his own life or experiences with his patients. The remarkable quality of Jungian psychology is that its founder, C. G. Jung, has always applied his own findings first on himself. This fact, by-the-way, justifies a rather chronological-biographical way of outlining Jungian thought, as his whole approach even in its most advanced development has been growing slowly almost, shall we say, in a biological way. Not only has Jung's thought had a close connection with his own personal life, but every new discovery has always been intimately connected with the preceding one and has always been very carefully checked against all the preceding ones. This means that the whole of analytical psychology is empirical, or in other words that all of Jung's ideas are based on empirical data, empirical facts. These

empirical facts are themselves connected closely with Jung's life. But this does not make his findings systematic. Instead, its system can only be discovered in Jung's life and any system that lies at the bottom of human life is usually only discovered *après coup*, which means that a person's life is given a certain meaning only retrospectively.

Jung was born on the 26th of July, 1875, near Lake Constance in Switzerland in a little village by the name of Kesswil, where his father was a parson. Jung's ancestry consists of a number of clergymen and physicians. One of his ancestors and his namesake, Carl Gustav Jung, is still held in great esteem for having reformed Basel University Medical School. All intellectual Swiss people are proud of the fact that Basel University is one of the oldest existing universities, as it was founded in the year 1460. Jung attended school in Basel and then graduated from Basel University Medical School. Then he went to the Psychiatric Clinic of Zürich University, the "Burghölzli", where he became assistant and later on an "Oberarzt", which is the chief assistant, to the director of the Clinic, Dr. Eugen Bleuler. Bleuler was one of the most famous psychiatrists of his time. He made a special study of schizophrenia, which then was called "dementia praecox". In fact, the whole concept of schizophrenia goes back to Eugen Bleuler. With Eugen Bleuler Jung started to introduce experimental methods into psychiatry, with the purpose of explaining more accurately the strange mental phenomena appearing in schizophrenia. Schizophrenics have ways of expressing themselves that are tremendously puzzling, and in the light of the then rather fashionable point of view of association psychology, they were explained as disturbances in the association of ideas. In order to investigate these particular phenomena more in detail, Jung used an experimental method which had been developed by the famous German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, according to certain ideas of Galton's. The word association method as used then by Jung which developed into what was called the Word Association Test, still forms the backbone of Jungian Psychology. The method is very simple, which is its great advantage. Jung's modification of it goes as follows:

The doctor has a list of one hundred single words, and pronounces word after word to his test person who is instructed to answer each word as soon as possible with the first word that comes into his or her mind as the result of this, so called, stimulus word. When the doctor writes down the answer word he observes the time elapsing between the moment he pronounced the stimulus word and the moment the test person reacted to it. This is all very simple. I cannot go into all the intricacies of this experimental situation, but I shall now summarize the conclusions arrived at from thousands of tests given in those days. First of all, it has to be said that the experiment did not work out in

the way it was designed by Jung, for it was intended originally to help with the diagnosis of mental diseases, in particular schizophrenia. The findings were of no importance for this purpose. The test had also been thought of as a means to probe into the schizophrenic's tortuous ways of thinking and speaking. This it did to a very interesting degree. But I can only go into this point after having dealt with those findings which had not been planned and which proved to be more important and interesting than anything which was expected.

Jung discovered that in the course of such an experiment, no matter whether the test person was healthy, mentally disturbed or truly psychotic, there appeared a disturbed reaction to one or more of stimulus words. This disturbance showed itself in a number of different ways: the time lag between stimulus word and reaction was longer than the average; the test person was unable to answer in one word but reacted with a whole phrase or with several words; the test person repeated certain reactions, certain words or answers too often, even when the particular reaction did not fit; the test person reacted with a translation of the stimulus word into another language, or used foreign expressions instead of the obvious ones. All those indications of an interfering disturbance were carefully investigated statistically, and Jung came to a conclusion as to their origin. His findings were new, although later he discovered that in the area of the psychology of neuroses, his conclusions were similar to those of Freud.

These important new findings and their interpretation revealed a special trait in Jung's scientific approach, which must be very strongly emphasized, as it seems to me to apply to practically every single step in the development of Jungian Psychology.

When Jung graduated from medical school he wrote for his M.D. thesis a small book entitled, *About Psychology and Pathology of So Called Occult Phenomena*, a psychiatric study which was published in 1902. This was highly unorthodox for occultism was always, and particularly in those days, looked down upon as not being worthy of scientific research. However, Jung found interesting phenomena in the study he made and arrived at helpful explanations for those phenomena. In this Jung showed an unerring scientific instinct which ever since has led him to approach a subject matter or topic seriously even though it had previously hitherto been neglected or not seen. In other words, his intuition led him to make discoveries and in that sense seems to be a true scientific instinct. This characteristic appears in Jung's dealing with the Word Association Test, for before him those who had been working with this method in the clinical or purely psychological field, had disregarded the disturbed reactions on the ground that they did not serve the purpose of the experiment. Jung, however, became intrigued with difficulties people had in following



instructions for the test and by concentrating his attention upon those instead of the natural reactions found that which today has become a commonplace term in our language, namely, the complex. This term was created by Jung at the time and was later adopted by all schools, including the Freudian and Adlerian. The disturbance of a normal sequence of thought or verbal expression proved to be a *via regia* which opened up a new vista with regard to the effects the realm of the unconscious has on our conscious reactions and intentions. The particular way in which unconscious elements interfere with our intentions was made accessible to experimental research. In summary the result of the use of the word association method, as it had been specially devised by Jung for diagnostic purposes in psychiatry, was the discovery of the complex; or in other words, the result was the experimental proof of the fact that something of which we are not conscious has the power to interfere with man's conscious intentions. This proved to be the key to many of the strange phenomena observed in psychiatric and neurotic cases. For example, Jung found that there was a peculiar relation between the disturbing factors discovered in the association experiment and the patients' neurotic or bodily symptoms, (Freud called them conversion symptoms), and also the patient's dreams dreamt at that particular period of time. The experiences Jung had proved to be an experimental confirmation of certain ideas Freud had published a few years earlier when he approached the problem of neurosis with his newly devised psychoanalytic method. Jung, of course, was delighted with these parallels, and it was with extreme interest that he met Freud personally in 1907. They discussed at great length then these very striking parallels between their findings which had been reached independently. This meeting of two scientists was the beginning of an extremely fruitful relationship; later on Freud said that Jung was his most important disciple, as well as his successor or heir apparent. But unfortunately the two scientists separated in 1912 when Jung published his paper on Symbols and Transformations of the Libido. But that is another matter. I now deal with the result of this early experimental work of Jung as it developed later.

For this I shall go into what might be called "A general theory of complexes". Not only has Jung's experimental method provided the possibility of understanding psychopathological phenomena like certain schizophrenic symptoms and certain neurotic symptoms, but it also has given a new understanding of normal phenomena, or more or less normal phenomena. These are such things as slips of the tongue, forgetting, or the famous phenomenon of the *déjà vue*, in short, phenomena occurring during our daily occupation and interfering with it mostly in an unpleasant way. Freud dealt with these later on in a special study called "The Psychopathology of Everyday Life". In the

light of the findings of Jung practically all of them can be explained as effects of complexes which, on each particular occasion, are stirred up by something which would equal the stimulus word in the word association test. From these experiences, the conclusion is that certain stimuli constellate a certain complex. Others, of course, do not. The stimuli have been shown to be related to the complex by that which can be best called an emotional tone. A complex is an entity consisting of a number, sometimes a great number, of elements among which there is a nucleus, the original cristallisation point. Around this nucleus new elements seem to gather in the course of time. In this way a complex has a tendency to grow in content, to assimilate all kinds of other elements. And this assimilation makes the complex something like a hungry human being who tries to swallow whatever is near him. This assimilating tendency of the complex shows that the complex has a certain autonomy of its own which gives it the power to interfere with man's conscious intentions. This means that the effects of the complex are beyond man's conscious control. The complex, thus, is something like a second will, which at times can be stronger than man's primary will or man's conscious will. In the course of the investigation, experimental mostly, of the complexes, it was found that many of them have the qualities of a personality, so that a fully developed complex has the qualities of an "alter ego". Now this is a strange condition for man to be in. It means that within man there is another ego apart from his conscious ego, living its own life so to speak, which can interfere with his conscious life at the slightest provocation. How can we look at the free will in light of such entities in our system? Now, the autonomy of the complexes seems to be very neatly illustrated by myths or fairy tales or folklore all over the world. They may, in fact, be the origin of the widespread idea of animism which by no means is only found among so called primitives.

A general theory of complexes will have to make clear that complexes must be regarded as perfectly normal contents of man's psyche, even though the theory will have to show that when they become too powerful, too autonomous, too all embracing, they are more or less pathological phenomena. In the normal process of man's conscious activities he depends to a great extent on the existence of some autonomous processes which at certain junctures of his activities, as in his thinking are capable of exerting influence. If this did not happen, if in other words, the spontaneous activity of the complexes had no chance to find its way into man's consciousness, he would very soon run out of his own thoughts or intuitions. I point to what we call a hunch or a brand-new idea. This comes suddenly in the twinkle of the eye; at first it looks completely phantastic and out of harmony with the trend of our thoughts; but which really may be a truly creative

part of our thinking. Such experiences are often described by creative people, musicians, writers, artists, etc. They are exactly of the same dignity as those phenomena we have described as interferences or disturbing factors which can be traced down to the existence of a complex in man's unconscious.

Now we return to the more unpleasant effects that complexes can have. We have to admit that those unpleasant effects make it necessary for the human being to do something to cut down the autonomy of these daemons, shall we say, and that this need is certainly the more urgent the more autonomous the complex is. As I said, a typically full blown complex can show all the qualities or most of the qualities of a personality. This fact is most probably responsible for the appearance of complexes in dreams where the dream figures represented as human beings must be regarded as personifications of those complexes. Such dream figures behave entirely, or to some extent, in an autonomous way and do things which do not coincide with man's conscious intentions. The general theory of complexes then, should include suggestions of methods of approaching the complexes in a way which will render them more harmless. This can be done by making them more conscious, in other words dissolving them as complexes, (i.e. entities separated from the rest of the psychic system) and introducing them into the conscious system or in other words to give them a chance to cooperate with the conscious mind rather than to manifest their existence in unpleasant ways.

The existence of fully developed complexes in normal as well as pathological personalities has another interesting aspect, which explains phenomena most frequently observed in pathological cases, in particular cases of hysteria and severe cases of neuroses. One of the most obvious traits in such cases is what the French psychologist Pierre Janet has described as the dissociation of the personality. In cases of dissociation there seem to exist more than one personality within one and the same person. Morton Prince has done a great deal of research work with cases of such dissociation and in these cases it is clear that the partial personalities which appear are in fact what, in the findings of the Word Association Test, would be called fully developed complexes. So, all the research done by applying the Word Association Test has had far reaching consequences in respect to psychopathological phenomena and to phenomena of dreams and to the creative activities of the human mind.

I should like to dwell a little longer on other consequences of the results of the word association test. It appeared very early that the common denominator of the various elements which built up a complex was a particular emotional tone, an emotional tone which seemed to link the various elements together and to attach them to the complex

itself. All the elements seemed to possess the same affective tone. Now, from this the reason why complexes can affect the body and why they affect it in a particular way became clear. The early investigators, all pupils of Jung then at Burghölzli Clinic, started to investigate the effects which complexes have on the body. Today we know from the findings of what is called psychosomatic medicine that there is practically no organ in the human body which cannot be affected by emotional processes. But in the days of Jung's early research little was known about such connections, except that breathing was affected by emotional processes. Under elation or depression, the habitual type of breathing is greatly changed. So investigators tried to combine the word association experiment with a careful record of the breathing movements of the patient's chest. Such studies were made particularly by Petersen, who was highly interested to discover that whenever in the word association experiment there appeared a disturbance, the test person's breathing activity was affected. The breathing became more shallow or more deep, according to the nature of the reaction. Furthermore, one other physiological reaction was combined with the word association test with equally interesting results. It was known that the resistance of the human skin to an electric current changed under certain affective reactions. It looked as if the skin, which protects man from the influences which the outer world has on his body, became more transparent, or opened up somewhat, during an affective and emotional reaction. This psychogalvanic skin response was combined with the word association test to give another complex indicator and the combination was used subsequently to investigate the effect of complexes and/or emotions on the body.

I now go back to the early years of Jung's career when he was in close touch with Freud, and speak of the first original book of Jung's, called "Symbols and Transformation of Libido". In that book Jung dealt with a clinical case he had never seen himself, but which had been described by a psychologist of Geneva University. The case contained what is now called unconscious material, consisting of a phantasy of the patient. That gave Jung a chance to study the parallels in mythology and religion that seemed to correlate with certain elements of the patient's phantasy. In the course of his research Jung had to develop some ideas about psychic energy, which now we call ideas about the dynamism of the unconscious. This dynamism had previously been called Libido by Freud. But whereas Freud had given this Libido an exclusively sexual connotation or origin, Jung concluded that this dynamism of the unconscious was not restricted to sexuality, but that there were in it all kinds of other sources of primary energy. Adler had already said something to this effect when he made power the primary interest of man in contradistinction to Freud's sex. When



Jung studied the clinical case in question he began to doubt the truth of Freud's dependence upon sex alone to explain the dynamism of the unconscious and also to doubt the Adlerian point of view; for he saw that while both men were partially correct they were not wholly so. Thus it became important for Jung to find out how the difference between the two men could be explained and, if possible, reconciled. In the effort to deal with this matter Jung undertook to clarify the difference theoretically. The result of this work is found in the book called "Psychological Types".

In this book Jung pointed out two different types of attitude, which means two different ways in which man directs his interest to objects about him. The two types he called the extravert and the introvert or the extraverted and the introverted attitude. In the case of the extravert the attitude is directed to the outer object, and when this is habitually so, it obviously has existed almost from the earliest moments of the individual's life. Whereas the introvert's attention is mainly directed towards the inner object, that is, towards the subject. Strictly speaking what the introvert is mostly concerned with is what Jung in this book called the subjective factor. This means that the introvert's interest is habitually caught by the way in which he or she reacts to all incoming information. How this information strikes him is more important to him than the information itself, and this reaction to the information is what Jung calls the subjective factor. Jung then went on to try to clarify the varieties of human reactions and human behaviour in still another way by speaking of four different elementary psychological functions. According to him these elementary psychological functions or functions of orientation of the conscious mind are: sensation, thinking, feeling, and intuition. In order to show what this is about I shall construct an example: I have a certain visual impression of something standing before me here, glittering, round, of such and such shape, etc. These are the sensory data, shape, color, position; and these sensory data are perceived by the use of sensation, in Jung's sense. Sensation, therefore, tells me that there is a certain thing before me and that this thing has such and such qualities. But this is in no way sufficient. We have to try to understand what this thing is and this understanding is given by what Jung calls, thinking. Thus, thinking now allows me to say that the thing I just perceived is a glass, and that the contents of this glass are apparently water. Or in case the contents are red I should say they are probably wine. Thus what I have done in addition to noting the perception given by sensation, is to diagnose the object, in terms of my pre-existing system of knowledge, a process which is usually called apperception. I now know what I see. By the sensation, I know that there is something and how it looks, and by the thinking, I know what there is. Now this may still not be satisfactory, for most probably

there is something else to be said about the object. For example, I will know that either this glass of wine is indifferent to me or not. Suppose I am a tee-totaller; in that case I will say: "Oh, what terrible poison!" and will reject the object. In other words I will devalue it and come to a negative conclusion with regard to its value. While if I am a connoisseur, I will say: "How wonderful, I hope it's good." This process of evaluation of an object Jung calls "feeling", inasmuch as it tells a man that a perceived object, is something he likes or something he dislikes, or something that means nothing to him. Now, feeling defined as a function of values is what Jung means when he uses the term.

Then Jung goes on to say that even this is not all man knows about an object or all he can know, or all he wants to know. Maybe he still wants some other information. Yet there seems to be no other channel through which he can get further information, at least no conscious channel. But there may be other information furnished in a different way, that is via the unconscious; and the information man gets in this way Jung calls "Intuition". I return to our example: As I look at the glass of wine my intuition suggests that it looks as if it was the famous Pommard I gave my friend three years ago on his 50th birthday, and I may be right. But I cannot possibly know. Jung says that such information and such a way of getting information is questionable. For it may just as well be right as be wrong; when it is right it is astonishing. But Jung holds that intuition plays an important part in life for men often find themselves confronted with situations where they need certain information which is not given. In such cases intuition may be of vital importance.

By isolating the four fundamental psychological functions of the conscious mind, Jung realized gradually that they constituted pairs of opposites in such a way that always two of the four formed a pair. Thinking and feeling, for example, are mutually exclusive. They both are rational functions, capable of forming a judgment, but while man is thinking and to the degree he is thinking, he must exclude feeling, and vice versa. Sensation and intuition, on the other hand, are functions which are irrational for there is no rational way by which a man can explain why he has such and such a sensation or such and such an intuition. Both functions are perceptive, but they are also mutually exclusive, for in case man depends upon sensation and scrutinizes the particular qualities of the object before him, he must exclude intuition which would give him information about the object which the senses cannot perceive. And exactly the reverse is true.

Now when he grouped the four psychological functions in two pairs of mutually exclusive opposites, Jung came across a fundamental problem in psychology, which is the problem of opposites in general.

Since he met this problem he has given a great deal of attention to the work of collecting illustrations of the way it shows itself in the history of all kinds of human activities, such as literature, religion, psychiatry, psychology, and so forth. The bulk of his book on *Psychological Types* deals with such examples from the history of culture. He was also able to show that the differences between the main trends of the new psychology of his time, namely the Freudian and the Adlerian schools, rest on this principle of opposites, that Freud's school is really based on an extraverted attitude, whereas Adler's is based on an introverted one. Jung believes, and I think he is correct in believing, that the Freudian and the Adlerian points of view actually can be explained on this principle of extraversion and introversion. Now the question remains whether such opposites can, and how they can be reconciled. In order to deal with this question Jung has been spending a good deal of his time on the phenomenon of the symbol.

But at this time I need say only that in dealing with the principle of the opposites it is necessary to remember that the unconscious must be included in the system for the simple reason that almost always in any individual case one or two of the psychological functions will be differentiated or in other words will belong to the conscious system, or be available to the conscious intention and function properly within the realm of consciousness. The rest of the functions, either three or two, because of the exclusion-principle are bound to remain relatively unconscious, in other words they are undifferentiated and are caught up in the unconscious. Consequently, they do not work in the way which can be properly called conscious. Yet they have their autonomy, and are for this reason appearing mostly as interfering or disturbing factors in man's conscious intentions.

Jung made another interesting discovery at this juncture, which is the fact that a differentiated function always unites with the habitual type of attitude, for example, when a man is a thinking type, his thinking will be extraverted if he is an extravert, or it will be introverted if he is an introvert. Thus the differentiated function unites with the habitual type of attitude, the attitudinal type. Contrariwise, the inferior undifferentiated psychological function, the opposite of the superior differentiated function, remains in the opposite attitude. Thus the feeling of an extraverted thinking type will remain in the unconscious and unite with the introverted attitude. Now, this seems to be fairly abstract, but these findings are corroborated by the many examples from history and from all sorts of mental activities Jung gives in his book on types.

There is one more thing to be said in connection with the subject of types, and this may be the most important conclusion drawn from the study of the type problem: it has become clear in the course of the

development of Jungian thought that during a person's life history the type adopted to begin with slowly and gradually undergoes, or rather has to undergo, a change. Or, in other words, in the course of a person's life the functions and the attitude which have been in the unconscious, which have not been differentiated, become more and more important. This development goes on in such a way that it looks as if life tries to create an allround personality by the gradual development of the opposite attitude and the opposite functions, the inferior functions. This struggle for the development of the opposite attitude and functions, according to Jung's idea, becomes urgent, becomes imperative only during the second half of life. Now, of course, this is a relative concept. The second half can never be defined in terms of numbers of years, but there obviously is a turning point in the life of most people which frequently shows itself phenomenologically or even clinically in a certain crisis which demands a completely new orientation or re-orientation. This serves to draw out and emphasize the opposite attitude and the inferior function, thus making the person better rounded and more complete.

## II

### *Archetypes and Collective Unconscious*

In this lecture I shall deal with archetypes and the collective unconscious. These two concepts have given rise to much controversy and among the principles of Jungian psychology have been the most misunderstood and misinterpreted. However, I believe that an objective reader of Jung's books sees that both concepts are well founded and that evidence for them can easily be checked, provided a person has no prejudice, particularly prejudice which comes from resistance of a personal nature.

I shall introduce the concepts of the archetypes and of the collective unconscious in a historical way, that is by tracing the way the two concepts were created by Jung during his empirical experience with certain phenomena in the human psyche. It is important to note that both concepts have to be regarded as exclusively empirical concepts. Jung always insisted that others should go the same way as he went and experience the same phenomena themselves. The best way to experience the existence and reality of the archetypes and the collective unconscious is to observe carefully our own dreams. It is easy to deal with other people's material, and by discovering parallels between that material and pathological material to say that obviously there is something pathological about them; in this way we remove ourselves from such a charge since we are sure we are normal, healthy, individuals. But psychopathology must be looked at in an unprejudiced way, and we must understand that psychopathological phenomena are in fact only normal psychological phenomena grossly exaggerated to a bizarre degree, and that therefore we can learn a great deal from them about the normal functioning of the human mind. I remember very well, when years ago at the Burghölzli Clinic, I had to guide a visitor from the Government through the Clinic, and I had shown him a few typical cases. When he left the Clinic he thanked me and said: "This has been a most illuminating experience for me as a layman, because I begin to see that this Clinic is really a cross section of the town of Zürich. The population of Zürich is full of characters which are better understood in the light of the patients you have shown me today."

Now I know that such a point of view, in which one uses pathology to explain the normal, can be very dangerous. Yet I must say that the riddles of normal psychology, if we are humble enough to admit that there are many, can best be solved from this perspective, and that by such a comparative method we have a much better chance of under-



standing the somewhat startling reactions and actions of ourselves and our neighbours.

We start with the first experience which Jung had which can be explained only by the use of the concept of archetypes and the concept of the collective unconscious. We find the report of this experience in the book "Symbols and Transformation of Libido". Jung used as a parallel for a certain motive in a patient's phantasy his own experience with a different patient at Burghölzli Clinic. This man, whom I happened to know when he was an inmate at Burghölzli, had a most vivid hallucinatory phantasy and used to hallucinate night and day. One day when the doctor during his ward rounds came across this "Dr. Schwyzer," as he was called, the patient took him to the window and said: "Stand here and look at the sun. What do you see?" The doctor said: "Well, I see the sun". Whereupon the patient said: "But, don't you see the tail on the sun?" The doctor answered: "I am not so sure." "Well", said the patient, "Look carefully and move your head as you look; you will see the tail move. That moving tail is the source of the wind." That certainly was not a very common image, and the doctor, although puzzled by it, dismissed it as pure nonsense.

Then the incident was reported to Jung. It happened that Jung had been reading a book published at the time by the German philologist Albrecht Dieterich, entitled "Eine Mithrasliturgie", a mythraic liturgy. In that book Dieterich dealt with what I think nowadays would be called a magic papyrus, and in the book was the *editio princeps* of the text of that papyrus, which was written in Greek. The book was available only to a few scholars of Greek and classical antiquity. Jung had noticed in the book that at a certain junction in the liturgy the initiate was asked to look at the sun, where he would see a tube hanging down, swinging first to the right producing the East wind, and then swinging to the left, producing the West wind. The patient in the Burghölzli Clinic had been there for a number of years; he was completely uneducated and knew no Greek. There was not the slightest possibility that he had seen the Greek papyrus; and he could not have read it had he seen it. Yet the similarity between his hallucination and the mythraic liturgy was clear. This could, of course, be dismissed as sheer coincidence, but as I have told you, Jung always stopped and asked questions about any strange phenomenon which came to his attention. And as with the Word Association Test, where he concentrated upon the unusual, so he concentrated on this unusual coincidence with the same challenging scientific spirit, and he gained the same success.

The coincidence in that particular case proved to be something that was by no means rare, for when Jung went on to compare phantasies of mentally deranged people with other mythological texts or with

folk literature, he saw that such coincidences were found rather frequently. Later on he discovered that in dreams of children between the ages four and, shall we say, eleven, there are often elements which are obviously mythological yet which could not have been consciously acquired. The dreams contained parts of myths, or whole mythic events, which could not have possibly been known by the children. In general, however, it is difficult to find cases where serious knowledge of the relevant mythological material can be excluded completely. In the case of "Dr. Schwyzer" I believe that it was firmly established. Today it can be proved in some cases that there have been no known conscious normal channels through which the mythological elements entered the particular person's unconscious material. So the only possible answer to the occurrence of such elements in unconscious material is that the unconscious mind apparently as such, consists to a large extent of mythological material.

Mythological research not long before Jung did this work had brought to light the fact that the myths of different peoples showed striking similarities. Sometimes those similarities were general and sometimes they were special. Sometimes the similarity was in a minor detail which was a strange detail, something that we would dismiss as being wholly incomprehensible. Yet to find such a detail in the myths of two separate people was hard to understand unless there had been migration between one tribe and another. Yet it was shown that such correspondences in certain cases could not possibly be attributed to migration. And statistically, I would say, that such similarities are so widespread and so frequent that we would even have to think of a complete *consensus gentium* all over the surface of our planet. Now, from those studies in comparative religions or mythology, and the occurrence of striking similarities in phantasies of insane as well as normal people, Jung reached the conclusion that there is something like an ubiquity of the unconscious or its main contents.

Jung was led in his studies of this subject to a second conclusion which was that in individual cases there are often differences in the conventional imagery. He found, for example, that in a dream where the main imagery was obviously religious, where Christian symbolism appeared, that the conventional Christian imagery did not cover the image of the particular dream completely. In other words, he often found minor, subtle or even strikingly blatant differences between a dream and the orthodox symbol, myth, dogma or creed.

The question, of course, is how to account for these differences from conventional imagery. Before I go into this question I need to point out that we now know it to be highly unusual for dreams or phantasies showing religious imagery to be conventional. We might correctly say that the unconscious is highly heretical. We therefore, need

an explanation for the fact that the unconscious of a Christian appears to be much less Christian than his conscious system is. As an example I shall relate a dream of a relatively young girl who is a devout Catholic. This girl decided as a result of this dream that she needed to study psychology, and that perhaps she had the ability to train in analytical psychology with the purpose of using it practically later on. Here is the dream:

"I saw my sister who, radiant, mighty and superior, looked like a mother of God or a fairy queen. She wore a blue cloak and on her head a golden crown, the points of which are set with rubies and emeralds. Astonished and enraptured I exclaimed: 'Paula, how beautiful!' Smiling she answered: 'Yes, a snake, or the snake, has produced this,' and she added: 'Nobody can henceforth doubt this or claim that the snake found this crown ready made and induced it into me from outside, for this would be technically impossible.' Then she continued and said: 'Sometimes the snake produces something which looks like the scepter of the Anti-christ', and at that very same moment she held it in her hand. It looked like a Bishop's cross of gold filigree; with a subtle touch on a mechanism in the horizontal bar the cross opened in a vertical cut similar to a reliquary and exposed two rows of rather small, round cut, clear blue turquoises, arranged close to each other in the manner of a cobble stone pavement. My sister asked in a pre-occupied voice filled with doubt what would happen if the scepter or the cross were not given to the priest and if it began to urge her to use power? With that painful question I woke up out of depths such as I have never experienced before in my life."

That dream was in many ways highly unorthodox. It shocked the patient so badly that she had a therapeutic need to go into analysis. All I need say here is that after she had given thought to the subject, the dream became a great comfort to the patient, for it really gave her all the support she needed in dealing with the difficulties she had experienced in her faith and particularly with regard to her confessor and spiritual guide. Her analysis consisted to a great extent of a careful investigation of the comparative and historical background of her imagery. The fact that we find very few dreams containing orthodox or conventional religious matters and many dreams containing heretical material is an interesting fact in itself.

After all, as a psychologist I am in the company of St. Augustine who says in *Retractationes* I. XIII: "The thing itself, (*res ipsa*) which is now called the Christian Religion, was with the ancients (*erat opud antiquos*), and it was with the human race from the beginning to the time when Christ appeared in the flesh: from then on the true religion, which already existed began to be called the Christian."

Or, if you think I need a further justification I quote from the

Bible, Acts: XVII 28, where St. Paul says to the pagans: "For in Him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said."

In order to explain such unorthodoxies, and in order to be able to help a person to an understanding of them, one needs a good deal of knowledge in the comparative history of religion, in the history of the church and in the mythologies of the ages. If one does not know this material, he will not recognize the religiousness of a dream or phantasy, nor see or understand the individual differences; he would therefore miss the point, and cheat his patient. It is not strange that most people who criticize Jung's concept of the collective unconscious say that the dreams which Jung relates in his books are either made up, or specially dreamt for him, or altogether faked. Such criticism cannot be met unless the critic takes the trouble to become acquainted with the relative material. As long as people remain ignorant of mythological material, they are bound to overlook such allusions in dreams and come to the same conclusion as the opponents of Jung's psychology.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the religious imagery existing nowadays is the product of a long historical development. The more that is known about the literature of the early centuries, the clearer it is that even the Scripture is a composite of material, which goes back to various sources, and that Christ himself had obviously been in touch with a number of religious systems existing in his time. Further than this, throughout the centuries new ideas or new versions of other ideas have appeared and have either remained one person's particular phantasy or became the accepted doctrine of a particular group or sect; some of those ideas have been condemned by the church as being heterodoxical and others have been accepted and incorporated into the teaching and later on into the dogma. Occasionally ideas which once were refuted have been taken up later on and accepted. So the history of mythology, religion and the churches shows that these elements have always fluctuated, which may be regarded as a proof of the life that has been in the church or the religion of the people. Even the dogma of the Catholic church has undergone remarkable changes as additions to it have been made throughout the centuries, and this process has not come to an end even in our days.

Now, in an individual case where religion can be observed in the making and where the products of the unconscious mind can be carefully observed, it is not strange that in certain instances the images bring up ideas, thoughts, and symbols which can be traced back to earlier stages of development and which may be related directly to a particular school or sect in the early centuries or in the middle ages, and where there may even be variations of one of those sects. In order to interpret such products it is necessary to keep in mind that not only

today but all through history they cannot be understood in the light of the collective conscious thoughts and ideas and convictions of particular faiths, or particular religions, but that the actual situation of the person involved must be considered, for that situation is found to be something unique. Any particular person's situation has the characteristics of certain general problems, but those problems are encountered in an individual way. Thus, I think, whenever a new religious orientation takes place or is reached, it is bound in parts to be conventional or orthodox, and in parts unconventional or unorthodox.

I should like to call your attention to the fact that, if there were no such personal systems popping out of the unconscious, if in a dream or phantasy which obviously has religious meaning and traits there were no personal variations, or if in a myth there were no evidence that the dreamer has deviated from the conventional myths or religious imagery, then Freud would be correct in saying that religion is only an illusion and consequently *delenda*. If in such material produced by one single person, we could find collective traits, that is elements or whole parts of religious systems, that had not been specifically altered or adapted to the person's actual inner or outer situation, then the ideas could be regarded as being taken over consciously from the parents without having any life of their own.

In order for us to see how Jung arrived at the conclusions that there are archetypes of the collective unconscious and that there is the collective unconscious as such, I choose one example of the many archetypes which can be observed. This one is particularly characteristic of Jungian psychology and has been described by Jung himself. It is the concept, the Jungian concept, of the Anima. Jung has dealt with this concept theoretically in a paper: "*Ueber den Archetypus, mit besonderen Berücksichtigung des Animabegriffes*". (*Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie*, Vol. IX, 1936). In this paper he tried to give the proof for the existence of the anima, the image of the anima, by referring to a motif very well known and widely known in the history of religion, namely the motif of the *syzygy*. (a Greek word of which the exact Latin equivalent would be *conjugatio*, conjunction.) The motif of the *syzygy* is the motif of the male/female divine couple. We know from ethnologists that many primitive tribes hold the conviction that once upon a time there was a being which was, and sometimes still is, the supreme being who was of double sex. And the double condition of this highest being was once the condition of all men. According to one ethnologist by the name of Winthuis (his ideas are published in Vol. 5 of "*Forschungen zur Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*", under the title "*Das Zweigeschlechterwesen bei den Zentralaustralern und anderen Völkern*" in Leipzig, 1928), the highest being, this being of double sex, was not only the origin of mortals but also the goal of



mortals. Man expects and hopes to unite again with the opposite sex, and in such a way to gain an original totality. All man does, according to Winthuis (we don't necessarily have to go as far as he does) in his cult is to make an attempt to regain this original and perfect condition. Now, however true or wrong this explanation may be, we are reminded of something we find in Greek philosophy in particular in Plato.

In "The Symposium" (189 d.l. and 192 e.) Plato tells us the following story about the genesis of man:

"And first let me treat of the nature and state of man; for the original human nature was not like the present, but different. In the first place, the sexes were originally three in number, not two as they are now; there was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this double nature [which was once called Androgynous]; this once had a real existence, but is now lost, and the name only is preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round and had four hands and four feet, back and sides forming a circle, one head with two faces, looking opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond. When he had a mind he could walk as men now do, and he could also roll over and over at a great rate, leaning on his four hands and four feet, eight in all, like thumbblers going over and over with their legs in the air; this was when he wanted to run fast. Now there were these three sexes, because the sun, moon, and earth are three; and the man was originally the child of the sun, the woman of the earth, and the man-woman of the moon, which is made up of sun and earth, and they were all round and moved round and round like their parents. Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods; and of them is told the tale of Otus and Ephialtes who, as Homer says, dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the councils of Zeus and of the gods. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts, as they had done the giants, then there would be an end of the sacrifice and worship which men offered to them; but, on the other hand, the gods could not suffer their insolence to be unrestrained. At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: 'I have a notion which will humble their pride and mend their manners; they shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of making them more profitable to us. They shall walk upright on two legs, and if they continue insolent and won't be quiet, I will split them again and they shall hop about on a single leg.' He spoke and cut them in two, like a sorb-apple which

is halved for pickling, or as you might divide an egg with a hair; and as he cut them one after another, he bade Apollo give the face and the half of the neck a turn in order that the man might contemplate the section of himself: this would teach him a lesson of humility. He was also to heal their wounds and compose their forms. Apollo twisted the face and pulled the skin all round over that which in our language is called the belly, like the purses which draw in, and he made one mouth at the centre, which he fastened in a knot (this is called the navel); he also moulded the breast and took out most of the wrinkles, much as a shoemaker might smooth out leather upon a last; he left a few, however, in the region of the belly and navel, as a memorial of the primeval change. After the division the two parts of man each desiring his other half, came together, and threw their arms about one another eager to grow into one . . . ”

“Suppose Hephaestus, with his instruments, to come to the pair who are lying side by side and say to them, ‘What do you people want of one another?’ they would be unable to explain. And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said: “Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another’s company? for if this is what you desire, I am ready to melt you into one and let you grow together, so that being two you shall become one, and while you live live a common life as if you were a single man, and after your death in the world below still be one departed soul instead of two — I ask whether this is what you lovingly desire, and whether you are satisfied to attain this?’ — there is not a man among them when he heard this who would deny or who would not acknowledge that this meeting and melting in one another’s arms, this becoming one instead of two, was the very expression of his ancient need. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time, I say, when the two were one, but now because of this wickedness of men God has dispersed us, as the Arcadians were dispersed into villages by the Lacedaemonians”.

As you can see, the idea of this complete original being is, of course, taken from *Empedocles*, where this complete being is called the *sphairos*, the sphere, the allround being:

“Two things I proclaim: once out of several parts one whole grows, once the One disaggregates into many. Mortal things create themselves out of the immortal elements partly when the things procreate out of the *sphairos*, partly when they return again into it. In both cases, however, they perish again, once by continuous separation, once by continuous union. Uninterruptedly these processes change and never come to an end. Now united in love everything comes together in One, now disunited in hatred everything tends to separate again.”

It is rather striking that a very primitive tribe in Central Australia has an idea about this original being almost identical as the one developed by pre-Socratic philosophers and by Plato; no migration hypothesis can explain that similarity. From the fact that there are these striking similarities between two peoples so far apart, mentally and geographically, it is possible to conclude that the human minds, in certain respects work almost exactly alike, no matter in what level of culture they are found. The hypothesis of the collective unconscious strongly recommends itself in light of the above and other similar facts. At all events Jung says that the motive of the *syzygy* is as universal as the fact that there is man and woman, and consequently he maintains that wherever there is a male psyche or psychology, there is always a feminine psychology, or the image of a correlated feminine being. This image corresponds exactly to what Jung calls an archetypal image, and in this particular case the archetypal image is the image of the anima, the image of what Jung also called the soul. Historically it must be said that Jung took the word archetype from St. Augustine, who in his theory of ideas used the Greek synonym "*to archetypon eidos*." But the term *archetypon* is older than St. Augustine, for it is found in the neo-Platonic Corpus Hermeticum, dating from the third century, where there is the term "*to archetypon eidos*", which corresponds exactly to the archetypal image.

Philologist may be interested to learn that Cicero knew this word; that it is found in Philo in the *de opificio mundi* 71, and that since then its use became widespread. St. Augustine's definition of the archetypon is an idea or ideas "*quae ipsae formatae non sunt, quae in divina intelligentia continentur*." This most obviously is a Platonic idea; in Plato we have this concept of an image being located *en hyperouranio topo*, in a place above the heavens or beyond the stars. This idea is in Phaedros. Jakob Burckhardt, by-the-way, used the expression of *urtümliche Bilder* when he spoke of such ideas, an expression which can hardly be translated into English; yet the term can be translated easily enough into the Greek *archetypon eidos*. These archetypal images coincide with what the German ethnologist Bastian has called a long time ago *Völkerideen* — peoples' ideas — or what the French ethnologist Levy-Brühl called *Representations collectives*. In both cases, Bastian and Levy-Brühl, it is obviously a matter not so much of definite images, but rather motifs, as we would say in mythology; we would call them mythological motifs — motifs which can be found practically everywhere and on every level. Now, the motif of the *syzygy* is widespread in innumerable variations. I quote a few examples. There are the famous constituents of Chinese, and in particular Taoistic, philosophy, the Yang and the Yin, the bright and the dark, the masculine and the feminine. Or in the Tantric system in India there is the eternal couple

of Shiva and Shakti living in eternal embrace. Or there is the gnostic idea of Nous and Sophia. Or, in the Christian religion, there is Christ and the bridal church. In the mediaeval period the motive of the *syzygy* was taken up particularly by alchemistic mythology, where *sol* and *luna*, or *rex* and *regina* play exactly the same roles.

Why this is so, is a very difficult question to answer, but it is highly probable that with the fact that there are the two sexes in reality, in observable reality, the idea simply pointed to the fact; but it is also probable, and indeed highly probable that the idea would have originated in an individual who had never seen a specimen of the other sex. In other words, it is highly probable that not only the existence of people of the other sex and the experiences we have with members of the opposite sex account for the formulation of the image of the opposite sex, but also the qualities which each of us has as an individual. In each person there are genes which are not particularly differentiated as to a particular sex but which belong to the opposite sex — for there are always feminine genes in a man and masculine genes in a woman. Only the relative preponderance of one set of genes accounts for a person's belonging to either one or the other sex. The fact that the motive of the *syzygy* is so universally given in itself, makes it clear that the origin of this image of the other sex does not completely go back to the existence of living beings of this other sex, since the peculiarity of the *syzygy* is, that the couple is always a divine one, which means that it is more than the merely human couple. The *syzygy* is a theistic idea and as such shows us that behind it there is more than simply the image of the parental couple; it is much more a projection of unknown contents which necessarily must come out of man's depths — for only contents of his unconscious can be projected. One cannot very well say that the parental couple is unknown, in other words that man is unconscious of them; consequently, they cannot be projected as long as they are conscious contents of our conscious mind.

I will give three more examples in order to show that the existence of an image of the opposite sex is particularly strongly constellated, and that it offers itself readily in our dreams or phantasies when the divine background of our experience is involved. One example is almost universally known, found in the ritual of the baptism of children. In most of such rituals the parents are kept in a relatively humble and unimportant position even though the event is of importance for them, and other people step in who are called godfather and godmother.

The second example is in the third vision of the only Swiss Saint, Niklaus von Flüe, who in that vision perceived God once as the Royal Father, and once as the Royal Mother.

The third example is in the vision of Anna Kingsford as related

by Edward Maitland, in a book called "Anna Kingsford, her Life, Letters, Diaries and Work", London, 1896. The relevant part of the text of the vision is: "It was God as the Lord who by his duality proves that God is substance as well as power, love as well as will, feminine as well as masculine, mother as well as father." From all the parallels I have used to illustrate the origin of the archetypal image of the anima, it should be rather clear that whenever there is a masculine being, there is simultaneously something correspondingly feminine given. The masculine compensates itself by a feminine element.

This view comes close to the idea Jung developed later on that the feminine is to the masculine the most unknown, and that in such a way the anima in fact represents the unconscious of the man. Yet this being of the opposite sex, since it is the unknown unconscious counterpart, always appears in a projected form, and as Jung pointed out, the anima proper is the projection producing factor par excellence in a man. Since there is this projection producing tendency in the anima, it can be compared to the *maja* of the Hindus, the illusion producing dancer who is always projected onto every woman; this makes it very hard for a man to find out what the true identity of the woman is. Consequently, whatever remains of the image a man has of a certain woman after he subtracts the real woman from the image, is the anima, her divine background; and it is not strange to find that such a dream figure has all kinds of mysterious qualities.

The clinical importance of the anima image becomes important mainly in the second half of life, for the simple reason that in the first half of life a man has to grapple mostly with a mother complex, and only in the second half of life can he approach the matter in a somewhat different way, i.e. when all the values begin to change in their meaning, when he has to turn away from mother in order to return eventually to her for good. So, clinically the anima has to be defined as a function. As she represents the unconscious, a man's unconscious, it is extremely important, in particular during the second half of life, that this figure is changed into a *function of relation to the inner world of man*. She must become the initiant into the unknown counterpart of man. Once man succeeds in transforming this personification into a function he will have achieved a relationship to the inner world, which will give him a new dimension, which is what I would call a maternal eros. Man will then be related, not only to the inner world, but also to the external one, in a different way than he used to be before the anima had been turned into a function, or had developed into a function. He would show a real relatedness which I would call Eros in its most general meaning. In a similar way, all the various images, archetypal images, should be turned, in the course of a human life, into functions. Before Jung spoke of archetypes, he used to call these phe-



nomena *dominants of the collective unconscious*, in order to emphasize their functional quality.

What I have said so far about the image, the *archetypal image* of the anima, has been to give the theoretical justification for the formulation of that concept by Jung. However, this concept is only one out of many Jungian concepts which have been formed over the years as the result of Jung's clinical experience with his patients. And this has always been done in the same way as it was done in the concept of the anima: Jung observed his patients' dreams and phantasies, and in the course of time began to notice that certain personifications, dream figures, tended to repeat themselves, particularly when long series of dreams or phantasies were observed, and that at certain junctures the accumulations of certain figures or situations or motifs became quite apparent. Such a phenomenon justifies the creation of a particular name for the figure or situation or motif involved. The question, of course, always is what is the meaning of such repetitious dream figures or images. And in the course of his long practical experience Jung has given names to a small number of such typical dream figures or situations. Some of them coinciding literally with motifs known from comparative studies of fairy tales, or mythology, or religions.

Jung not only made the observations just mentioned, he also observed another rather striking phenomenon. This was that such figures and motifs appeared in regular succession. In the course of a longer, more thorough and more complete analysis, it was possible to outline a hierarchy of the figures. It became apparent that when one figure appeared another figure or motif frequently preceded it. In light of this, it had to be said that accumulations of one or the other of the images occurred usually only in a certain order. This order seemed to be an inherent one which could only be explained as the result of a repercussion that the process of analysis had on the unconscious. Only after your consciousness has increased by having assimilated a particular content from the unconscious can another aspect of the unconscious psyche appear. As a rule it is necessary first to assimilate contents of such and such a nature before the contents of another nature can appear which then becomes the next step in analytical development. Thus after the motif of figure A has been dealt with sufficiently the motif of figure B begins to be more frequent in dreams. And when those elements have been integrated into the conscious system and dealt with properly, figures or motifs of class C will begin to be more frequent. If an analytical process is observed without having a particular idea or theory as to its prescribed course a natural sequence of elements will be seen.

The very first opportunity to increase consciousness will be the encounter of what Jung calls the *shadow*. This figure is well known, as

illustrated by the French expression of the *bête noire* or the famous phenomenon of the scapegoat. Sir George Frazier's book, "The Scapegoat", constituting Vol. VI of his "Golden Bough", gives a great deal of information about the scapegoat and its function. The idea of the scapegoat is best known in the ritual of the Jewish Day of Atonement, described in Leviticus 16:6-22. The personification of this darker side of an individual's system is sometimes very striking. I will give an example of a dream involving this problem, dreamt by a young American psychologist. In the dream the young man is helping his friend, Frank, to empty his cupboard as Frank has to return home. Frank is overloaded and weighed down with all kinds of objects, and the young man helps him to carry some of the objects out of the room. But he sees that his friend can never reach home with so many things, more than half of which are balloonlike. The young man recommends to Frank to let the air out of all the objects and roll them up, and thus have more room to pack. Now in order to understand what this dream means we have to know a few things about the role Frank plays in the dreamer's mind. In other words, we have to collect the associations connected with Frank. The dreamer tells us that he dislikes Frank for the simple reason that he thinks he is inflated. Moreover he characterizes Frank as an introvert, while he himself is an extravert. Literally in that case we can say that Frank represents the introverted shadow of the extraverted dreamer.

The dream tells us something about the difficulties of the extravert to understand the introvert; and it tells us that the introverted shadow of the extraverted dreamer appears to the latter as something inflated, which must be understood as a projection. The dreamer makes such projections unto somebody who possesses a number of creative qualities, which however, as long as they are in the shadow part of the personality, are devoid of value to the dreamer because they cannot be realized. Jung has devoted a whole chapter of his book on Psychological Types to this subject. In that chapter he deals with Jordan's book "Character as Seen in Body and Parentage", and points out that the author is an introvert who gives a wholly unsatisfactory and unjust description of the extravert and a highly incomplete description of the introvert.

In order to say something theoretical about this figure of the shadow, I will call him "the dark brother within" or "the dark mirror reflex". I have already noted some of the personifications of the dark brother within found in folklore. In addition we only have to think of goblins and evil spirits and the fact that among primitives the shadow has great significance so that they treat it with all the necessary precautions to have added protection. Primitives take the shadow literally and the way they deal with it goes so far as to make them liable of a

serious crime if they step on it; in certain instances they believe they are justified in killing the person who steps on their shadow. We also know of cases where the shadow gets lost. In German literature there is a very famous story by Chamisso, called "Peter Schlemihl". Then we have stories like "Dr. Jeckyll and Mr. Hyde" where a light and a dark side of man somehow are living in a symbiosis. The primitive man's "bush soul" would correspond in many ways to what Jung calls the shadow.

The shadow always represents that aspect of a man's system which is refuted, rejected, repressed and which he hides from other people. The less respectable qualities of a person are always represented in shadow figures; so that the existence of the shadow really points to a moral problem par excellence. The shadow is always represented in our dreams and phantasies by a person of the same sex, of our own sex, which is in contradistinction to animus and anima who are of the opposite sex. This is seen particularly in the beginning of analysis, when tramps, murderers, alcoholics, or drug addicts, and all kinds of unpleasant figures of the man's own sex appear in his dreams. And it becomes a problem for man to have to admit that such tendencies exist in him. It always constitutes a major difficulty in analysis to get analysands to come to terms with the shadow figures, or in other words, to take the shadow figures, as Jung would say, on the *subjective level*. There is no doubt that the shadow has a personal aspect, or belongs more or less to what Jung calls the "personal unconscious", which as such would be equivalent to the Freudian unconscious. But when one deals with the widely held prejudices that arise out of the darker aspects of the human personality, it is doubtful how much of this belongs to the personal unconscious, and how much of this remains on the subjective level; this is to raise the question of the extent to which the individual can be held responsible for this in the true sense of the word. We only have to think of collective prejudices of this kind, as for instance, antisemitism, or other such isms which have to do with the unreflected condemnation of something human to find illustrations. Such prejudices are immediately projected not only onto certain persons, but also onto some particular group with some particular creed, or onto particular political convictions which cover up the incompatibilities we have in our own system. These things which all of us know very well poison the atmosphere of practically the whole planet. In other words, when we deal with collective shadow projections, where men not only forget about the beam in their own eyes but criticize their neighbours for the moats in theirs, it is doubtful whether the situation can be dealt with on a personal level. Since this is at the same time a moral problem, we have to admit that the collective aspect, or the collective roots of a shadow projection, most clearly originate out of the

collective unconscious and no longer out of the personal unconscious. For this reason it can be said that the collective shadow is a problem which simply has to do with the objective existence of the moral problem or the question of good and evil.

The relativity of good and evil in Jungian psychology has been given a great deal of thought and has been discussed at great length, particularly by theologians. In order to see the significance of Jung's teaching we must go back to the first dire necessity that occurred in our life, which made it inevitable for us to deal somehow with the dark aspect of our own nature, or, as it were, to take up that life in us which had hitherto not been lived, but with which we have to come to terms. As soon as we meet with this problem, we experience its ambivalence. Not only do the shadow figures represent all kinds of obviously negative qualities, and not only will we have to deal with those qualities in a way which gives them a chance to be lived, or at all events to be considered, reflected upon and made peace with, but we also will discover rather positive qualities in those figures, which in themselves are perfectly valuable, but which for some external reasons have never been cultivated and lived, and therefore, have degenerated. This condition demonstrates what can be called the ambivalence of the shadow figure. In these cases where the shadow contains both sides, it has in its ambivalence all the qualities of what we may call in Jungian terminology, a symbol. A symbol, according to Jung's definition, always unites two sides. Here we have then this quality of the shadow which we call the double, our double — the shadow who is at the same time a poison and a medicine. May I remind you of the famous passage in *Omar Khayyam* where he says: "If a sage hands you poison, drink it. If a fool hands you the antidote, pour it out." The problem amounts to the relativity of the value of the shadow, and thereby to the relativity of the value of evil. We may also, at this point, quote from the Koran (Sura XVIII - 64:81):

"Then found they one of our servants to whom we had vouchsafed our mercy, and whom we had instructed with our knowledge.

And Moses said to him, "Shall I follow thee that thou teach me, for guidance, of that which thou hast been taught?"

He said, "Verily, thou canst not have patience with me;

How canst thou be patient in matters whose meaning thou comprehendest not?"

He said, "Thou shalt find me patient if God please, nor will I disobey thy bidding."

He said, "Then, if thou follow me, ask me not of aught until I have given thee an account thereof."

So they both went on, till they embarked in a ship, and he — *the unknown* — staved it in. "What" said *Moses*, "hast thou staved it

in that thou mayest drown its crew? a strange thing now hast thou done!"

He said, "Did I not tell thee that thou couldst not have patience with me?"

He said, "Chide me not that I forgot, nor lay on me a hard command."

Then went they on till they meet a youth, and he slew him. Said Moses, "Hast thou slain him who is free from guilt of blood? Now hast thou wrought a grievous thing!"

He said, "Did I not tell thee that thou couldst not have patience with me?"

Moses said, "If after this I ask thee aught, then let me be thy comrade no longer; but now hast thou my excuse."

They went on till they came to the people of a city. Of this people they asked food, but they refused them for guests. And they found in it a wall that was about to fall, and he set it upright. Said Moses, "If thou hadst wished, for this thou mightest have obtained pay."

He said, "This is the parting point between me and thee. But I will first tell thee the meaning of that which thou couldst not await with patience.

As to the vessel, it belonged to poor men who toiled upon the sea, and I was minded to damage it, for in their rear was a king who seized every ship by force.

As to the youth his parents were believers, and we feared lest he should trouble them by error and infidelity.

And we desired that their Lord might give them in his place a child, better than he in virtue, and nearer to filial piety.

And as to the wall, it belonged to two orphan youths in the city, and beneath it was their treasure: and their father was a righteous man: and thy Lord desired that they should reach the age of strength, and to take forth their treasure through the mercy of thy Lord. And not of mine own will have I done this. This is the interpretation of that which thou couldst not bear with patience."

As we can see evil here becomes the teaching and this is something not totally unknown in analysis. There are times when the analysand has to deal with the problem of the shadow; then the analyst may appear as a shadow figure, thus giving to this shadow quality a healing influence. This whole problem of the relativity of evil is dealt with in the Catholic church according to the sentence: "*Omne bonum a deo, omne malum a homine*," by which evil appears as no real being, over against which the real being — the Greek *on* — only belongs to the good; making the evil a non-existent "reality", which is the absence of good, the *privatio boni*. I think we have perfectly good reasons to



turn this theory upside down and to say with Wilhelm Busch that "the good, this law is safe, is always the evil which is left out."

One of the purposes of analysis is to make the person capable of coming to terms with this inferior personality consisting of laziness, evil, negative values, moral and spiritual inferiorities and backwardness of all sorts, and to come to terms with the effects this inferior part of his person has on him. These effects are naturally automatic as long as this inferior part remains in the unconscious, and it is a problem of the first order to learn not only about these autonomous unconscious tendencies, but also to control them, for if they gain the ascendancy in the life of a person a neurotic dissociation of the personality results. This task of linking this part of the person to the conscious personality is of course a major technical and moral problem. In this task man will have to keep a balance between the various tendencies and will have to accept some of them by using the necessary critique. Such a procedure will inevitably make it necessary to be disobedient, because man will have to develop an independent sort of position. The moral problem actually exists only because man must be able to will differently. It is essential that man must be able to do things which are not generally accepted by the majority of people, because only if he is able to do so, does ethics make sense. If man is just an animal who piously obeys the laws nature imposes on him, no ethical question comes up, and it is consequently of no particular merit if he simply obeys laws. Thus the possibility of disobedience is necessary in order to make the moral problem a reality. It can, of course, happen that man gets stuck in this conflict or in a dissociation, so that he starts to live a double life. In order to get out of this condition, man needs something like a therapeutic myth, a therapeutic myth which can appear in a dream. Dreams most always have something of a mythic quality, and whenever a dream is seen as an attempt for the increase of consciousness, or an attempt for the creation of consciousness, it always has some similarity to cosmogony. Every dream appears as a small cosmogony, or the creation of a microcosm, simply because there is in it an inter-relation between the conscious and the unconscious. It is for this particular reason that care must be taken not to attribute dream figures *in globo* to the dreamer's conscious personality, for this in many cases would give rise to the danger of an inflation — positive or negative. In view of this danger it would be much more correct to treat the dream figures as being forces in which man participates rather than being forces with which he is identified. Examples of therapeutic myths which are helpful in dealing with this conflict of a shadow, or with this moral conflict are the myth of the Virgin Birth, the myth of the redeeming work of Christ, and to some degree the more modern myth expressed in the new dogma, where Mary with her body is received into Heaven. In

this myth Mary's body, in other words matter, as the substratum of corruption, is sanctified.

In literature there are many other examples. There is Othello with his shadow counterpart Jago, or there is a myth of venerable age which is particularly striking in this respect, the famous Gilgamesh epic in which the hero Gilgamesh meets with two different aspects of the shadow, first a personal one who is represented by Enkidu and then a collective one, represented by Chumbaba. The latter one has to be overcome *tale quale*, whereas the first one has to be made friends with. This is the therapeutic aspect of the Gilgamesh epic. When the hero has integrated the personal shadow figure into his ego, he gains a new dimension, by which he becomes less of an individual and more something generally human. If man did not have his shadow, he would not be real, for only ghosts do not cast shadows. This, in the spiritualistic experiences, is always thought of as being a shibboleth for the reality of unreality of an apparition.

The next step in the analytical process is what Jung calls the "*Persona*". The persona, according to Jung, is a certain system of adaptation which is built up during the first half of life in order to protect man from the influences of the outer world, and in order to allow him to appear more or less decently in the outer world without giving himself away too much. This system can also be called a "role" which man wants to play. Thus Jung took the term of the persona, which is actually the Latin word for the mask used by actors in the ancient theatre, where the mask represented a particular role. From this mask, as a *pars pro toto*, we go to our clothes, therefore the costume we wear. In French, for instance, costume or *coutume* is synonymous with *habit* — which also means a relatively solid habitual complex of functions. Considered as a function, the persona is the function of relatedness to the external world, and as such is a correlative concept to the ones I shall presently describe as anima and animus, for *they* represent the function of relation to the inner world. The persona is formed in the course of life partly by the effects the outer world has upon us, and partly by our reactions to those effects. Schopenhauer put it very neatly when he said "that which somebody represents in contradistinction to that he actually is". If we identify ourselves with this persona, then we are *personal* in contradistinction to *individual*. For this reason for people who are identified with their personae, *personalities* play such an important part. Yet it must be noted that the stronger the persona is, the more rigid it becomes and the more the bearer of this persona is jeopardized by influences from within. In such a case, for instance, a strong man or a confirmed rationalist suddenly shows superstitious traits. I should like to report here an experience I had during my last trip to this country, when I visited a world-famous

scientist whom I had known from Europe. He received me on the porch of his house which was adorned with a horse shoe. I tried to make a funny remark by saying, "but Professor, you don't believe in that sort of thing, do you really?"; whereupon he answered quite naively, "of course not, but you know I have been told that it works even when you don't believe in it." We all know examples of people who have identified so completely with their persona that their lives consist only of the role they play, their profession, or their position, or the use of their particular gift. Certain famous singers, tenors, sopranos, etc. are examples of this. Perhaps the most obvious example of such an identification in history was Louis XIV, the French king, with his conviction that "*L'Etat c'est Moi*" — the State is me. In dreams the persona is rarely personified since the persona is something we *wear*, like our clothes, rather than something we *are*; thus it becomes a dream-motive rather than a dream-figure. This becomes particularly clear when something goes wrong with our persona. In such cases we have dreams in which such speech metaphors as "losing one's shirt" or "losing one's face", (i.e. the mask we wear) are illustrated, or in which something is wrong with our clothes or we are exposed by being naked or partly naked, or our persona, our mask, has become defective or transparent. In cases where the persona is actually personified, it is always represented by somebody of the same sex. As we have already seen, this is true with the shadow-figure in the beginning of analysis and the dream-figure which looks like our father or our mother in earlier years of life. The father and mother images play a considerable part as examples in the building up of our own persona. Here is an example of such a dream: the dreamer is a young American psychologist, who dreams that he sees himself being carried out of the house in a coffin — he is not particularly moved by this, except that he is upset by the fact that he sees himself lying in the coffin in his best dark blue suit which he realizes will now be destroyed. This young man was greatly interested in his outer appearance and had always paid particular attention to his clothes. His face scarcely ever showed any mimic reactions for he always put a lot of emphasis on correct behaviour. Consequently he was very impersonal.

The persona is usually much more elaborate and much more rigid with men than it is with women. This fact has its mirror-reflex in the well-known fact that clothes and the hairdo, etc. with women are ever so much more adaptable, changing much more frequently with the fashion than they are with men.

The next step in a typical analytical development is the appearance of and the dealing with the anima — in the case of a man — and the animus — in the case of a woman. Previously I offered some justification for the creation of the term anima; here I shall point to the

kind of experience which made Jung think of such a term and the objective material which can be used in order to justify these concepts of archetypes of the collective unconscious. In order to do this I need to give you an idea of the development in the realm of anima or animus which takes place in a typical case of analytical psychology. We deal with the anima first, in other words, with a hypothetical case of a man in order to illustrate the effects of the anima on a man's system. The anima is the projection producing factor par excellence and consequently, the anima always is seen by the person in a projected form, i.e. as all women, or most women, or certain women. The man will be affected very strongly by this projection. Such projections have a high degree of autonomy, so that they produce strong emotional reactions which are one of the main features of any anima projection. The existence of such a projection exaggerates, viciates all the human relations so that relationships to people, particularly women are weakened and to a strange degree mythologised.

If such a condition were to be analyzed a good deal of phantasy would be found in it; in other words, there are unconscious phantasies which automatically stain the object of the phantasy and make the sender of the projections very irritable, very touchy and moody. Man apparently becomes possessed by his anima-image and that makes him something less than a man, and produces an effeminate set of reactions. Thus he is not only moody but also very jealous; he reacts like a dandy; he is unadaptable and effeminate. He becomes a strong man with a tender sort of kernel. Now, if this anima is made the subject of analysis it undergoes a certain development which can be outlined by the various stages of that development, of which there seem to be five. To begin with the anima image will be projected onto the mother. As long as this is the case, the whole problem can just as well be called a mother-complex in the ordinary Freudian sense of the word. The image of the mother will quite automatically be contaminated with the pre-existing image of the anima. While the mother carries this projection, there is a condition that is highly undesirable and the mother-complex can properly be called a *complexus delendus*; it simply has to be somehow dissolved. If it is not, it will have all kinds of unpleasant affects, ranging from promiscuity to homosexuality, from Don Juanism to criminality. In the second stage which occurs somewhat later in life, in adolescence or perhaps earlier, the image of the anima is projected on a mother-substitute, the older girl-friend of a young man, or in days when there were still maids or cooks in homes, the maid or the cook. The third stage I should like to call the stage of the prostitute type. At this stage, the anima image takes on a somewhat androgynous nature. A prostitute can be called that because she *is* and *is not* a woman. Obviously she is not a mother-type which accounts for the

fact that with the prostitute-type the mother-complex gets dissolved. A prototype for this third stage is "Baubo", the inspirer as you remember, of the unchaste and obscene jokes of the women during the Demeter festivals in Eleusis. The fourth stage I should like to call the priestess type. This image is usually projected onto nurses or beautiful nuns, or onto women with some sort of a holiness or onto women whose backgrounds are unknown or most varied. The fifth stage can be represented by what we used to call the "*femme inspiratrice*", that is a lady with a salon, in the French sense of the word, who is of brilliant, witty, clever and rather mysterious quality, or a lady with a quality that cannot be penetrated, or a lady who is rather taciturn and mystic. This aspect of the anima-image is illustrated by Ninon de Lenclos, Diane de Poitiers and other "grandes dames" of the French past. Now, all these figures, all these stages of anima-figures, when projected, produce or exert a very peculiar influence on the man, the upshot of which is a completely demonic one.

Now this list of five stages is admittedly a clumsy sort of simplification of the problem, but there are a number of clinical examples of this phenomenology in the published dreams in the Jungian literature. Instead of giving more such examples, I would note some of the ways in which the problem of the anima appears in non-psychological literature. It is interesting to study the gnostic myth where there are several stages of feminine figures portrayed. The first stage is the mother-type represented by Eve. The third type, the whore or prostitute appears strikingly in Helena and particularly in the famous story of Simon Magus which is found in Acts 8:5-24. Simon Magus, who declared himself to be "the great power of God" and was by his followers likened to the Holy Ghost, was a rival to Peter and John. He had found the girl Helena in a brothel in Tyrus and he called her his "first thought". She is the "*ennoia*", the power contained in the aion who is also a charis and who makes aion long for the women so that the situation becomes creative and the anthropos is begotten. This story is also known from Irenaus and Hippolytos. The next stage, that of the priestess type, appears in the Gnostic system in Maria, and the fifth stage, the *femme-inspiratrice* type most clearly in Sophia. In English literature an excellent example, always quoted by Jung, appears in Rider Haggard's novel "She". The "She" has the attribute of "She who must be obeyed" — in other words, she is a woman of strict or almost absolute authority. Many aspects of the anima image can be found described in Rider Haggard as well as in a parallel book in French by Pierre Benoit "L'Atlantide". There is also a really interesting description of the experience of the anima, in a famous book of the Renaissance period, written by a Venetian monk, by the name of Francesco Colonna, with the strange title "Hypnerotomachia di Poliphilo." It was published in



1499 and is one of the most expensive incunabula because of the most beautiful woodcuts with which it is adorned. The book has been made the subject of a special study by Mrs. Linda Fierz in a book published by Bollingen in 1949.

In the dream of Poliphilo the various stages of the anima are naturally projected onto actual women, and as long as they remain unconscious, a period of time identical with the period of their projection, they must do so, for as soon as a contact is made with the conscious they are no longer projected. The ways in which these images usually appear are various and may be of the following types: the dream-figure is an unknown woman, sometimes of dubious character; or a diseased woman, a despicable sort of character, a "*femme qui se fait suivre*"; or a primitive, very often, particularly in this country a colored girl, or a stranger or perhaps to a non-Jewish dreamer, a Jewish girl. The image may also have historical traits, or may be untimely or even outside of time, so that she is not subjected to our terrestrial time. She may have qualities of a virgin, mother, queen, goddess; she may have the qualities of a sister, mother, wife and daughter, all telescoped into one. This is what I mean when I say she may be outside of terrestrial time. She also can be represented in theriomorphic form, e.g. as a snake, or an animal of prey, cats, tigers, etc. The carriers of these projections usually are somewhat outstanding women, preferably actresses, dancers, heavily made up persons, at all events women with rather striking and extraordinary features, very dark or very blond, etc. When in the course of analysis these qualities are discussed and when some kind of an understanding for their existence within the dreamer's own system is reached, in short when this content of the collective unconscious is integrated, more or less integrated, it has one outstanding effect on the consciousness of a man. It will produce what I would like to call an Eros of Consciousness. Such a man will possess, because of this Eros of consciousness in addition to his masculine consciousness the quality of relatedness not only to women but also to everything that comes his way. For being aware or conscious rather of the effects of the anima and her content, he will have an entirely different attitude to many phenomena of life. While the integration of the shadow enables a person to have a much better relationship to the fellows of his own sex, the integration of the anima has still more of an effect on his relations to the other sex. Man will find that in the course of such a process a triade is produced. This triade consists of the male subject, the female subject, (namely his vis-a-vis, his partner,) plus the third element which is transcendent and which will have to be called the anima.

The correlative concept to the anima in a man's case is the concept of the animus in a woman's case. I think this can be summed up by

saying that it represents the masculine element in a woman's system. This element usually comes to the fore in the second half of life where it manifests itself more or less biologically. Women begin to grow mustaches, their voices get lower, they become more energetic and so on. The more psychological phenomenology of the identity with the animus would be that such a woman becomes a nagging individual, she likes to fight merely on principles and ideas, she develops a kind of logic which is doubtful yet persistent, she begins to know everything better, she is possessed with ideas, tends to become sectarian religiously, or to adhere to some fashionable latest philosophy, etc. There are again certain stages of the development of this phenomenon, which I should like to outline briefly.

The first stage would be represented by the father complex in early life. A girl will feel attracted to older men and will particularly be interested in paternal sort of men-friends. The second stage I would call the stage of action. In this stage the woman will admire men who are outstanding in any kind of action such as an air pilot, a strong sun-tanned sportsman. In the negative case, it can be even a notorious yet physically attractive criminal. The third stage I would call the spiritual stage. In this stage professional men will be singled out; parsons, teachers, doctors, actors, perhaps artists and the like. Negatively, it can be a swindler, or a genius misunderstood, or even a garrulous idiot. During these stages of the development, in dreams the animus may be personified in an air pilot, or in a race car driver, or perhaps in a negative form as an eagle or some other kind of a bird, particularly when it is a question of the third stage. The third stage too can be represented by a priest, or by some sort of sorcerer. When the animus is projected onto a real man, this can have very serious effects, for a woman can become an absolute slave to such a man, and it can lead to a helpless sexual bondage. Again I should like to refer you to some examples from literature, which seem to describe the phenomena of the animus projection rather clearly. Read Ronald Frazier's book called "The Flying Draper" the book by H. G. Wells, called "Christiana Alberta's Father", where you can see another peculiarity of the animus I have not mentioned yet, namely the fact that the animus very often is a plurality, consisting of a group of men, in contrast to the anima which is usually one woman only. In this book, "Christiana Alberta's Father", the animus is represented by what the heroine calls "the court of conscience". A good example also is Mary Hay's book, "The Evil Vineyard". It is, in fact, much more difficult to describe the animus than it is to describe the anima, and I therefore must refer you to these examples in literature rather than to any particular psychological papers.

Now, as concerns the integration of the animus, we again have to say that the animus as such, that is, the archetype of the animus, can-

not be integrated, any more than can the anima. What you can integrate is its effects, by a discrimination in the personification of this archetype. You will thereby create a relatedness to what at a later stage, when it has been made conscious to a great extent, will be a logos. This logos will give the feminine consciousness something like a reflectiveness or meditateness and will give the mind a perceptive quality. This achievement will show mainly in the relationships with other people, and in particular, with the partner. It will bear fruit as it goes along with the development of the anima in man and his ability to build up a relationship. Similar to the triad I described as being the result of this integration of the anima, there is also a triad when the animus is integrated, namely, a) the feminine subject, b) the masculine subject in the partner, in the real man, and c) the animus transcending both.

Let us think briefly on the effects that animus and anima have in every day life. Animus and anima are responsible, in a large degree, for sympathy and antipathy. As ideal images they attract each other fatally, causing eventually the utter disappointment of the individuals in question. The projection is always made at first sight. It produces a strange feeling of old acquaintanceship; that once upon a time one has already known the other, and what is worse, the ability to see reality is lost. Almost everybody is possessed by these figures. But it has to be remembered at this juncture that our consciousness is still in full development, and that there always have been and always will be more conscious and less conscious individuals. When we stop understanding ourselves or others, emotions are always produced. In other words, there are gaps in our system of adaptation, where emotions immediately push through; when emotions rule, discussion becomes impossible. Whenever this is the case, our arguments are hopelessly involved and we are victims of our prejudices. Then, of course, one single experience is sufficient to conjure up the whole weight of all the apriori judgments, or in the opposite case, one single good experience can make us see everything in an unrealistically positive light.

In an article of this length it is impossible to give a full picture of the Jungian theory of analysis. I should like to add two more things which are of great importance, particularly for the later stages of Jungian analysis. I have been talking of the triad in connection with the animus and anima. I should like to say that in a man's case we will see in the course of time that this triad is no longer sufficient, and that at a certain juncture another figure appears in dreams or phantasies, which will likewise have to be integrated, at least to some degree. And this fourth figure would be the figure of what Jung termed "the wise old man". In the woman's case something equivalent will take place, and the fourth figure with her would be what Jung calls "the great mother". Both figures have something to do with what we may

boldly call wisdom. Very often in Jungian literature you will find that the author talks about the "Individuation Process". What I have been doing thus far is, in fact, an attempt to describe this "individuation process", inasmuch as these dream figures, images, motifs, and phantasies showing such elements are in the course of analysis made conscious, or inasmuch as they are in a continuous process assimilated to the conscious system and integrated into it. This kind of development, in other words, the subsequent stages in which these images turn up one after the other, in a triadic system wind up with the realisation of a fourth element which must be added to the system. From his experience that under given conditions such a development seems to take place more or less spontaneously, Jung felt justified in talking about it in terms of a process. I shall say more about this in the last lecture, but I should like to note here that the existence of such a process as this makes it likely that individuation, which is nothing less than the becoming conscious of the totality of the human personality, is something which is basically present in life so that it is only necessary to follow this course of development consecutively in order eventually to attain this totality. Individuation means nothing less than the consciously becoming of what one actually is. With such a definition the assumption is that this final being exists in *nuce* before man starts on this enterprise; and this is something we shall have to discuss in our lecture on the relation between psychology and religion.

### III

#### *Interpretation of Dreams*

It would seem redundant to tell you of the high esteem in which dreams have been held from biblical times until recent years. Not until the coming of the natural sciences in the 17th and 18th or, more precisely, 18th and 19th centuries, was this belief affected and then only among people who could be considered educated. Popular belief never abandoned the conviction of the importance of dream revelations.

In dealing with the place the interpretation of dreams plays in Jungian psychology, I shall proceed chronologically.

In a volume entitled "Studies in Word Association", which was published during the early years of Jung's psychiatric clinical work, there is one contribution called "Association, Dream and Hysterical Symptoms". In this Jung described the treatment of a girl who showed obviously hysterical symptoms. In that treatment he used both the Freudian method of interpreting the patient's dreams and his own word association experiment. In the course of the investigation it became clear that in the association experiment, and in the dreams, and in the symptoms of the patient, the same complex showed itself in various disguises. The complex that seemed to be at the root of the trouble of the patient was an erotic one, connected with what then was called the "mother complex".

A few years later, stimulated by this and other findings of Jung's, Herbert Silberer in Vienna inaugurated an interesting experimental approach to the unconscious, which he combined with the word association method, a technique he called lecanomantic gazing. This is a technique taken from ancient methods of divination, from which came the more modern practice of crystal gazing. Instead of a crystal he used a bowl filled with water, with a few lighted candles set around it. The bowl and candles were placed in a dark room and the patient was asked to gaze into the surface of the water. Various kinds of visionary impressions, or phantasies, developed. The word association experiment that was done at the same time with the test person showed clearly that the associations produced were not based on the visions produced during the lecanomantic gazing, but that both the associations and the lecanomantic visions were based on the same complexes. Silberer concluded that the visions and the associations mutually support their interpretation by pointing concentrically to the same groups of complexes. Silberer was able also to demonstrate that the figures of the images tended to develop in the course of time, and become more



elaborate and clear. He noted that they began to be psychological potencies, turning into types or typical images. Now all this is interesting, but it must be admitted that none of those experimental methods produced pure causal relations, but that there seemed to have been some kind of a "translating" element at work. Furthermore, this "translating" element seemed to be rather autonomous, independent of the originally intended effects. The conclusion to be drawn is that a definite causal explanation cannot be given to any of the dreams, symptoms, or effects observed in the association experiment, but a statement can be made about the conditions out of which the phenomena come. This is important for it bears upon the whole question of how to approach dreams in order to find out about their deeper meanings, for it indicates the difficulty of knowing that such and such a dream element goes back causally to such and such a fact or such and such a pre-existing condition. In the light of this difficulty it may help to recall some points made in the first lecture concerning the results of the Jungian word association method. We noted then that through his experiences Jung discovered the existence and the effects of what he called complexes, and that in the course of time he developed a general theory of complexes. In this general theory of complexes it was shown that these complexes are like partial personalities and that as such they behave autonomously, and that they are charged with a considerable emotional tone, and that very often they are incompatible with the attitude of the conscious mind. These qualities of the complexes are close to the results found in Silberer's experiments, so that it can be said that complexes are reflected in dreams in a personified way, as personifications in dream figures. In the dreams these complexes are able to act, to perform, to play their parts uninhibitedly, because conscious control during sleep is weak.

Another interesting result of Jung's research in the field of complexes coincides with the theory of the "*niveau mental*", the level of consciousness, developed by the French psychologist Pierre Janet. Janet worked out a theory to explain all kinds of phenomena in hysteria, and, I think, Jung used this theory to explain some of the effects of the complexes. Janet talked about "*l'abaissement de la tension psychologique*" or "*l'abaissement du niveau mental*", which is a phenomenon taking place whenever an emotional condition exists. Various kinds of unusual, strange or even pathological mental disturbances can be explained adequately by this concept of the mental level or the level of consciousness. Janet, in a later paper, published 1937, "*Les Oscillations du Niveau Mental*", says that the notion of the "abatement of the psychological tension" makes it possible to deal readily with the psychological peculiarities of sleep and dreams.

Jung observed that whenever a complex is stirred up by a critical stimulus word in his word association experiment, something happens

which corresponds to the "*abbaissement du niveau mental*" of Janet; the level of consciousness remains lowered for a period of time, varying from a fifth of a second to minutes, which is a fairly abnormal state. It is clear that when a complex is constellated, that is stimulated, or stirred up, the tension or attention of consciousness is lowered. It is also clear that in sleep the level of consciousness is physiologically lowered until consciousness is almost completely wiped out. Thus it is understandable that in sleep the complexes which are normally down in the unconscious realm will be closer to the frontier of consciousness and in that way exert an influence or make an impression on the conscious mind; and it is possible that these impressions account for dreams since in such a state the complexes will be active.

Now this point of view can be expanded further by another suggestion Jung made about the psychology of dreams. I refer to the suggestion that dreams have dramatic structures, that they can be looked at as being real "*dramas intérieurs*", inner dramas, and that they can be analysed just as a stage drama can be analysed to uncover its hidden structure. Schopenhauer once said that the ego was the secret stage director of a person's dreams, or, as he put it on another occasion, "In a dream everyone is his own Shakespeare". Jung, in the early seminars on children's dreams he conducted at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, made the members of the class analyse certain dreams according to the classical pattern of the drama. This pattern has a number of parts in it. First there is the list of characters, or the *dramatis personae*, and the statement concerning the time and place of the action. Second, when the action begins, there soon comes a portrayal or exposition of the problem with which the drama will deal. The plot begins to develop and leads to a certain set of complications. Third, the lines in the plot are drawn together into a conflict or crisis; this is the high point of the play in which something decisive either for good or ill must occur. Fourth, there comes the solution which must be a reasonable and meaningful ending for the crisis.

Now I shall report on a dream, which I shall use at this point and a number of times later on. The patient said, "I was fishing for trout, not in an ordinary stream or lake, but in a reservoir divided into compartments. For a time I fished with the usual equipment of flies, etc., but I caught nothing. Becoming exasperated, I took up a three-pronged spear, which was lying nearby, and immediately I succeeded in spearing a fine fish."

Now I shall apply the pattern of the dramatic structure to this dream. The first sentence, "I was fishing for trout, not in an ordinary stream or lake, but in a reservoir divided into compartments" is the same as the first part of the drama; it gives the *dramatis personae*, which is in this particular case the dreamer, the time and the place.

The second part of the drama, the exposition, is given by the next phrase, "For a time I fished with the usual equipment of flies, etc., but I caught nothing". The plot leads to the problem. The third part of the drama is in the first half of the next phrase "becoming exasperated, I took up a three-pronged spear, which was lying nearby". This is a critical sort of high point which must be followed by some kind of resolution. This is in the rest of the sentence, "and immediately I succeeded in spearing a fine fish" which corresponds to the fourth part of the drama.

I want you to keep this dream in mind, as I shall go into its deeper meaning later on. At this point I want to use it as an example of the Jungian concept of the dramatic structure of dreams. But I would note that the suggestion that dreams have a dramatic structure has certain consequences. It means 1) that the dream is a whole with a beginning and an end, with a conflict and its solution. The Greek word "drama" means action, so the action of the dream would lead to the "lysis", the Greek word for liberation or salvation; 2) that it is very likely the stage drama had its origin in dreams. Note how the solution in the dream under consideration was brought about by the appearance of an entirely new element, the three-pronged spear. This was often the case in the ancient drama, where the solution came about through a *deus ex machina*. In antiquity when Artemidorus, Macrobius and Synesius wrote about dreams they cited examples in which divine intercession brought about the solution, and in all those cases the authors were convinced they were dealing with "*somnia a deo missa*" — dreams sent by God; 3) that the dramatically acting personifications in the dreams are moved by fate in the same way as fate was the dynamic of the ancient drama. Illustrations of this are the famous oracle in the Oedipus dramas, or the curse of the Atrides; 4) that there is a close connection between dreams and the old kind of dramas, which were, as has been pointed out by Nietzsche, *mystery plays*. A dream is a *therapeutic myth*, which is exactly what the mystery dramas or mystery plays were; 5) I would point out that Nietzsche said that in the dream man repeats the experience of earlier humanity, which seems to be an anticipation of the Jungian idea of the collective unconscious.

Dreams have several discernable effects. The first is that the dream wakes the dreamer up. This happens relatively frequently; in many cases because the 4th part of the drama is lacking so that the resolution to the drama is left to the conscious mind, which throws the dreamer back into consciousness. Second, a dream has a salutary effect, an immediately salutary effect. A great deal has been said about the cathartic effect of a drama upon an audience. People who attend the performance of a drama are affected by what is going on on the stage because they identify themselves with the hero or heroes, the protagon-

onist or the antagonist. The cathartic effect comes through the strongly emotional reactions produced in people by this identification and they emerge from the experience liberated by the resolution of the drama. In antiquity Plutarch provided an excellent example of this when he reported that during a performance of *Medea*, a Euripidean drama, pregnant women began to give birth and men started having crying fits.

Jung introduced another important matter into dream analysis. Schopenhauer's statement that a person is his own stage director in his dreams suggests that there may well be some kind of responsibility on man's part for what goes on in his dreams. In the identification of the spectator with the hero or heroine of the drama somewhat the same thing is true. The matter Jung introduced has much to do with this characteristic of the drama or the dream. Jung pointed out that dreams can be interpreted on two different levels. Dreams can be interpreted on the objective level. This means that all dreams may be regarded as reporting something about those persons, figures and situations appearing in them as they exist objectively. This principle of interpretation is valueless when the dream figures and dream motives can no longer be traced to objective actual figures or situations in outer reality. At this point, the second level of interpretation is needed, which is to take everything happening in the dream on a subjective level, i.e. to attribute all personifications to the dreamer's own system. Interpretation on the objective level is justified as long as dream persons are well known to the dreamer and conditions which exist in the dream are a known part of the dreamer's external world. This principle becomes questionable when the dreamer's boss, or his wife, or his father, all persons who in one way or another are only partly known enter his dream. And when clearly mythological figures enter the dream an interpretation on the objective level becomes absolutely impossible. And the same thing would apply if situations which the dreamer has never come across in reality enter his dream. The necessity of interpretation on the subjective level raises the problem I alluded to earlier when I spoke of the problem involved in the shadow. It is difficult to explain how some of the qualities found in certain dream figures belong to a person's own system. If the *bon mot* of Schopenhauer I quoted is correct, if man is his own Shakespeare in his dreams, then he will have to accept the fact that there is something not only like Othello in him, but also something of Jago, of Shylock, and, as it were, of the whole cast of characters: Portia, Shylock, Antonio, Bassanio, etc. etc.

A few other qualities of dreams which seem to be fairly typical, and which are observed much more frequently in dreams than in other realms of experience must now be noted. In a collection of several



thousand dreams there are several characteristics which in a variant degree of frequency appear; these are peculiarities of dreams in contrast to waking experience. By the way, I believe that such a comparative study of dream material and conscious material is the only method by which knowledge can be gained about the nature of the unconscious, the function of dreams, the conditions under which dreams appear, and the conditions under which such and such dreams appear. Such comparative study is the only approach I can think of whereby a theory of dreams can be built. The first quality of dreams to which I point was strongly emphasized by Jung. He called it the compensating or complementing function of dreams. By this Jung meant that dreams have to be looked at in the light of the conscious attitude, condition and situation of the particular dreamer's life. He thought that dreams in many cases completed the picture of a person's life given in a study of the conscious. The Latin word *compleo* means to fill up completely, and in that sense the complementary function of the dream would be the function which adds to man's conscious picture of his own situation that which was left out for one reason or another, as e.g. repression, resistance, or wrong moral judgment. This element could come into the dream because the unconscious does not suffer from any such prejudices or repressions, because what is in it is not judged, as there is no ego which can pass a verdict.

Something similar has to be said about the compensatory function of dreams. The Latin word *compenso* means to weigh one thing against the other and to smooth out. A dream can have such an aspect which can only be seen and understood in contradistinction to the conscious condition of the dreamer. The idea of compensation presupposes the existence of some more complete standpoint for the individual superior to or different from the one he takes in consciousness. As an illustration, there is the case of a distinguished lady who has a whole series of dreams in which she meets a harlot lying in the gutter completely intoxicated; or there is a young engineer, a very rationalistic man, who has repeated dreams that he constructs a *perpetuum mobile* of first order, which he knows is an impossibility. In these cases the dreams must be regarded as having a compensatory meaning, bringing in something highly irrational into the very rational and very sound or very safe system of the dreamers.

Another peculiarity of dreams is that they often produce images, elements which have a typically symbolic quality. And here I want to go into the Jungian concept of the symbol at some length. The Jungian concept of the symbol was the reason for his break with Freud. It is given the cause for all kinds of misunderstandings and misinterpretations, and is still not understood completely by most people who disagree with Jung's thoughts. It is therefore necessary, in spite of the fact



that Jung has published a good deal of material on the subject, which gives any unprejudiced reader a clear picture of his meaning, to speak of the definition of the symbol in the Jungian sense.

The term symbol was used by a great many predecessors of analytical psychology and of Freudian psychology. For instance, Scherner did a great deal of investigation of the relation of dreams to bodily disturbances; he coined the term, body-symbolism. Scherner showed that the dream imagery expressed certain conditions in certain organs of the body. An illustration was the imagery of a furnace filled with flames blown upon by a powerful wind in a case of pneumonia or an inflammation of the lungs. The fire represented the inflammatory process and the wind the breath. Such imagery was called body-symbolism, it is nothing more than the translation of something physiological or pathological taking place in the body into an image. There is no doubt that such translations take place in dreams; the ancient Greek authors and doctors, such as Hippocrates and Galen, diagnosed bodily diseases from dreams of this kind. Tantristic Yoga also has an elaborate system of correspondencies between certain bodily locations and corresponding psychological experiences in the system of the cakras. Herbert Silberer gave a well authenticated description of certain phenomena in dreams which have to do with physiological transitions that occur, such as falling asleep or waking up; he calls the imagery related to such physiological effects the "symbolism of the threshold". He pointed out by way of illustration that the dream motive of leaving for a voyage or a trip very often is related to the transition from one psychological condition to another, e.g. falling asleep. And this recalls what Janet had to say about the *niveau mental*, and what the English neurologist Hughlings Jackson (who first described Jacksonian epilepsy) had to say about levels of cerebration. Now, according to Jung, all this so-called symbolism is not really symbolic but semiotic, from the Greek word "*sema*" which means sign, thus a sign for something perfectly well known. We, for instance, use analogies; yet an analogy is actually an abbreviated expression for something well known and concrete, as of the emblems used by employees of an airline. Usually they consist of small wings with the initials of the firm on them. They show that the person wearing such a sign in his button-hole is an employee of the airline. Or if we meet a Frenchman with a red rosette in his button-hole we know that he is a *Chevalier* of the *Légion d'Honneur*. Or think of Justice represented in a statue, usually a woman carrying a balance, a sword and with her eyes blindfolded. In all such cases, the observer can find out what is meant simply by using his common sense. Now, over against these semiotic expressions Jung would say that an actual symbol is something different because it is the best possible description of a relatively unknown but posited thing. Inasmuch as it

is the expression of something relatively unknown it always has further possibilities of meaning in addition to the obvious one. And Jung would say that as soon as all those further possibilities of meaning become known, the symbol becomes useless. It will be easy to make this clear to theologians. The Christian Cross as long as it was used to signify Christian love was an allegory according to the given definition and consequently not a true symbol. But as soon as the Cross was taken as the expression for something hitherto unknown, something transcending the ego, something beyond any rational explanation, and made the best expression for all this, then it became a real symbol. I think that Jung in his definition came close to what the ancient Greeks understood when they used the word "*symbolon*". Plutarch spoke of "*symbola mystica*" in *Consolatio ad Uxorem* 10. There the knowledge of these "*symbola*" by the initiate of the Dionysian Cult meant that he or she knew something which went beyond what could be experienced and was directly knowable. In this sense of the word, symbolism becomes a very important idea in dream interpretation. Through an investigation of tens of thousands of dreams it becomes perfectly clear that the Unconscious has the *virtus*, shall we call it, of forming true symbols.

Now I want to report a dream in which this is clear. The dreamer was a man of nearly 50 years; he was a psychologist working as an Assistant Professor at the Psychological Institute of a European University. The dream occurred in the course of analysis at a point where he began to realize what Jung calls the existence of the objective psyche. Here is the image which gave him this impression of having to do with something he had almost no conscious part in. He saw a red sphere revolving around a frontal axis in such a way that it moved away from the onlooker. The red sphere was within a blue one, a blue outer sphere, which was revolving sideways and backward around the inner sphere. The movement of the outer sphere was faster than that of the inner sphere. In the inner sphere he perceived what he called a "cross of light". This was a rectangular cross lying in a horizontal plane as it were in the equatorial plane of the inner sphere. The beams of light from this cross were white and along those four beams the white light was — as he said — pumped rhythmically from the center towards the periphery of the sphere. The rhythm was of about the frequency of his own heartbeat. The white light which was pumped rhythmically from the center to the periphery dissolved at the periphery of the sphere into, what he called, clouds of a red gleam. Outside this whole structure he saw a feminine figure holding her arm out towards the microcosm, with an impressive gesture, as if she wanted to say "you had better contemplate this phenomenon".

Now, this image — it is not really a dream since there is not much of an action in the sense of a drama in it — this image, to me,

appears to be a symbol of the psycho-physical totality of the dreamer's being which would be indicated by the fact that it is a highly abstract, most geometrical structure, and yet has a peculiar connection with his heartbeat, the pulsation of the light being directly related to his pulse. I think that more specifically we might call this central pulsation system or central circulation system a heart-symbolism, *sensu strictiori*. You will perhaps, at this juncture, remember the famous circulation of light-symbolism in Taoistic Chinese Philosophy. There is also color symbolism in the image, the blue and the red spheres, and the white and the red of the light. The blue and the red are opposites, the red having more to do with the blood — shall we say — and the blue having more to do with the spirit, or the red with feeling and the blue with thinking. Then, there is the symbolism of shape or form which was strictly geometrical: the two spheres, the rectangular Greek cross, the center and the periphery. In all this taken together there is a symbolism of totality. And, last but not least, some kind of a dynamic symbolism is given with this circulation or pulsation on the one hand and with the two movements of rotation on the other hand. In addition, there was a function of time, in the frequency of rotation of the spheres; and there was the more obviously anthropomorphic symbolism of the woman, who belongs to the phenomenology of the anima, although in this case she would play the part of a mystagogue.

The image contained a number of elements which the dreamer himself was able to trace back to conscious contents and a few elements which the doctor was able to trace back to elements of the unconscious he had come across earlier during the course of analysis. To conclude; the image contained conscious as well as unconscious material, rational as well as irrational elements, and a number of pairs of opposites. To those of you who know about Jungian Psychology it must be clear that the whole structure must be attributed to those symbols which — with Jung — are called "Mandalas". It also should be clear that inasmuch as the image contained such a large number of opposite qualities and united them in one image it can be called a true symbol. The symbol according to Jung has a transcendent function, which means that it is capable of uniting opposites. For this reason a true symbol very often is called by Jung an "uniting symbol".

Now I will continue with the list of peculiarities of dreams and I speak now of what is best called the occurrence of *typical motifs*. Here are some examples: the motif of a departure; the motif of a passage or crossing like the crossing of a river, either by a ford or by a bridge; the motif of falling or of flying; the more complicated motif of the cave and its dangers; the motif of the treasure guarded by some monster, dragon, etc. ("the treasure hard to be attained"); the motif of animals, such as the snake or then more generally the animals which are help-

ful (the "motif of the helpful animals"); the motif of the "circumambulation", when man walks around something repeatedly three times or more; and the "motif of the night sea journey". Recall the story of Jonah. A remarkable amount of parallel material has been collected in Frobenius' book on the night sea journey called "In the Age of the Sun God", published 1904. All in all, these typical dream motifs have a very close relationship or similarity with the motifs which ethnologists and mythologists and people who have made studies of Fairy Tales have been pointing out. This phenomenon of typical motifs always bears a relationship to the level of culture of the people involved, so that the interpretations of such motifs must be within the same level of cultural history as that in which the motif is best represented. The cultural connections must always be taken into account.

Another feature of dreams, especially of certain elements of dreams, is what is called the "contamination", which simply means that dreams are soiled with material that has little or nothing to do with the original element. Such contamination always happens as an effect of the stirring up complexes and in the realm of such contaminations the method of free association, inaugurated by Freud, has its use. For example: a handkerchief appears in a dream and the dreamer jumps from the handkerchief to Desdemona in Othello and the connection between the handkerchief and the jealousy of Othello. This is free association, justified inasmuch as in the unconscious realm there is little, if any, discrimination. Everything is connected with everything. Cases of contamination have consequently been analyzed successfully by use of the Word Association method. Jung, in a little book on the Psychology of the Dementia Praecox, which is schizophrenia, has given a few very amusing examples of such contaminated expressions of schizophrenic patients analysed as to their meaning. One was an old patient, an inmate of Burghölzli who used to say: "I am the Loreley". Jung found out that she had taken this title because of the fact that whenever the doctor came to the ward and said a few words to the patient and the patient replied to the doctor, the doctor used to leave her shaking his head and saying: "I don't know what this means", referring to her statements which were full of neologisms. Now, "I don't know what this means" — *"Ich weiss nicht, was soll es bedeuten"* — is the beginning of the famous Lied of the Loreley, by Heine. Or, the same patient used to say, "I am the Socrates substitute" — by which she wanted to indicate that she had been locked up in the Clinic as unjustly as Socrates had been put in jail.

Another feature of dream elements is what is called the "condensation". A dream figure may have qualities of the patient's husband, of her lover, of her analyst or even of some other man, but at the same time the dream figure will be a dentist or a certain animal who is



neither fish nor fowl, so that the figure at one and the same time will be something like a winged serpent, like *Quetzalcoatl*, a chimaera. These are examples of condensation. Contrary to this there is the phenomenon of multiplication — which is that one particular dream element appears in great numbers, from two to several specimens, all identical. This phenomenon is obviously connected with the fact that when a person is intoxicated he begins to see double. There is a fine example of this in the Chinese meditation text, called the “Secret of Golden Flower” (page 55): “the Book of successful contemplation said, ‘the sun sinks in the great water and magic pictures of trees in rows arise’”. These multiplication phenomena are closely related with what the French psychiatrists have described as “*troubles cénesthesiques*”.

Another feature of dreams is that they concretise more or less abstract psychological inner facts. The words “*bête noire*” mean, in psychological terms, the carrier of a shadow-projection. In a dream a *bête noire* may actually appear as a black ram or something of that sort. Complexes, as I said, tend to be personified, and not only personified but also acted out, which has the effect of giving a dramatising quality to dreams. Instead of a certain thought, the dreamer hears the whole story or instead of a certain fact, a whole drama is produced to illustrate the fact. Dreams tend to express themselves in an archaic way so that an animal which appears in a dream may talk, just as a certain animal talks with primitives because it is the carrier of or is identical with his bush-soul. This seems to be so because of the fact that the Unconscious has actual historical qualities inasmuch as it contains the history of mankind and also the pre-history, so it is able to express itself in a primitive or archaic way.

I shall now draw the theoretical conclusions which can be reached from all I have said about the peculiarities of dreams. Then I shall apply these conclusions to the dreams I have been quoting. It has to be said, first of all, that, according to Jung’s conviction, the dream is a natural phenomenon, occurring spontaneously in man’s psyche. It is not produced by any act of will and is apparently not influenced by man’s conscious mind. Consequently any method of explaining the dream cannot be causalistic but must be a method which shows the conditions which led up to the production of the dream. The causalistic explanation is impossible because there are no causes which would of necessity produce such and such a dream. All that is possible is to demonstrate the conditions which are connected with the creation of a particular dream. Again, every attempt to define the roots of dreams must of necessity remain very vague; all that can be said is that on the one hand the contents of a dream derive from the conscious mind and come from facts known by the dreamer, (such contents Freud calls the “remnants of the day”) and, on the other hand, contents come into



the dream which stem from the unconscious. These contents are usually called the constellated contents of the unconscious. Those constellated contents can be of two different natures: a) they can in turn be constellated or stimulated by a content of the conscious mind and b) they may have no such connection with the conscious mind and consequently have to be regarded as spontaneous, coming from creative processes in the unconscious mind. The latter possibility we have already come across when we talked about complexes of the unconscious and their autonomy — this autonomy more or less equals this spontaneous creative quality.

Now we are ready to deal with the meaning of dreams. This must be formulated in such a way that what the dream has to say is seen in light of the attitude of the conscious mind of the dreamer. There are at least four possibilities in the relation between the conscious and the unconscious in dreams. First, the dream is simply the unconscious reaction to a conscious situation. This possibility is described by the Jungian concepts of complementarity and compensation, completing or compensating. Here, all the impressions of the conscious life provide the conditions needed for the production of such a dream. Second, the dream shows a situation which results from a conflict between the conscious and the unconscious. In this case the independence of the unconscious mind is a prerequisite for the creation of such a dream. Third, the dream in which the unconscious plays a still stronger part, so that the dream represents a tendency of the unconscious which seeks to change the attitude of the conscious mind. Such a dream would be possible only when the unconscious influence is stronger than the conscious one and, naturally, such a dream would make a particularly strong impression on the dreamer. Fourth, the dream described by unconscious processes which has no relation to the conscious mind. Such dreams give the impression of utter strangeness and impress the dreamer deeply. Dreams of this category have the nature of a sudden inspiration, or appear oracular, or as what the primitive calls a "big dream", or as what the ancients call a "*somnium a deo missum*".

When we differentiate the various stimuli which can influence the contents of dreams we find a number of them. Somatic sources can affect a dream content in such a way that certain disturbances in the body or certain physiological conditions of the body can appear in dreams as, for example, hunger or thirst or the sexual urges. As a second category there are the facts in the external environment which come into the dream, physical facts like sounds, church bells or a pistol shot. Such physical factors have been investigated carefully by the Norwegian, Mourly Vold, and also by the Frenchman, Maury. A third category are the psychological facts which can come into dreams. Psy-

chological facts of the environment may be illustrated by the psychological problems of the parents which appear in the dreams of the children. These most probably come into the system of the child by subliminal perceptions. Jung gave an example of a small child who dreams that her mother was going to commit suicide — the dreamer woke up and rushed into her mother's bedroom only to discover that the mother was, in fact, attempting suicide. When we think of the time factor connected with dream elements, two more categories of sources of dream elements can be discriminated; namely the experiences of the past and the experiences which may occur in the future. Jung has shown particularly with children's dreams that they often foretell the future development of the child. But future developments can be anticipated in dreams also later in life and I should like to quote one particularly impressive dream Jung observed in a middle-aged American patient. This dream came with surprising suddenness, its meaning only became clear later. The dreamer was alone in a house, it was evening and she began to close all the windows. Then she went to lock the back porch door, but there was no lock to the door, so she tried to push pieces of furniture against the door in order to block it against intruders. The night grew darker and darker and more and more uncanny. Suddenly the back porch door was flung open and a black sphere came in and moved forward until it had penetrated her body. The house was the patient's aunt's house in America. She had visited her aunt in that house more than twenty years before the dream. The family was completely disrupted because of a conflict between its various members, especially with the aunt. The patient had not heard anything about the aunt for twenty years. The striking fact was that about ten days after the dream the patient received a letter from America informing her that the aunt had died at exactly the time of this dream.

In arriving at a possible meaning for a dream, another number of facts must be considered. Dreams are never simple photographic reproductions of events that happened previously; there are always minor alterations made by the dream as over against the actual facts of the happening. In a dream where a patient perceives the doctor, the image seems to be really of the doctor as he actually looks. Upon closer inspection, however, both the dreamer and the doctor discover that a little difference can be seen so that it becomes doubtful whether the image actually means the doctor as he is, or whether the dream has not shifted the emphasis from the facts known about the doctor to some observation the dreamer made about him which had little to do with him. In other words, the image is a projection the patient has about the doctor. As far as we know there is only one exception to the rule that dreams are never simple repetitions of previous happenings; the exception is the "shell-shock dreams" which were frequent neurotic phenomena occur-

ring during and after the first world war. In these dreams people who had been under gunfire and had either been wounded or covered with dirt by an exploding shell kept repeating their experience in their dreams over and over again.

Secondly it has to be borne in mind that the dream illustrates unconscious contents which may either have lost their original connection with the consciousness, or may never have had any such connections. Thirdly the dream may show contents of the personality which have not been uncovered in the life of the dreamer up to that time; the dream thus may portray particular qualities in the dreamer's personality which may develop in the course of time. All three of these statements actually boil down to the fact that there is an autonomous factor at work in dreams which has great freedom in portraying facts of the past, present and future, and is capable of showing things the conscious mind cannot possibly know or may have forgotten completely. I only have to remind you of certain cryptomnesias to link this statement up with observations made in psychology and psychopathology.

Now when it comes to the matter of the technique for analysing dreams, I need first of all to emphasize that it is almost impossible to analyse a single dream properly, and that it is much better to attempt dream analysis when a series of dreams of the same dreamer are available. There are important reasons for this: A series of dreams is usually not a sequence where one dream is the result or product of a preceding one, in such a way that A of necessity produces B and B of necessity produces C, and so on. But the arrangement in a series — if there is any — is a concentric one; the various single dreams of a series deal with one and the same central problem and thus group themselves around this problem. Moreover, a series of dreams give a number of different aspects of one and the same situation in such a way that one dream gives one aspect and another dream another, so that through the series the situation becomes clear. Under analytical conditions the interpretation of dream A may have been quite good and still not absolutely satisfactory or convincing. Then dream B may well add whatever has been overlooked in the interpretation of dream A and thus make up for the lack of completeness. This characteristic of dreams to circumbulate about a problem is illustrated by the behaviour of an individual who is confronted with a situation about which he knows next to nothing. Think of a man lost somewhere in an unknown country or in the jungle. If he is wise he will try to find out more about his situation by investigating the area in sections or by going around his camp in ever-widening circles. This is somewhat like the method nature has used in describing the unknown aspect of a certain situation by giving a person news about it from various points of view.

Now having dealt with these preliminary matters, we may be pre-

pared to say something about the technique of the interpretation of dreams. First, it is essential to get a complete description of the actual situation of the dreamer. Then, an investigation into the preceding experiences of the dreamer in the conscious realm must be carried on. Next, it is necessary to collect what is technically called the context. The context consists of all the associations and the material of subjective nature the dreamer is capable of contributing to the text of the dream. It may well be that if there is an archaic motif in the dream the possible mythological or folkloristic parallels will have to be studied. We shall presently go into the importance of this feature. Whenever dreams occur in the course of an analysis it may become essential that not only your analysand produces the contents of his conscious and, if possible, unconscious mind but that the analyst may have to do the same thing. This most certainly is of vital importance whenever the analyst plays a part in the analysand's dream. If the situation is complicated, the analyst would need to get information of an objective nature about the dreamer's situation from other sources, the dreamer's wife or husband, family, etc.

Let us return for a moment to the necessity of producing parallels of mythological nature to the archaic motifs in the dream. This practice is typically Jungian and its theoretical justification lies in the fact that whenever the dream is not clear, it becomes wise to use the method of amplification in order to interpret the particular motif to the point where its meaning becomes clear. The method of amplification actually rests on the fact that the meaning a dream has is not known and cannot be known in advance. This is the opposite of the Freudian idea that actually we know very well what is hidden in a dream and that a dream, the meaning of which is hidden, is no more than shadow boxing. Freud thought that a dream is the guardian of sleep because the infantile tendencies of our unconscious which are incompatible with our conscious attitude become alive during sleep; and they have to be blurred by a dream in order not to stir up too much and interfere with sleep. If this were so, the method used in the Freudian school would be perfectly correct, for the free association method actually is logically speaking a *reductio in primam figuram*. Now the Jungian method of amplification is the exact opposite of this; it consists in practice of a technique which goes as follows: the analyst asks the dreamer, "What comes to your mind in connection with this dream element?" Then, the analyst asks again, "and what else comes to your mind with regard to this dream element?" And the analyst continues to ask questions until he collects many thoughts of the dreamer concentrating upon the one element. In other words, the element is amplified by bringing in correlated material. Whereas in the free association method of Freud the first question is repeated for each answer. The answer to question

A is B. So the same question is asked of B, which results in the answer C, and so on for C, D, etc. By this the analyst leads the patient away from the original element until in the long run the final answer leads back to that original element. This is in a way the famous Aristotelian *anagoge* or logical reduction. On the contrary, the method of amplification is closely connected with the Jungian concept of the symbol where — as I noted earlier — the assumption is that a symbol always contains qualities unknown as well as known, qualities that transcend the ego, qualities which at the time could not possibly be known yet which have to be accepted, nevertheless, as existent.

Now, with all these premises in mind, I shall return to the American patient who dreamed that he had no luck fishing for trout with the conventional equipment and getting exasperated picked up a three-pronged spear lying nearby and immediately speared a fish. Here are a few particulars about this patient which describe his actual conscious situation and some of his previous experiences. The patient had been a very successful American businessman — a banker — of 56 years of age. When he came to the analyst he had been in a very serious melancholic depression for over three years and had been in various excellent American mental institutions where all possible efforts had been made to cure him. He was without any hope, he was completely paralysed and could not really speak or listen. He was literally dragged into the analyst's consulting room by his wife and he was quite unable to answer any of the analyst's questions. The analyst saw him once a day for perhaps twenty minutes or so, engaged in a kind of monologue in which the analyst tried to make him see that such depressions may have some deeper meaning and that it would be particularly helpful if he would tell of his dreams. But as he never answered any of the analyst's questions and appeared completely unimpressed by what the analyst's words were saying, he was always dismissed after a relatively short period of time. After about one week of this rather one-sided conversation his wife told the analyst that he had had a dream and that she had written it down for him; it was the dream I quoted earlier. From then on the patient had one dream each night for more than a week, at the end of which time he was cured and remained cured for the rest of his life. The outcome of this entitles us to attribute a major importance to the dream. We have to think of the connection between the lysis of the dream and the cure for it appears that the dream made a forecast of the latter. But in order to understand how such a thing is conceivable it will be helpful to use the amplification method, particularly with regard to one item in the dream. First, however, I want to say a few things about other elements in the dream. Fishing had been the patient's hobby, but the hobby no longer seemed satisfactory as he did not succeed in catching any fish; the reservoir di-



vided into compartments was a peculiar place, not only because it was not a usual arrangement but also because the water was stagnant. The stagnation was a very apt description of his paralysis. The various compartments meant that everything in life was neatly divided up and concealed; that is an illustration of what we are used to call "compartment psychology". But then something unusual happened, unusual for his present state or frame of mind. He got exasperated. This was an emotional reaction which took place spontaneously; it was connected with a faint realization of his inadequacy in respect to his situation. The literal meaning of the word "emotion" means "to be moved out of" something, namely, in that case, I would say, out of his paralysis. When he got emotional, exasperated, as he put it, there was a connection with his perception of the three-pronged spear. This was the culmination of the dream which brought in an entirely new element. The inference was that the spear had always been there but he had not seen it. Immediately after he became excited he did see it and the lysis followed as a matter of course in the spearing of the fine specimen of trout. Now, I consider the three-pronged spear to be the famous trident of Poseidon, or Neptune. I shall now try to show the importance this has in the case by using the amplification method; the importance comes because the image provides an explanation for the fact that this was a healing dream. The *triaina*, Poseidon's spear, is the main attribute of this Greek God. In other words, it is this God himself. Who is this God, then? He has a great many qualities which have to be found in amplificatory material. It is interesting to read what Homer has to say in the *Iliad*, (15, 189): "Windswift Iris of the Fleet Foot obeyed these orders promptly and set out from Mount Ida for sacred Ilium, dropping in her eager haste like the snow or chilling hail that falls from the clouds when a squall comes down from the bitter North. She went straight up to the great Earthshaker and said: 'Girdler of the World, god of the Sable Locks, I have come here with a message for you from aegis-bearing Zeus. He commands you to stop fighting, to retire from the field, and to rejoin the other gods or withdraw into your own sacred sea. If you disregard his explicit commands, he threatens that he too will come here in person to take the field against you. And he warns you not to come to grips with him, maintaining that he is by far the strongest god as well as your senior by birth. Not that that appears to deter you (he says) from claiming equality with him, of whom the other gods all stand in dread.'"

"The great Earthshaker was infuriated. 'This is outrageous!' he cried. 'Zeus may be powerful, but it is sheer bluster on his part to talk of forcing me, who enjoys the same prestige as he does, to bend my will to his. There are three of us Brothers, all Sons of Cronos and Rhea: Zeus, myself, and Hades the King of the Dead. Each of us was

given his own domain when the world was divided into three parts. We cast lots, and I received the grey sea as my inalienable realm. Hades drew the nether dark, while Zeus was allotted the broad sky and a home among the clouds in the upper air. But the earth was left common to all of us, and high Olympus too. So I am not going to let Zeus have his way with me. Powerful as he is, let him stay quietly in his own third of the world. And do not let him try to scare me with threats of violence, as though I were an arrant coward. He would do better to give his own Sons and Daughters a piece of his mind. He is their Father, and they will have to listen when he orders them about.’”

“‘Girdler of the World, god of the Sable Locks,’ said wind-swift Iris of the Fleet Foot, ‘do you really wish me to convey to Zeus this contumacious and peremptory reply? Will you not change your mind? It is a mark of excellence to relent. And you know how the Avenging Furies always support an elder brother.’”

“‘Lady Iris,’ said Poseidon the Earthshaker, ‘you are right in what you say. How excellent it also is for an ambassador to show discretion! But it galls me, it cuts me to the quick to be bullied and scolded by a god with whom Fate has decreed that I should share the world on equal terms. However, I will give in now, though not without resentment. But let me add a word of warning about my own feelings. If Zeus, against my wishes and those of the Warrior Athene, of Here, of Hermes and of my Lord Hephaestus, spares the citadel of Ilium and will not have it sacked, giving the Argives a resounding victory, let him know that there will be an irreparable breach between us two.’”

“With that the Earthshaker left the Archaean army, much to the regret of those gallant men, and withdrew into the sea.”

Poseidon is Zeus’ brother and the brother of Hades and the brother of Hera. When they divided up the World among themselves, Poseidon got the Sea, Zeus the Heaven and Hades the Underworld. They are equals, inasmuch as all three of them have the whole Cosmos and rule the Cosmos. Poseidon, more particularly, is the God of Earthquakes; he produces earthquakes by driving his trident into the earth. With such an act, the whole globe shakes. But Poseidon is not only destructive, he is creative inasmuch as each time he uses his trident, something creative like the welling up of a spring (e.g. Hippokrene) or the opening up of a valley (e.g. the Hellespont and the Bosphorus or the Peneus in Thessaly) happens. Besides this, Poseidon is the god of storms. He, also, is a stormy lover, has affairs with all sorts of creatures producing many offspring, so that he is creative also in this sense. He is the god of the earth and as such is responsible for fertility, in particular plant-fertility; he is in that respect called “*georgos*”, the farmer. Then he is a horseman par excellence and has created the first horse

by using his trident. Then he is called "*Genethlios*" — the father of men, particularly the Ionians and as such the father of the tribe and its protector. He has a number of other qualities, of minor importance; he is an oracle god, in Delphi, he is a doctor, the father of the two famous doctors in the Iliad, Machaon and Podaleirios. Now, from all these attributes we can see that he is a creative god and the trident is his main creative instrument. As such it has a typically phallic connotation. I want to point out in this connection that the Phallos in the Greek sense is never conceived of as being a symbol in the Freudian sense meaning only a *sema* for the male organ but that it means a real symbol in the Jungian sense, pointing at the power of creation in nature which is far from being understood, appearing to possess a mystical quality. So that — I think — we have to reach the conclusion that this amplification of the trident as *deus ex machina* gives us a much better chance to understand why the appearance of this divine element in the dream was found to have such an obviously healing effect.

Now, I also said earlier that it is difficult to analyse one single dream correctly and that it is much more preferable to venture to say something more conclusive about dreams if we have a whole series of dreams which can be cross examined and checked against each other. I want, therefore, to present one or two more dreams of this same dreamer. Here is the text of the second dream which took place the second night: "The dream began as I dropped my eye-glasses and broke them. I immediately got into a Ford car which was standing close at hand and drove off towards the optician's office (I never drive automobiles myself in conscious life). On the way I saw an old man, a respected friend and advisor of mine. I asked him to come with me which he did. On the journey to see the optician I told the old man of my worries and difficulties and received from him much good advice." Now I should like to compare the two dreams in respect to motifs. The dropping and breaking of his eye-glasses represents a conflict; it is to be likened to his unsuccessful fishing in the first dream. The glasses, in this case, were broken and that created a tension of some sort or an impasse, comparable to the emotion appearing in the first dream. At the impasse in this dream he got into a Ford car which was standing close at hand. So the Ford car had a similar function to the trident in the first dream, it came to his help, to his rescue. He began to be astonishingly active, compared to the absolute passivity he displayed in his depression; this was shown by the remark he made that in conscious life he never drove automobiles himself — he always used to have a chauffeur. Thus we can say that he got into motion, he became emotional as it were. Yet while the automobile was driven by him, the automobile is something which moves autonomously, not by conscious forces but by forces of a different sort. I noted that Poseidon was

a great horseman and charioteer; the automobile can, therefore, be compared to Neptune's chariot which is driven by his horses. The man the dreamer wants to see, namely the optician who is to mend his broken glasses, is in some way an allegory of the analyst, whereas the old friend he met and whom he called a respected friend and advisor would be like the "wise old Man". The friend and advisor, however, corresponds to the fish he caught in the first dream, inasmuch as the fish was the solution, the lysis, of the dream and in the second dream the lysis was the good advice he received from his friend. Now, with regard to this advisor I should like to come back to Poseidon who is the *halios geron*, the old man of the sea, and who interestingly enough has many of the qualities of the advisor in the old myths. As I said, Poseidon was an oracle god and a doctor and he was also related to the fish. From these two qualities of Poseidon I arrived at the conclusion that the old man advisor the patient met was closely connected with the Poseidon figure, thus closely connected with the fish in the first dream. Again I should say that the fish as well as the old friend both come to him spontaneously; in the first dream he seized upon the possibility given to him by Poseidon, and that in such a way something was achieved or came to him, or came back to him, which had hitherto been lost. In this sense, I think we have to interpret the fish in the first dream as a typical libido symbol and from the epicrisis of the case we know that this libido actually did come back to him shortly after he had the first dream. When I said that the wise old Man of the second dream was parallel to the fish of the first dream, I was reminded of a parallel which I find very interesting. I quote from the 18th Sura of the Koran, the scene where Moses and Joshua meet Kidher or Alkadhir:

"Remember when Moses said to his servant, 'I will not stop till I reach the confluence of the two seas, or for years will I journey on.' But when they reached their confluence, they forgot their fish, and it took its way in the sea at will. And when they had passed on, said Moses to his servant, 'Bring us our morning meal; for now have we incurred weariness from this journey.' He said 'What thinkest thou? When we repaired to the rock for rest I forgot the fish; and none but Satan made me forget it, so as not to mention it; and it hath taken its way in the sea in a wondrous sort.' He said, 'It is this we were in quest of.' And they both went back retracing their footsteps. Then found they one of our servants to whom we had vouchsafed our mercy, and whom we had instructed with our knowledge. And Moses said to him, 'Shall I follow thee that thou teach me, for guidance, of that which thou too hast been taught?'"

When the text says: "it is this we were in quest of," it means that the loss of the fish is a sign to those two of their finding him whom they seek, namely Alkadhir, the reputed visier of Dhulkanrein, the

two-horned, which is another name for Alexander the Great. He is said to have drunk of the fountain of life by virtue of which he still lives and will continue to live till the day of judgment. He is said to appear clad in green robes (hence his name, Khidder, the green one) to Moslems in distress; he promises longevity; and one of his outstanding qualities is that he is a very good friend of Dhulkarnein and therefore a friend and advisor of Moslems in general. As advisor he reveals divine secrets to his friends and he is to be met on the road as they hike along. This is exactly what happened to our dreamer; he met his friend and advisor on the road. Alkadhir is likened also to Elijah who was immortal and who went to heaven on a fiery wagon. Khidder, by the way, still has a maritime character with the Mohammedans; in the folklore he is called the Khawwad-al-buhur — the one who traverses the seas — and as such is the patron of the sailors who still sacrifice to him when a new boat is launched. The loss of the fish in the Sura quoted would correspond to the loss of the instinctual soul or of the psychic energy in the dreamer of our case, which accounts for his being so tired and so depressed; whereas the fish he catches in the first dream would then be the opposite, namely the new life gained, or rebirth, as it were. In the myth of the Australian aborigenes, the *al-jiranga-mijina*, the fish in its archetypal aspect is thought to be the animal ancestor of the tribe, or, in other words, the totem animal of the tribe, just as Poseidon — as I mentioned earlier — is the ancestor of the Ionians.

The return of energy in the psychological sense was indicated over and over again in the series of dreams which the patient had. I shall only give three more examples. The fifth dream said: "In this dream I went to the railway station, apparently the Hauptbahnhof in Zürich, to receive a large amount of money, which had to be taken from the station to one of the banks. I made several trips but before doing so I arranged for a guard to follow me on the street, keeping a little way behind me. After one or two trips I glanced around and I could not see the guard, so I quickly turned around and went back to the station. Then I found the guard sitting down on a comfortable bench in a small park. I accused him of neglecting his duty; I was quite bitter in my remarks to him. His only reply was that the arrangement was foolish since there was no danger of anyone in Zürich attacking me." And in the 7th dream he said: "I was standing on the Fifth Avenue in New York City watching the return of the Rainbow Division from the great war. I saw many old friends in the marching troops. After the parade had ended several of us met for dinner. Among the party was a very humorous officer who made prophecies about our future. Some of his remarks were very funny — but he did not get to prophesy my future before the dream ended." And at the end of this whole series, he had the following dream: "I went to the home of the



great male eels somewhere in the South Atlantic. I watched billions of eels starting home and could see them in the water as far as the horizon." With regard to the last dream I should like to make only one remark. The homing of the eels is one of the most astonishing phenomena in nature — as you may know some individuals among the many eels stop feeding in the autumn and become silvery; then these silver eels descend to the sea and travel across the Atlantic to breed in an area southeast of Bermuda; they die after breeding. Larvae called *Leptocephali*, which are transparent, travel back to Europe in the course of two and a half years' time. It has been proved that these larvae find their way back to the same waters from which their long-dead parents came when they started on their honeymoon trip to the Bermudas. In view of this fact I think we may safely draw the conclusion from these dreams that the instinct is infallible and energy will find its way back to the dreamer in due course.

## IV

### *Psychology and Religion*

It may be out of place for me to apologize for dealing with this subject but there are one or two reasons for doing so. William James dealt with the Variety of Religious Experience as a psychologist and was a pioneer in the subject. C. G. Jung dealt with the same topic some thirty-five years later in his Terry lectures. Thus two of the most competent people have dealt with this theme and I expect that their work is well-known. I am not able to speak as competently as they did. Another reason for making my apologies is that I am a dilettante in one of the two parts of the theme, the theological. On the other hand there are grounds which give me some assurance as I proceed. In analysis and particularly in Jungian analysis, religious problems appear very clearly. Then for nearly twenty years I had been dealing with the institute of incubation as it was practised in Greek and Roman times so that I have been highly preoccupied with the irrational or the religious aspect of healing. When I studied the records of this incubation rite I came across the fact that in the Hellenistic period and later on in Christian times people who have devoted themselves to the cult of a certain deity were called "*therapeutes*"; which is our modern word therapist. Today analysts are called "psychotherapists" which would mean people devoted to the cult of the psyche. Although the psyche is no longer a goddess in our day, the Latin equivalent of the Greek word, "*anima*", meaning soul, is considered to be of a semi-divine nature. When Tertulian spoke of the "*anima naturaliter christiana*" there is reason to doubt that he was sure the human soul is naturally Christian. If human nature was said to be Christian, the statement would logically lead to pantheism which is not Christian.

Jung in his work discovered what he calls a religious factor in nature. He found it in dreams and dreams are products of nature. On this basis it appears that there is such a thing as a religious instinct. Now theologians may be deeply disappointed or scandalised by such a statement since it appears to be a new version of the old *medical materialism* of William James. But William James in 1901 and 1902 showed that the idea that various religious phenomena are "*nothing but*" the effects of certain chemical changes in a person was in no way satisfactory. And such is certainly not Jung's idea. When he says that there is a religious instinct innate in man he is not speaking in terms of medical materialism. Since 1912 when he published his book, "Symbols and Transformation of the Libido" and more particularly since 1937

when he gave the Terry lectures at Yale, he has provided evidence for the fact that religious factor is something *sui generis*; that it exists in the same way as other instincts exist which means that they cannot be reduced to anything more elementary.

In Greek Antiquity there was the belief that dreams are *somnia a deo missa*, that is, dreams sent by God. The idea that man's soul or his unconscious serves under certain conditions as the door through which the divine or religious element is capable of reaching his conscious mind has always been believed. If man's soul has a divine spark in it, or in other words, if it participates in any way in the realm which transcends the conscious self it is a ready made instrument for that purpose. There are certainly other channels to the transcendent realm; records from the past are full of instances and ways in which man has participated in this realm. Aldous Huxley's book "The Perennial Philosophy" and William James' book, "Varieties of Religious Experience" give many examples of the ways such phenomena take place. To deny the possibility of a variety of ways by which man is related to the transcendent is either to place a limitation on the religious factor or a limitation on the functions of the human soul or psyche, in particular the unconscious psyche. This suggests why in the Freudian system there is no room for an autonomous religious function. In Freud's system the unconscious and its products are looked upon as being only a facade so that they always have to be reduced to more basic roots or elements. Consequently, the Freudian system has to be understood as an impressive yet effective method for doing away with the unconscious. Unconscious products have to be unmasked because they never mean what they appear to mean, and a person who has undergone such a treatment, will feel liberated from many useless, silly and superstitious pre-occupations.

Jung has said that he has never really cured a patient in the second half of life unless, in the course of the treatment, that person found access to the religious function. As this statement was made as a result of Jung's vast experience, we simply are compelled to believe it. The difficulty is that the two concepts, the healing of the patient and the religious factor *sui generis*, are not clearly defined. For this reason, if we are to advance our understanding of our subject, we shall need to make some further investigation.

The concept of the healing or the cure is complicated. In order to illustrate how complicated it may be I use the case of a neurosis with a simple, clear-cut symptom with which I was involved during the early years of my private practice. During the second year of my practice as a psychotherapist I was consulted by a man who suffered from impotence. The man bored me intensely. When he told his story I discovered that he was absolutely uneducated and completely stupid. I

realized that it would be impossible for me to have a decent discussion with him; I let him talk on and at the end of an hour's interview I dismissed him with a few palliative words. I never saw him again. But from that time on, in regular intervals of one year, five other men came to consult me for the same complaint. When the last one came, I decided that I was going to find out what the strange coincidence was all about. So I asked this man how he happened to have come to me. He replied that when he told a friend of his physical disability the friend suggested that he see Dr. Meier in Zürich since he cured him of the same thing in one session and subsequently did the same for four other men whom he knew. Such an experience presents quite a problem. It might be said that the cures which took place in five of those men were due to suggestion, that my fame as a miracle-working doctor was really the cause. But that would not account for the cure of the first man. Or, as another illustration of the complexity of a cure we may be reminded that many patients who consult a doctor for this or that neurotic symptom and are cured sooner or later begin to develop what is called a transference; that is, for those patients the analyst begins to represent the "Healer" with a capital H. The doctor may be tempted to make it clear to his patient that he is not the healer and that the idea that he is is an illusion, but such a dealing with the matter will not work. It absolutely is essential for the doctor to take the projection very seriously and actually make it a major issue in his subsequent work. The point here is that in mental illness it is practically impossible to do, what I would call, combating the sickness. Instead, the analyst, by going along with the sickness engages in the process which is at work in the patient. The doctor learns that the sickness is something of what the Ancients called a "divine sickness". But this appears to suggest the age-old belief that sickness not only is a punishment but if it is approached in the right way it can lead to a change of the old being or to an entirely different existence. However, a neurosis can no longer be explained causally, resulting from a lack of the religious factor. If that were the case, pious people would never be neurotic; which is not true. This theoretical conclusion, confirmed by practical experience shows that the religious factor cannot be introduced by medical means in such a way as to do away with the neurosis. Freud is right in many cases in assuming that a neurosis can be causally traced to conflicts of early childhood, and that shows that there is no religious problem involved. If it were possible to proceed by introducing the religious factor as a substitution for the illness, the implication would be that a whole neurotic or psychotic condition had actually developed from the beginning in order to compel the patient to accept the religious demand. This would be to declare that the sickness as such was unreal and only a neurotic arrangement in Adler's sense. Not only would the

sickness in this way be degraded to something completely wrong thus devoid of any deeper meaning, but it would also suggest that all sickness is only a neurotic arrangement imposed on a person; and that is a contradiction in fact. From this contradiction alone the conclusion that what is hidden actually behind the sickness, the neurosis as an *unknown* complex, must follow. This is further shown by Jung's assertion that a real cure is reached only after the religious factor has been assimilated for this takes place only after a long period of work. Since such a long time and so much effort are involved in order to bring about the realization of the existence of the religious factor, the factor itself must be then unconscious.

This reminds me of a remark Jung once made: "the astonishing fact about the unconscious is that it is really unconscious" which means that it cannot be reduced to anything well-known. It would consequently be methodically wrong if in view of Jung's finding that the religious factor is indispensable in a cure, a doctor were to try to *à tout prix* extricate it like the Manichean spark of light out of the unconscious matter. This would be a *petitio principii* and would be wrong for many reasons. The more important of these would be that an analyst who was prejudiced in such a way would never be capable of dealing adequately with a manifold variety of cases. A person who used his own panacea could never be an analyst as in his work with other people he would only prove the reality of his own monomania and thus project his own complex into everybody and everything. Moreover, since the religious factor is subjective reality and since a person needs this factor in order to be cured he must discover it himself as the result of his own personal research and effort. In the effort the analyst can accompany him carefully and in a subtle way, for only so will his discovery have the necessary convincing quality. The analyst can accompany the patient in this search only if he has made the journey himself. But if the search is successful that would point to the fact that the discovery of the religious element is the product of the sickness and the treatment. Such a result can be expected only on condition that the analyst and the patient ask about the purpose of the suffering.

Many religious people used to think of disease or a stroke of bad luck as something sent by God. I should think that such an idea makes a lot more sense than the idea that bad luck or disease is caused by blind fate or by the stars. Even so, to believe that God sends diseases is to believe in a god who plays a rather dubious part in life. This was the idea men had of Jahweh in the old days. He kills and cures; He is the one who says in (Vulgate) Isaiah 45:67, "*Ego dominus et non est alter faciens bonum et creans malum.*" But the same thing was true of Apollo and even of the Christian God up to the baroque period; the statues of God portrayed Him sending his plagues with bows and



arrows. In antiquity there is also the healing god who is himself sick or wounded; this motif is closely connected with that of the poison as medicine or the weapon which serves as the cure. In Richard Wagner's *Parsifal*, "only the spear that cleft can close the wound." Such mythologems cannot be explained rationalistically as threats used by priests with the thought that, "God made you ill, so restore your faith and he will cure you in gratitude." Patients are usually more sophisticated than that. They would be inclined to accept the explanation that the sickness is something self-inflicted. However, this would also be a rationalistic or causalistic conception. Psychologists have learned that there is no such simple connection between *causa morbi* and the medicine. To know this is important from the point of view of mental hygiene for the following reason: if it were possible for a person to make himself sick and also to cure himself he would be like one of the gods I mentioned who have both powers; and this god-likeness would be a very dangerous thing inasmuch as it would show that the person not only had a neurosis but that he also had some kind of a megalomania.

The goal of the integration of the religious factor can be reached when a creative use has been made of the disease, in other words, when the disease has not only been successfully combated but when it has been made a meaningful part of the patients' life. This is not a simple thing to achieve for it is not easy to understand the deeper meaning of a neurosis. But to speak of a deeper meaning amounts philosophically to speak of the *causa finalis*. Psychiatrists are much more in danger of being impressed with the non-sense mental diseases produce so that it is difficult for them to see sense in such things. This continues to be true even after Jung's discovery because, by applying the Jungian technique, the psychiatrist can understand what the patient wants to say but the strange bizarre style the patient uses and the reason why the patient seems compelled to express himself so enigmatically remains unexplained. It is interesting to note that, in the few papers Jung wrote about Psychology and Psychotherapy of Schizophrenia, he said that those diseases have the same function as other mental disturbances, namely that they are a pushing through into consciousness of collective unconscious material, and that as such they are equivalent to a compensatory reaction of the unconscious, compensatory with regard to the conscious attitude or "Weltanschauung". If this is so, it is necessary to work with schizophrenic patients constructively, so that the destructive demons may be changed into something really creative and the patient helped to build a new personality. In recent days much has been said about the analytic treatment of schizophrenics, but as far as I know, such a view with regard to the cure has never been mentioned. The *telos* or the meaning of the disease does not seem to worry the psychiatrists who deal with the treatment of schizophrenics; and

they seem to be satisfied with the causalistic-reductive interpretation of their cures.

Personally, I have had a limited experience with the analytic treatment of schizophrenics and all my cases date from the early thirties when there was little known about the subject. But I should like to quote one of my cases. I was at the time a young intern at the Psychiatric Clinic of Zürich University "Burghölzli" and in my early years of analysis with Jung. I was very enthusiastic and eventually took a few patients, typical schizophrenics, into analysis. The case I report was that of a young man who had been confined for seven years. When I took on the ward he was in, my predecessor warned me to never approach him because he was so aggressive and dangerous. He was a catatonic schizophrenic who stood in the corner of his room, practically immovable, for almost 24 hours a day. When I first saw him I could not believe that condition for the reason that in the patient's eyes there was a certain kind of warmth and a human expression which did not fit with the rest of his appearance. When I visited him the next day I went up to him and stretched out my hand in order to shake hands with him; to my astonishment he immediately reacted, took my hand, held it for some time, although he did not say anything. The next day I took him to my room. This created tremendous excitement among the hospital personnel. However, the visit went well; I talked to him and he began to talk, which he had not done for years. He told me his problem which was that there was a cleft between the two halves of his brain. The right and the left half were separated and the left half consisted of silver-ore whereas the right one consisted of coal. This fact, he said, accounted for his condition. In the course of the next few days he continued telling me about his delusional system. I took him out to the park, went for walks with him and discussed this system and his dreams. After a few days what you would call an analytical situation was created. A day or two later he told me that something had happened in his brain; that in the cleft between the right and the left halves a flower had started to grow, a blue flower. Strangely enough, from that moment on the patient could be regarded as cured. He was shortly afterwards dismissed from the Clinic. Eight years later I met him on the street. He looked extremely well; he told me all that had happened since we had seen each other last. He had worked regularly. He introduced me to a young lady who he said was his fiancée. Upon taking his leave of me he said: "Well, Doctor, if I hadn't lived through this, I wouldn't believe what good can come from such a disease". The way in which he said this and the expression on his face made absolutely clear that he had been capable of assimilating the whole psychotic experience in a creative way, that he was deeply grateful for the experience, and that he was looking at it in a religious way. I was convinced

that the man was cured, that he was healed, a word synonymous with "whole". I was reminded of Saint Ignatius of Antioch who said in the Epistle to the Romans 6:2: "Once arrive there I shall be a man" — *anthropos esomai*. Using the mythologem contained in Appollodorus who gave the text of an Appollon oracle: "*ho trosas iasetai*" — He who wounds will also cure — I would say that the catatonic schizophrenia of my patient was at the same time his specific remedy; the disease acquired the dignity of medicine. This is the old homeopathic conviction of *similia similibus curantur*, where the poison is the remedy. There is a tremendous psychological problem involved in this and it is hard for analysts to learn that the principle of this *trosas iasetai* actually has to be carried to its extreme in some cases. The extreme being that the patient becomes the doctor and the doctor the patient. Upon this paradoxical situation I have to say more later.

To speak of a patient as becoming whole calls to mind another puzzling statement made in the texts of ancient incubation rituals which appears rather pagan. According to the ancient idea the two concepts of *nosos* and *penia* are practically synonymous: *nosos* meaning disease and *penia*, poverty; likewise *hygieia* and *plutos* are synonymous: *hygieia* meaning health and *plutos* plenty. In Swiss German, when we ask a patient what he is suffering from, we say, literally translated into English, "what is it you are lacking of," which is exactly *penia*. While a man who is healthy has plenty — *plutos*, he is whole. In the ancient temple medicine, *theurgic medicine* there was only one possibility of cure: that the god who wounded or sent disease or was himself diseased or wounded personally interfered. A divine intercession always took place when the patient in the temple of Asklepios was cured. Recall the dream of my American patient in which Poseidon made an epiphany in the guise of his trident and the cure took place almost immediately after that epiphany. For many years writers and people have thought that in the old theurgic clinics in Antiquity there was a medical staff. This is definitely wrong. The cures were irrational and exclusively religious. There was no causal therapy whatsoever, but instead of the principle of causality, there was a principle of analogy, the same principle upon which later homeopathy rests, *similia similibus curantur*. When it comes to the question of the integration of the religious factor as being a *conditio sine qua non* of the cure, there is a parallel in antiquity where the patient who has been cured in the temple of Asklepios has to make an offering to the god in such a way that he is related to the god for good. From then on the ex-patient is known as a "*religiosus*". It is significant to see that through the millenia certain correspondences regarding the criteria of healing remain the same.

Now we are to look at the Poseidon dream in light of the compensatory function of dreams and note how that applies. The dreamer was

in an apathetic condition and was not capable of any strong psychological reaction. In the dream he got "exasperated" — in other words, emotional, and (*emotio* means "to be moved out of" something) sought release from the paralysis, whereupon he immediately realised that he was given the instrument he needed, the trident. In such a way the compensatory meaning becomes quite clear. The patient only had to let himself be sufficiently annoyed by his state of inefficiency and the help appeared. I would not insist that this dream is in any obvious way bringing in a religious theme or motif but I would note that the helpful element in the dream was represented in a divine attribute, even though it was a pagan one. It may not be merely coincidental that the help came first by a pagan or ancient motif. We might ask ourselves why the help did not appear in the Christian way of the miraculous Draught of Fishes, which is a motif of venerable age. All we can say is that obviously a still further regression was needed in order to let the patient finally find access to his energy and to make it possible for him finally to catch the content of the stagnating condition of his unconscious, the fish whom he will be able to assimilate, to eat, to integrate into his own system. In the end, the patient did catch the fish, as you will remember.

I need also to point out, that the use of an obviously *pagan* symbol instead of a Christian one can be explained by the principle of compensation, because what the patient needed most was a more emotional, more primitive, more instinctual reaction. In any case I would maintain that the trident must be regarded as a divine intercession, if only for the absolutely decisive part it played in the cure of the disease. Only the later development of the case could show whether the patient was able to relate to this divine element and in such a way develop a religious attitude; although this does not mean that he would be a church-goer but simply that he would rightfully claim for himself the ancient term, *religiosus*. Such an effect can be observed rather frequently which is why Jung made the statement that he has never cured a patient really unless the patient has found access to the religious function within.

Now to come back to the concept of compensation in the Jungian sense: I think that what it really means is that the unconscious products as soon as they have been assimilated into the conscious system counter-balance insufficient or wrong conclusions or actions of the conscious mind in such a way that a balance or an equilibrium is produced.

I want, now, to discuss the concept of compensation at some length because it has given rise to many misunderstandings. Compensation can be likened to what is nowadays well-known from cybernetics as the "regulating circuit" which is a device used in automation. This analogy can also be applied to certain biological actions, in particular to what used to be called a self-regulating system, but this serves only for a time in connection with the conscious system for the border of that is soon

reached. Norbert Wiener, the father of Cybernetics makes this clear in his book, "The Human Use of Human Beings", published in 1950, in which he makes fun of the purely rationalistic attempts to explain the higher functions of consciousness by saying: "to them there is no God and Marx is his prophet." As soon as there is a duality of the conscious and unconscious the analogy will not always work. In all the cases where something is lacking in the patient's system it could be conceived that the lack would be made up by the self-regulating process in the psyche; but such a process would only be a quantitative one and consequently would have to be called complementary rather than compensatory. A complement may be illustrated by the way an answer to a question is found: by increasing one's knowledge, by more experience, or by having an expert — a doctor or what have you — tell you the answer. This seems to be the case in almost all of the problems with which Freud or Adler deal. I must point out, however, that the general opinion regarding Adler's point of view is not quite correct. The popular belief seems to be that Adler's point of view is a finalistic one, e.g. what a person gains by his neurosis is supposed to explain its existence. Thus a successful analysis would make it impossible for the patient to stick to his fictitious goal, which would amount to the dissolution of the problem and thus be the cure of the neurosis. In my view this amounts to the correct solution given as the "output" of the computer, called analysis, as against the wrong one which the patient gave himself before he came to analysis and in support of which he needed the neurosis. Inasmuch as the true answer in such an Adlerian case is already contained in the system from the beginning, but is simply not wanted by the ego, this answer is not really finalistic — it seems rather to be identical with the cybernetic model. Philosophy would call this *immanent teleology* which would correspond to the principle of the regulating circuit. Over against this immanent teleology the concept of compensation in Jung's sense would be one of *transcendent teleology*.

The knowledge gained from observing the contents of the unconscious in the Jungian analysis has to be applied on the conscious system; this is done as the patient thinks about the elements and discusses them with his analyst. Jung has shown that if this method is applied ruthlessly it is possible to see that not only the conscious mind is changed but the unconscious as well, and this interplay begins to produce a new phenomenon which Jung called an *individuation process*. This development has a *telos*, a goal. This could not have been guessed either from the neurosis or from the patient, but it could have been prefigured long before its realisation in a symbolic way; it could be known that the goal was the totality or rather the completeness of the human personality. Earlier I have noted that completeness, wholeness, is synonymous with healing, and this with holy. It is to be expected that



in the moment such a symbol of the wholeness appears, something of the religious function is at the same time given in experience, since the religious belongs to wholeness of the human personality. Only retrospectively can it be seen that this goal, this *telos*, was a *causa finalis*; nor could this *causa finalis* be found had not the *theorem* of compensation been applied consecutively. The subjective experience connected with a religious phenomenon and with healing is actually one of transcendence and this transcendence is a new element which was not in the system from the beginning. At this point I remind you of the dream of the Dutch psychologist I reported earlier which is an excellent example of a dream wherein the symbol of totality of the human personality appears. This symbol is, in Jungian terminology, usually called a *mandala*, from the sanscrit word for circle. In the particular case the mandala was certainly a very particular one. The symbolism of that mandala was strikingly similar to a dream Jung described and commented upon in his Terry lectures on "Psychology and Religion". I quote what he has to say about that dream since his words apply almost literally to our case. I simply need to state that my patient's dream came two years before Jung's Terry Lectures and that my patient was a different type of a person from Jung's patient. The common denominator of the two is that they both have an extremely well developed intuition. Here is the text of the vision:

There is a vertical and a horizontal circle with a center common to both. This is the world clock. It is carried by the black bird. (The patient refers here to a preceding vision, where a black eagle had carried away a golden ring.) The vertical circle is a blue disk with a white rim, divided into  $4 \times 8 = 32$  partitions. A hand is rotating upon it. The horizontal circle consists of four colors. Four little men are standing upon the circle carrying pendula and the golden ring (of the former vision) is laid around it. The world clock has three rhythms or pulses:

1. The small pulse: the hand of the blue vertical disk moves on one thirty-second ( $1/32$ ) at a time.
2. The middle pulse is one complete rotation of the hand. At the same time the horizontal circle moves on by one thirty-second.
3. The great pulse: thirty-two middle pulses are equal to one complete rotation of the golden ring.

And now let me quote part of Jung's commentary on this dream: "It is, of course, difficult to understand why a feeling of 'most sublime harmony' should be produced by this abstract structure. But if we think of the two circles in Plato's *Timaeus*, and of the harmonious all-roundness of his *anima mundi*, we might find an avenue leading to an understanding. Again, the

term 'world clock' suggests the antique conception of the musical harmony of the spheres. It would be a sort of cosmological system. If it were a vision of the firmament and its silent rotation, or of the steady movement of the solar system, we would readily understand and appreciate the perfect harmony of the picture. We might also assume that the platonic vision of the cosmos was finally glimmering through the mist of a semi-conscious mental condition. But there is something in the vision that does not quite agree with the harmonious perfection of the platonic picture. The two circles are different in nature. Not only is their movement different, but their color, too. The vertical circle is blue and the horizontal one containing four colors is golden. The blue circle might easily symbolize the blue hemisphere of the sky, while the horizontal circle would represent the horizon with the four cardinal points, personified by the four little men and characterized by the four colors. (In a former dream, the four points were represented once by four children and again by the four seasons.) This picture reminds one immediately of medieval representations of the world in the form of a circle or of the *rex gloriae* with the four evangelists or of the *melothesia*, where the horizon is formed by the zodiac. The representation of the triumphant Christ seems to be derived from similar pictures of Horus and his four sons. There are also Eastern analogies: the Buddhistic mandalas or circles, usually of Tibetan origin. They consist as a rule of a circular *padma* or lotus which contains a square sacred building with four gates, indicating the four cardinal points and the seasons. The center contains a Buddha or more often the conjunction of Shiva and his *Shakti* or an equivalent *dorje* (thunderbolt) symbol. They are *yantras* or instruments of ritual for the purpose of contemplation, concentration and the final transformation of the yogin's consciousness into the divine all consciousness. No matter how striking these analogies are, they are not satisfactory, because they all emphasize the center to such an extent that they seem to have been made in order to express the importance of the central figure. In our case, however, the center is empty. It consists only of a mathematical point. The parallels mentioned depict the world-creating or world-ruling deity, or else man in his dependence upon the celestial constellations. Our symbol is a clock, symbolizing time. The only analogy to such a symbol that I can think of is the design of the horoscope. It also has four cardinal points and an empty center. There is, moreover, another peculiar coincidence: rotation is often mentioned in the previous dreams and this is usually reported as moving to the left. The horoscope has twelve houses that progress to the left, that is, anticlockwise."

From the motif discernable in my patient's dream and from Jung's

remarks on the dream of his patient, it is clear that we are dealing with a typical symbol for the totality of the personality. In my patient it was clearly a prefiguration of this totality, for outside of this system there was the figure of the anima who pointed at the system as if she was calling the dreamer's attention to the symbol, pointing in a way that deeply impressed the dreamer. This is the role of the mystagogue — naturally enough this part fits the nature or the function of the anima very well. Such mandalas play an important part in Christian iconography but they are not limited to this religion, for they are found in practically every known religious system. Jung found such a structure with the first patient he had, the girl who was a subject matter for his doctoral thesis. At that time Jung ventured the idea that the structure was a prefiguration of the totality of the personality which was not then understood. In most of the known religious mandalas the center is usually occupied by a symbol or the figure of a god. This is not so in the Taoistic or Lamaistic mandalas, particularly the Tibetan ones, where the center is occupied by the "great void", an empty space. One might be tempted to conclude that a structure without the representation of a god in it was empty in the religious sense of the word; but this is most certainly not so, at least not subjectively in the individual case. The very contrary actually is true, for the dreamers are always very deeply impressed by what Rudolf Otto called the numinosity of this image or vision. The numinous belongs to the few most characteristic qualities of a religious experience and whenever a patient is as deeply shaken by a vision as was the case with the Dutch psychologist, the assumption can be made that the religious element has expressed itself in such an image.

In thinking of this matter we must not be prejudiced by any particular religious way or creed for, as I pointed out before, the imagery which may appear may not be in any way orthodox or dogmatic. Quite the contrary, for if it were orthodox it could be traced back to known contents of the consciousness and thus would not be a living symbol. A symbol according to the Jungian definition always contains elements which are known and more importantly elements which cannot be reduced to known facts. We can go so far as to say that a symbol which contains only conscious elements is no longer alive; it is a dead symbol inasmuch as all its contents have already been integrated into consciousness and, consequently, it will no longer contain any new possibilities or, in other words, be worthless for life. For this reason, it may be the shocking discrepancy with regard to well-known symbols in our religion that is responsible for the numinosity of a spontaneous product of the unconscious which can shake a person to the core.

I related earlier the illustration of the dream of a pious Catholic girl. Her older sister was in analysis which affected her deeply enough

to produce the dream which had a shattering effect on her because it was so heterodoxical. The dream was tremendously ambivalent in the fact that the dreamer's sister was represented as the mother of God in all her canonical garb. The ambivalence showed in the text when the dreamer did not know whether to call the image: sister, mother of God, fairy queen. Then there is the snake, which we know can be a symbol of the healing God, Asklepios, or of the evil principle or a symbol of the Saviour, as was the case with the Ophites. This ambivalence is an equivalent of the principle I pointed to earlier of the poison becoming the medicine. Another striking example is that of the "scepter of the Antichrist" which is a bishop's cross. The *episcopos*, the bishop is the person who sees to it that in his diocese Satan or the Antichrist has no place yet he it is who wears the cross. In the dream it was the sister, a woman, who played the part of the bishop. Now the sister who was the mother of God, was at the same time, in danger of using her power instead of, as is believed by the orthodox, being an *ancilla domini*, which is the exact opposite of power. From this it would seem that the dream described the existence of a tremendous temptation to misuse power — obviously power of a magic quality. This is exactly what it would mean if the power of consciousness was used for egotistic purposes. This is the reason why the cross, the scepter of the Antichrist, has to be given to the priests. Evil here is a relative entity and a human being has some kind of a choice which is a blessing as well as a curse and a good reason for praying: "lead us not into temptation". The subtle point here is that when it comes to making the choice man has no choice, he simply has to make it, trusting that it will be within the prefigured plan. All we can say with regard to this prefigured plan empirically is that it seems to exist and express itself in images, dreams, and visions where the symbol of totality appears. The existence of this totality has to be thought of as being *ante rem*. This pre-existing totality may well be likened to the divine *pronoia* since the *pronoia* was in pagan religion and in Christian, one of the essential attributes of God. The Jungian concept of compensation contains a principle which may be called the principle of omniscience — as there has to be some authority who knows everything — in order to make compensation possible. The subject of this absolute knowledge does not necessarily have to be an anthropomorphism; but it must be agreed that once the existence of such a complete or absolute knowledge is admitted — metaphysics is introduced. That is why I have said that the *physician* who deals with the unconscious in an analytic way is bound to become a *metaphysician*.

But this raises the problem of the immanence or transcendence of such a principle. To deal with this we must assume that there are *somnia a deo missa* — dreams sent by God. In view of the problem here I suggest that all man can do is to be religious in the original



sense of the word "*religio*" which as Jung has pointed out, is "careful observation". This practically amounts to "going along with the process," going along implying a relatedness to the facts revealed in dreams and relatedness referring to the position of the ego and the center of the drama. As long as the ego plays the primary part no real relatedness is possible. Only when the center plays the primary part and the ego begins to be properly related to it, is the person no longer egotistic, only then can he start from this superordinated center and engage in actions that will no longer be selfish or egotistic, only then will he *really* be related, not only to his true self, but also to his fellow-beings, and only then will he be able to give, *really give*.

Up to this point I have tried to make things rather simple by not talking about two points which in the practice of Jungian analysis are of primary importance. These two points which complicate the matter considerably are the phenomenon of transference, and the function of the symbol and the archetypal image. Transference is a special kind of projection occurring to some degree in every analysis but, as Jung says, fortunately only developing to a full length classical transference in a few cases. Those are the cases I mentioned earlier as being not satisfied with a symptomatic cure, but still needing more of analysis, still feeling a need to go on with the process. Once an analyst responds to such a demand he will have to deal with an utterly complicated situation in which he will find that the projections the analysand makes on the analyst go far beyond human dimensions. The patient will project the Saviour or the "wise old man" on the analyst, or if the analyst is a woman and the analysand a man he will project the "great mother" or some similar archetypal image. Such images are more than human; they are superhuman. The problem of how to reduce such projections, in other words of how to lead them back to their source in the dreamer, is a classical one in analysis. In the cases where the contents projected on the object can be relatively easily reduced to the dreamer's own system, the matter is simple enough. But when the image is superhuman the dreamer simply refuses to have the contents attributed to himself, either because his resistances are too strong or because the contents are simply beyond him. In such cases it is vitally important that both the patient and the analyst understand that the projection producing factor is actually trying to drive home to the patient that he has to deal with facts and powers which transcend him. The process thus becomes a matter of understanding and accepting the archetypal origin of such projections. Practically this means to accept the existence of a third entity, an entity which can neither be attributed to the dreamer nor to the analyst but which has to be regarded as a representative of the collective unconscious, or as an archetype of the collective unconscious. Jung calls this the *objective psyche*. Here again we have to be reminded



of the point I made earlier about the analyst's ability to handle such a case which is only possible when he has gone through the condition himself and has acquired a more balanced system of his own over against the more labile system of the patient. Here once more a deeper psychological justification for the principle of *ho troas iasetai* — he who wounds will also heal — can be seen. It is very important that both patient and analyst understand that at such a juncture they are actually dealing with something that is beyond them, for if they attributed this content to one or the other of them, either of them would be in danger of becoming inflated and consequently of losing adaptation to reality.

Now I come to the second point: Symbols of such power. Symbols representing powerful archetypes usually only appear when the actual situation is full of tension, when there is an impasse of some sort; this is clearly the case in a strong transference situation which goes beyond practical possibilities. Such symbols only appear when man finds himself in dire necessity and this is so because only when there is an extreme tension between opposites (example: the erotic projection on the part of the patient and the moral responsibility of the analyst) only when this is the case will saving grace come in and the symbol will be the saving grace inasmuch as it will provide man with the tertium which logically is not given. Jung says that symbols of this sort have a transcending function which simply means that they are able to reconcile the opposites. They produce a cooperation of the conscious and the unconscious systems or they make it possible to create a symbiosis of the two realms. As Jung says in "Psychological Types": "the birth of the symbol stops the regression of the libido into the unconscious. The regression becomes progression, the repression flux," and — again in the same book he says: "the stagnation of the vital powers is ended, life can go on and develop towards new goals with new forces" — *Habentibus symbolum facilis est transitus*. You will recall what I said about the trident of Poseidon having exactly such effects in the case of my patient. Many of these reconciling symbols show paradoxical qualities inasmuch as they embrace both thesis and antithesis. I would remind you of the symbol of my Dutch psychologist, the world-clock, in which as the light was pulsed, the light became matter, and the blood became light almost in the sense of a "subtle body" in such a way that the matter became immaterial and the immaterial became matter.

About the archetype I would say that the *archetype as such* cannot be represented, but will always appear in what Jung specifically calls an *archetypal image*. The archetypal concepts as such are not representable as long as they are not clad in such an image. In other words, the archetypal images are the representations of the archetypes as such;

the images translate physical facts into psychological images or into psychological language.

I need, now to emphasize one point: it is probably impossible to find a development such as that described in the many examples given by Jung for what he calls the individuation process, unless it is somebody who lives his personal myth. This means a person who goes along with this process, in such a way stimulating this process and this development by taking an active part in it, which is to show an interest which is properly called religious. Lately Jung expressed the view that the symbol of the Self, with capital S, which more or less coincides with the symbol of the mandala, coincides with the symbol of God. I quote what Jung has to say about this problem in "Psychological Types", page 314:

Veneration for the great natural mysteries, which religious language endeavours to express in symbols consecrated by their antiquity, significance, and beauty, will suffer no injury from the extension of psychology upon this terrain, to which science has hitherto found no access. We only shift the symbols back a little, thus shedding light upon a portion of their realm, but without embracing the error that by so doing we have created anything more than a new symbol for that same enigma which confronted all the ages before us. Our science is also a language of metaphor but from the practical standpoint it succeeds better than the old mythological hypothesis, which expresses itself by concrete presentations, instead of, as we do, by conceptions.

May I remind you that, whenever Jung talks about the problem of the symbol he talks from experience and more particularly from experience with his patients and himself. You must also note that the patients of modern psychotherapists are, practically all, persons to whom the collective symbols have become inefficient which is identical with the fact that their particular religion no longer holds the highest value for them. The collective symbols furnished to them by their religions have become dead. Most of such cases have been looking for new systems, preferably Eastern ones, as you know particularly in this country and the fact that they eventually take refuge in psychotherapy indicates that they have failed in that way to find their proper symbols. No substitute religion will do in their cases. I hope you understand that the Jungian solution is not a substitute for religion either — all it can do for such people is to try to make them find access to the symbol producing quality in their own depth. But the way such lost souls have to travel in order to arrive at a point where new symbols appear out of their unconscious is a *longissima via*, and is far from being a safe one or one that promises any definite solution. In any case the solution which will be found by the individuals who seek cannot be known in

advance; the unknown part or factor of the symbol must remain unknown. Then it must be said that such a goal of analysis is not meant for everybody and will become decisive only in comparatively few cases. But once we have witnessed the achievement of such a goal we will not escape the impression and conviction that to a lost soul in our day there is hope and possibilities even if they may appear to be para-religious possibilities. As doctors we cannot help being grateful for the help that comes to the rescue of our patients and ourselves.

To close I shall give another example from my own experience: it is a man who had been in analysis with me some years ago. The practical result of this analysis had been very successful and the man left gratefully at the end of the period of work. Then suddenly, after a year had elapsed, he appeared again in my consulting room because he had had a series of six dreams within a weeks time which interested him tremendously. I read the last of these six dreams to you but first I would like to give you the epicrisis of the case. I had to tell the man as the upshot of the series of dreams that he was obviously being reminded of the fact that he was going to die before long — he was at that time 64 years of age. He was shocked by this interpretation but eventually he faced it with equanimity. Exactly nine months later he died quietly of a stroke after having attended to all of his worldly affairs in view of his approaching death. He reported his last dream as follows: "At the base of a high rocky wall a huge fire of wood was burning. The flames rose high up into the air and there was much smoke. The place was lonely and romantic. High in the air a number of big black birds were revolving directly above the fire. Now and then one of the birds dove deliberately into the fire and as it died its color was changed into white." This dream, he added, had a strong and lasting effect. It is an unfortunate truth that Western culture has lost to a large extent the ritual preparations for death. The East certainly still has them. There is a touching example of how death is met with, not too long ago in China, in the book by Nora Waln, "The House of Exile". In Book I, Chapter 5, she describes how the elder of the house has a dream in which he saw his soul stand beside him, dressed in travelling clothes and carrying a scroll; thus he knew that his earthly scroll was filled. So through the seasons in which he continued in robust health he made ready to die and the family went through a long ceremony of preparing his tomb, his coffin, his death-bed and everything, most carefully. As you can see in this case, the unconscious produced most impressive symbolic images, the last of which most clearly gives the dreamer the certainty of rebirth or, as you would call it in Christian terms, the resurrection of the soul.